JOURNAL
of
CENTRAL EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

VOLUME XIV JANUARY, 1954 NUMBER FOUR

EDUCATIONAL REFORM IN POLAND IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

by Nicholas Hans

THE eighteenth century was the period of "enlightenment," especially in the fields of science, political economy, and education. The leading role in this movement was played by England and France. In education the aim was the establishment of a secular, state-controlled, national system of schools, with curriculum and methods adapted to the economic and industrial needs of the country. John Locke and the English economists and educational reformers showed the way, and the French philosophers and physiocrats in the *Encyclopédie* and separate publications elaborated still further on the fundamental ideas.

Especially important in this respect was the school of French physiocrats founded by Dr. François Quesnay. With his followers, Turgot, Dupont de Nemours, Victor Mirabeau, Baudean, Mercier de la Rivière, Mably, and others, he established the Economic Society of Paris in 1761. The group met often at the home of the hospitable Marquis Victor Mirabeau, and through his numerous visitors from all parts of Europe, knowledge of the movement was spread throughout the continent. A kind of social extension of this physiocratic society was the salon of Madame Marie Thérèse Geoffrin, especially popular with the Polish nobility. Stanislas Poniatowski was a frequent guest of Madame Geoffrin during the years 1752-53, often affectionately referring to her as "ma mère," and after his election to the Polish throne he invited her to Warsaw, where, in 1766, she was fêted by her numerous Polish friends.[1]

During this period the "speculative" Freemasonry, of English origin, was most influential among the French philosophers and physiocrats. The English ideas of empiricism, deism, constitutional government, and tolerance were accepted by the French masons, to which group most of the philo-

[1]See biography of Marie Thérèse Geoffrin in *Nouvelle Biographie Générale,* (Paris, 1852-66), *s.n.*

sophers and physiocrats belonged.[2] These ideas were carried back to Poland by the many Polish aristocrats who visited London and Paris in the middle of the century, for most of them were initiated into Freemasonry. Stanislas Poniatowski, the future king, and his brother Michael, later the Primate of Poland, were in Paris from 1752 to 1753. Stanislas went to London in 1753 and Michael was in Paris again in 1759. Ignacy Massalski, the prince-bishop of Vilna, was in Paris in 1767-68, and in 1771-73 was again in Paris and in London. Adam Casimir Czartoryski was in London and Paris in 1757, and during his second visit to Paris in 1774 he became a member of the Grand Orient of France. Ignacy Potocki and his brother, accompanied by their tutor, Gregory Piramowicz, completed their education in France. In 1770 Ignacy Potocki again visited Paris, taking with him Joseph Martinowitz, a professor at Lwow. Joachim Chreptowicz was in Paris in 1770. Stanislas Poniatowski, junior, nephew of King Stanislas Augustus, was in Paris and London from 1770 to 1773. Michael Minszek was sent to Bern in 1762 and later visited Paris with his tutor, Elie Bertrand. Julian Niemcewicz, who later went to America where he became an American citizen and an intimate friend of Jefferson,[3] spent many years in England and France. Franciszek Bieliński was in Paris in 1763. All of these men were closely connected with educational reform in Poland.[3a]

The Polish Educational Commission, 1773

In Poland, as in all other Catholic countries, secondary and higher education was controlled by the Church. The oldest Polish university, that of Cracow, was a church institution, and in Vilna a superior college, combining secondary and higher education, was founded by the Society of Jesus. The Jesuits controlled most secondary schools, with the Piarists ranking second in influence.

The Jesuit system was based on Latin eloquence, dogmatic orthodoxy, and Aristotelian philosophy. The national language, history and geography were entirely absent, and the sciences were usually approached through the reading of classical works in Latin. The ideas of Bacon, Descartes, Copernicus or Newton were very seldom included in the curriculum. There was a general dissatisfaction with this state of affairs, resulting in an embittered campaign in France against Jesuit domination in education, led by the Jansenists and the Oratorians. In Poland this campaign was fought by the Piarists and their famous provincial, Prince Stanislas Konarski. Following the example of the French *Oratoire,* Konarski introduced into Piarist schools the study of Polish literature and history, and of experimental science based

[2]Jobert, Ambroise, *Magnats polonais et physiocrates français, 1767-1774,* Paris, 1941.

[3]*The Jefferson Papers* (Mass. Historical Society, *Collections,* Boston, 1900, ser. 7, v. 1).

[3a]For information concerning all these Polish leaders, see Jobert, *op.cit.* For Bieliński, Czartoryski and Chreptowicz, see *Polski Słownik Biograficzny* (Cracow, 1935 ff.) For all other persons, see *Encyklopedja Powszechna* (Cracow, Wydawnictwo Gutenberga, (193-?) *s. n.*

on observation and laboratory work. Konarski sent Father Anthony Wiśnewski to London in 1750 for six months to study physics and to buy laboratory equipment.[4] Upon his return, Wiśnewski was appointed professor of experimental physics at the Piarist College of Nobles, and started teaching according to new ideas and methods. Professor W. Rose describes in his book, *Stanislas Konarski,* the gathering of scientists and men of letters in December, 1753. He states: "One man only, the Piarist professor of physics, Anthony Wiśnewski, gave more place to sciences than to the praise of the Virgin ... In his inaugural lecture, 'On the uses of the [proposed] Warsaw Academy of Arts and Sciences,' Wiśnewski said that the purposes of the Academy were: 'to introduce light into the political life, to foster criticism on rational lines, to release theology from unnecessary tasks, to raise the standard of mathematics and philosophy, and to restore to its one time purity our Polish speech, which we drank in with our mothers' milk'." (Rose, p. 49) Wiśnewski was forthwith accused of heresy by the orthodox party, and retained his post only through the spirited defence put up by Konarski and the Piarists.

It was evident that as long as the Jesuits dominated education the reform could be only partial in a few Piarist colleges, and could not develop into a national system. However, various developments succeeded in altering the situation. By this time the leading Polish aristocrats had returned from sojourns in England or France, inspired by the schemes of educational reform propounded by Encyclopedists and physiocrats. Stanislas-Augustus, elected King of Poland in 1764, surrounded himself with men of similar opinions. The reform of education required substantial funds, and the Polish physiocrats at first intended using the religious orders, especially Konarski's Piarists. The dissolution of the Society of Jesus by the Pope in 1773 in one stroke made available for secular government use all the Jesuit colleges and their properties. King Stanislas, in consultation with Massalski and Chreptowicz, decided to establish a national system of education controlled from the center by the secular government. Thus the Education Commission was created on October 14, 1773. Prince-bishop of Vilna, Ignacy Massalski, was appointed its president, and the following seven leaders were named its original members: (1) Prince-bishop of Płock, Michael Poniatowski, later Primate of Poland and resident of the Commission; (2) Prince Adam Casimir Czartoryski, General of Podolia; (3) Count Ignacy Potocki, Chairman of the Literary Committee and founder of the Grand Orient of Poland; (4) Count Joachim Chreptowicz, social reformer and historian; (5) Count Andreas Zamoyski, social reformer and founder of the first schools for peasantry; (6) Prince August Sułkowski and (7) Anthony Poninski. (Sułkowski and Poninski were not active in the work of the Commission.) Of these eight men Poniatowski, Czartoryski, Potocki

[4]Rose, W. J., *Stanislas Konarski,* London, 1929; Jobert, Ambroise, *La Commission d'éducation nationale en Pologne, (1773-1794)* (Paris, 1941). Also, see article on Wiśnewski in *Encyklopedja Powszechna.*

and Zamoyski were active masons; Massalski and Chreptowicz probably were also members, and Sułkowski and Poninski were close relatives of known masons (Marshal of the Seym Adam Poninski, and Prince Alexander Joseph Sułkowski).[5]

Later members of the Commission, Count Michael Mniszek, Julian Niemcewicz, Andreas Mokronowski, Count Felix Potocki, Ludwik Gutakowski, Anthony Lanckoronski and Franciszek Bielinski, were all active masons, and three of them, Potocki, Mokronowski and Gutakowski, were Grand Masters. Another influential man was assistant and secretary to Massalski, Stanislas Siestrzencewicz-Bogush,[6] who was the son of a Calvinist preacher. He completed his education in a Dissenting Academy in London, and after his conversion to Catholicism, he later became Primate of White Russia and President of the Russian Free Economic Society (*Volnoe Economicheskoe Oleschestvo*).

The French influence was evident in the personal association of the Polish leaders, and in the direct participation of many Frenchmen brought to Poland by Polish aristocrats. Mercier de la Rivière, in a memorandum on the reform in Poland, written at the request of his friend Massalski, advocated the ideas of the physiocrats on property, security, liberty, and universal education. Massalski brought with him on his return from France Abbé Nicolas Baudeau, mason, secretary of the Paris Economic Society, and editor of its journal, *Éphémérides du Citoyen*. Baudeau was active in Poland in the preliminary stages of the reform (1768-1772).[7] Two young French scientists, Robert Quesnay de Saint Germain, grandson of Dr. Quesnay and brother of Alexandre Quesnay de Beaurepaire, and Pierre Cabanis, friend of Franklin and Jefferson, later an influential member of French masonry, came to Poland in 1773 at Massalski's request and returned to France in 1775. Also summoned by Massalski was Nicolas Reigner, professor of medicine, who came to Poland in 1768 and played an important role in the work of the Commission. Michael Mniszek brought back with him his tutor Elie Bertrand, Calvinist pastor, mason, and secretary of the Bern Economic Society.[8] Bertrand stayed in Poland as Professor of the Medico-Economic Academy of Warsaw. Count Michael Wielhorski, although an opponent of King Stanislas and his circle, also indirectly influenced Polish reform. Educated in France, he represented the Confederation of Bar in Paris. It was at his invitation that Mably spent the winter of 1776-77 in Poland with the Bar Confederates, a visit which prompted the publication of

[5]For masonic connections, see Jobert, *op. cit.;* Małachowski-Łempicki, S., *Wykaz polskich Lóż wolnomulinarskich, 1738-1821* (Warsaw, 1929); *Allgemeines Handbuch der Freimaurerei* (Leipzig, 1901), and correspondence of Poles with Franklin and Jefferson in *Franklin's Papers* (American Philosophical Society, *Memoirs*, Philadelphia, v. 24, 1947), and *The Jefferson Papers.*

[6]Polovtsov, A. A. (ed), et al., *Russky Biograficheskiy Slovar* (St. Petersburg, 1896 ff.).

[7]Jobert, *op. cit.*, and *Nouvelle Biographie Générale.*

[8]*Nouvelle Biographie Générale*, and *Abhandlungen und Beobachtungen durch die Ökonomische Gesellschaft des Kantons Bern zu Bern gesammelt*, Zurich, v. 1, 1760.

his *De la situation politique de la Pologne.* Most important was Wielhorski's invitation to Rousseau to contribute a memorandum on the reform in Poland, resulting in the famous *Considérations sur le gouvernement de la Pologne,* published after Rousseau's death in 1782.[9]

Adam Casimir Czartoryski[10] was responsible for the most important contribution to Polish educational reform, the Cadet Corps. During his sojourn in London he studied science, literature, and education, and gathered information on the naval and military training offered in private English academies, particularly the Royal Mathematical School at Christ's Hospital. Upon returning to Warsaw in 1765, Czartoryski, together with King Stanislas, his cousin, founded the Cadet Corps, a military school which emphasized scientific training. He invited John Lind to be its director, and Simon L'Huillier its professor of mathematics.[11] They were both masons and had been recommended to Czartoryski by masonic friends. John Lind, a deist, established the scientific and secular tradition of the school, and was for seven years a most efficient and competent director.[12]

In 1774 Czartoryski invited Jean Dubois[13] to Warsaw as professor of natural history at the Cadet Corps. Dubois was a member of the Dijon Academy, and a French mason of the circle of French "philosophes." In 1777 he founded in Warsaw the *Société de Physique,* of which many Polish masons were members. Dubois also took part in the work of the Commission. In 1783 Czartoryski appointed as vice-commandant of the Cadet Corps Franciszek Wojna, diplomat and aide-de-camp of King Stanislas. Wojna was a deputy Grand Master of Polish masonry.

However, Czartoryski's greatest service to the commission was his success in enlisting the talents of Dupont de Nemours.[14] During his second visit to Paris in 1773, Czartoryski, who had long been a mason, probably having been initiated in England, became a member of the Grand Orient of France, met all the leaders of French masonry, and also his old friend Viscount Stormont. In Paris he made friends with the physiocrat, Calvinist, and mason, Dupont de Nemours, and invited him to Poland as tutor to his sons and as foreign secretary to the Education Commission. In this latter capacity, Dupont, together with Chreptowicz, presented a memorandum which served as a basis for subsequent legislation.

---

[9] *Encyklopedja Powszechna, s. n.*

[10] *Polski Słownik Biograficzny, s. n.,* and Miterzanka, M., *Działalność pedagogiczna Adama Ks. Czartoryskiego, generała Ziem Podolskich* (Warsaw, 1931).

[11] L'Huillier, a Calvinist and a mason, was professor of mathematics at Geneva before going to Warsaw in 1779 (*Nouvelle Biographie Générale, s. n.*).

[12] He was the son of a London doctor and a graduate of Oxford. Appointed chaplain to the British Embassy at Constantinople, he went from there to Poland in 1768, later returning to London with his pupil, Stanislas Poniatowski. Lind was an intimate friend and collaborator of Jeremy Bentham and F.R.S., 1773 (cf. *Jeremy Bentham's Works,* vol. X, *Alumni Oxon., D.N.B., s. n.*).

[13] *Polski Słownik Biograficzny, s. n.*

[14] Jobert, *op. cit.,* also *Nouvelle Biographie Générale, s. n.*

When Czartoryski had settled on his estate at Pulawa, he founded there a kind of private academy along the lines of English private academies. Dupont taught economics, L'Huillier instructed in mathematics and science, Norblin, a French painter, taught drawing, and two linguists, a Pole and a Dane, were teachers of classics and modern languages. (The Pole was Gotfryd Groddek, a known mason, who in 1804 was appointed professor of Latin at Vilna University.) It was in this private school that Adam George Czartoryski, more famous than his father, was educated. Besides the two sons of Adam Casimir, the sons of many neighboring aristocrats (e.g. Sapieha) and squires also attended the school.

Ignacy Potocki was appointed chairman of the Literary Committee of the Education Commission to revise and prepare textbooks and curriculum, and selected eminent men, most of whom were masons, to serve on his committee. Members of this group who were known masons included: Count Sebastian Sierakowski, canon of Cracow; Abbé Scipion Piattoli, an Italian from Florence and tutor of Adam Czartoryski, junior; Simon L'Huillier and Jean Dubois, mentioned above; Etienne Roussell, an ex-Jesuit; Michel Hube, German physicist and successor of John Lind as Director of the Cadet Corps; and Etienne de Rieule, French scientist and member of the Grand Orient of France. Abbé Gregory Kniazewicz, who quitted the Society of Jesus because of his Voltairian opinions, was evidently also a mason. He presented a memorandum on education, and was the most influential Polish member of the Literary Committee.[15] Because of his close association with Massalski he was known as the "mathematician of Massalski."

The Statute of 1783

Gregory Piramowicz, an ex-Jesuit and evidently a mason, became Polish Secretary of the Commission at the invitation of his former pupil, Ignacy Potocki. While in Paris he was friendly with Abbé Delille, D'Alembert and Condorcet. He was a known pedagogue and the author of the Statute of 1783, published under the title *Ustawy kommissyi educacyi narodowei dla stanu akademickiego i na szkoły w krajach rzecy pospolitej przepisane.*[16]

The Statute established a national system of education better adapted to the economic needs of the country than the previous Church system. France supplied the principles of state supremacy and secularism, while England's contribution was a new curriculum and new methods of instruction. The main features of the Polish reform are well known. The two universities were made the administrative centers of the commonwealth (*rzec pospolita*) — Cracow for Poland proper, and Vilna for the Lithuanian-

[15]Małachowski—Lempicki, *op. cit.*, and Jobert, *op. cit.*

[16]For the complete text of the *Ustawy*, see Łukaszewicz, Józef, *Historya Szkół, w Koronie i w Wielkiem Księstwie Litewskiem od najdawniejszych czasów aż do roku 1794* (Poznań, 1849-51); also Hans, Nicholas, *History of Russian Educational Policy, 1701-1917* (London, 1931).

Russian Grand Duchy. Both parts were divided into provinces and districts, each province having a complete secondary school (*wydzislowe szkoly*), often transformed from a former Jesuit college. Each district had an incomplete secondary school (*podwydzialowe szkoly*), equivalent to the first four years of the provincial school. The Rector of the University was the director of the whole system *ex-officio* and rectors of provincial schools were inspectors of district schools. As the foundation of this ladder, the Commission intended to establish parochial schools (*parafialne szkoly*) for the peasantry in each parish, but this part of the scheme was only defectively realized, owing to the internal and external troubles which finally resulted in the partition of Poland.

The curriculum of new schools had a marked scientific bias. The time-table of the seven years' provincial school devoted 41 hours weekly to Polish and Latin languages and literature, 12 hours to German language, 34 hours to mathematics, 4 to handwriting, 14 to history and geography, 9 to morals and civics, 29 to physics and natural science, 2 to logics, and 7 to economics. Scientific subjects represented 70 hours, literary subjects 41, and the intermediary subjects (history and geography, logics, morals and civics, German, and handwriting) 41. Religion was entirely absent, its place being taken by morals and civics. There were senior teachers for four major subjects: (1) Polish and Latin literature, (2) mathematics and logic, (3) physics and science, and (4) morals, law, history, and geography. In addition there were junior teachers for German, and, in some schools, for French and Russian. Certain features which stood out clearly were state control and regional subordination, and the secular character and scientific bias of instruction. The contrast of this system with the previous system of Jesuit colleges is striking. It was not only a reform; it was a total negation of the Jesuit system, although it was not directed against the Catholic faith. Sunday Church attendance was retained, and all denominations could have their respective clergymen as instructors of religion.

To make the reform successful, the Commission had as its first task to secularize and modernize the two university centers of Cracow and Vilna. In Vilna it was comparatively simple; with the dissolution of the Society of Jesus, its Superior College was taken over by the Commission and refounded on a secular basis. Marcin Poczubot, well-known astronomer, F.R.S., and member of the Paris Académie des Sciences, was appointed Rector of the College by Massalski and Chreptowicz.

With the old Church University of Cracow, the Commission had a more difficult task. The clergy was entrenched in all faculties and their modernization could be achieved, without a direct revolution, only by the representatives of the Church itself. As it happened, the Primate of Poland, Michael Poniatowski, brother of the King, and the Bishop of Cracow, Prince Nikodim Puzyna, were both masons and adherents of reform. They appointed as Rector of Cracow the famous canon, Hugo Kołłątaj, radical politician

and pedagogue. He was educated at the reformed University of Vienna and, while in Italy, was whole-heartedly an adherent of "enlightenment." After a bitter struggle with the orthodox Catholic clergy, Kołłątaj, backed by the Primate and the Commission, succeeded in appointing new professors and changing the organization of studies and administration.

Foreign scientists, many of them masons and some Calvinists, were appointed to new chairs, and even the old chairs of theology were filled by known secularists and masons. The following is a list of some of the new professors, all of whom were known masons:[17]

University of Cracow

(1) Jan Sniadecki, Professor of Physics. Educated at Göttingen and Collège de France, under Cousin. Friend of D'Alembert, Condorcet, and Abbé Delille, all French masons. Evidently was initiated in France.
(2) Joseph Bogucicki (baptized Jew Israel Berkowicz), Rector of Cracow School and Professor of Church History. Visited Paris and London. Was accused of heresy, but was defended by Primate Poniatowski and Rector Kołłątaj, and retained his chair.
(3) Lazarist Thomas Hussarzewski, Director of Diocesan Seminary and Professor of History.
(4) Franciszek Wansowicz, Professor of Philosophy. Member of the Paris lodge *Les Neuf Soeurs.*[18]
(5) Martin Fyalkowski, Professor of Literature.
(6) French chemist Berniard, Associate Professor of Chemistry. Member of *Les Neuf Soeurs,* friend of Marquis Francis Wielopolski, who after a long sojourn in Paris brought Berniard to Poland. Wielopolski was a known maecenas and founder of schools for peasants. Probably there were other masons at Cracow, but there is no direct evidence.

Vilna University

(1) Piarist Jeromy Stroynowski, Professor of Law.
(2) Piarist Joseph Bogusławski, Professor of Moral Theology.
(3) Piarist Michael Olechnowicz, Professor of Law.
(4) Franciszek Narwoysz, Professor of Mathematics. An ex-Jesuit, went to Germany, Holland and England, was initiated in England in 1779.
(5) Laurenty Gucewicz, Professor of Architecture.

[17] Jobert, *op. cit.; Polski Słownik Biograficzny, s. nn.; Encyklopedja Powszechna, s. nn.,* and Małachowski-Łempicki, *op. cit.*

[18] Amiable, Louis, *Une loge maçonnique d'avant 1789, la R.: L.: Les neuf soeurs* (Paris, 1897). (His name is misspelled in French sources.)

(6) Andreas Strzecki, Royal Astronomer. An ex-Jesuit, went to England in 1777 to buy astronomical instruments, met G. Forster and evidently was initiated there. Met Franklin in Paris.[19]

(7) Nicolas Regnier, Professor of Medicine. French mason and Protestant from Strasbourg.

(8) J. E. Gilibert, Professor of Natural History. French mason, returned to France in 1783 and later was a professor at *École Centrale du Rhône.*

(9) Georg Forster,[20] Professor of Natural History. A Calvinist and English mason, educated at Warrington Dissenting Academy, England.

It was stated earlier that the Polish reform was not directed against Christianity, or even against the Catholic faith. The participation in the reform of so many Protestants and international masons led the Jesuit and other Catholic historians to see in the whole movement a Protestant-masonic conspiracy to wrench Poland from her historic allegiance to Rome. The Protestant part of this supposed conspiracy would appear to be a misconception. All the Calvinists and Lutherans who took part in this reform were invited by the Polish leaders because of their scientific qualifications and similarity of educational ideas, irrespective of their religious beliefs. The idea of a masonic conspiracy seems more feasible, but considering the circumstances of that period, it was hardly possible. Masonry, as any other sect, was split into factions, which, although sharing the general ideas of reform, were not able to agree upon rituals and organization. The Polish masonry of that period did not present a united front. There were members of French lodges, directly subordinated to the Grand Orient of France; there were lodges of "strict observance," subordinated to German masonry; and there were national Polish lodges, later organized into the Grand Orient of Poland. They did not see eye to eye in their attitude towards the King and towards Russian intervention, and often took opposite sides in the civil war. Under these circumstances a "masonic" conspiracy was out of the question. Indeed the founders of the original Freemasonry in England were Protestant clergymen, and it is true that in the second half of the eighteenth century masonry became definitely anti-Jesuit and anti-Roman, in the sense of strong opposition to any "ultra-montanism," but so were the French Gallicans, the Jansenists, the Oratorians and the Piarists, all of whom remained "good Catholics." Although Freemasonry was regularly denounced by the Bulls of successive Popes in Rome, hundreds of Catholic priests joined its ranks, without repudiating their faith.

The famous Paris lodge, *Les Neuf Soeurs,* had 21 members who were Catholic canons and priests. In Austria no less than two archbishops, seven

[19] *Franklin's Papers,* as above.

[20] See Forster, Georg, *Briefwechsel mit S. Th. Sömmerring* (Brunswick, 1877), for a detailed description of Vilna University.

bishops, and two-hundred Catholic priests were masons. In Poland the Primate, two bishops, and dozens of canons and priests took an active part in the reform, and all belonged to masonry. Even the Jesuits themselves started joining the society after their dissolution in 1773. Five of them, Roussell, Strzecki, Norwoysz, Piramowicz, and Kniazewicz, have been listed in this article, but there were many more. Masonry included adherents of all denominations—Catholics, Protestants, and Orthodox Russians—as well as non-denominational Christians and deists. As such, masonry could not execute a policy directed against any particular denomination. The secular and deistic policy of the "enlightenment" of the eighteenth century was based on the idea of "tolerance," and in this respect its English origin was unmistakable.

The Polish system survived the partition and served as an example for the Russian reform of Alexander I in 1801, in which many Polish leaders took part.

King's College,
University of London

HEINRICH BRÜHL: A SAXON POLITICIAN OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

by Robert L. Koehl

FREDERICK August I, when he became Elector, ruled about 700 square miles of Saxony along the Elbe from Wittenberg to Bohemia, plus the semi-Slavic trans-Elbian land of Upper Lusatia, the *Oberlausitz*. Perhaps he had one million Saxon subjects. But this was merely the tail-of-the-dog. Frederick August also was King of Poland. Just as in other elective monarchies, such as the Holy Roman Empire of an earlier century, this Wettin owed his election to the Polish throne at least in part to the inconsequence of his own political power.[1] How much the Polish crown meant to him can be told by some straws in the wind. He was an hereditary Elector of the Empire by virtue of the lands around Wittenberg. He was also hereditary head of the college of protestant German princes (*Corpus Evangelicorum*). Yet he turned Roman Catholic to clinch his election to the ultra-Catholic Polish-Lithuanian throne—an act calculated neither to please the other north German protestant princes nor ingratiate himself with his protestant Saxons. Having got the crown he proceeded to set up a brand new Catholic court at Warsaw, where he spent most of his time, setting up a *Staathalter* in Dresden.[2]

Back of his election lay the Polish political disorganization with which we associate the famous *liberum veto*. His victory represented a defeat for the Bourbon policy of controlling a political power opposite Germany, and was made possible by Russian and Habsburg, not to say papal support. During the Northern War (1699-1718), Charles XII drove him back into Saxony and set up his puppet Stanislaus Leszczynski at Warsaw, with the result that when Frederick August returned to Poland as rightful king in 1711, he owed an even greater debt than before to Russia and the Habsburgs who had opposed Leszczynski.[3] I do not mean to claim that this wily and ambitious Wettin was merely a cork bobbing on a tempestuous sea of power politics. He navigated very skillfully at times: there were plenty of German princelings bobbing in that sea, but he stayed afloat and laid plans for a great east German centralized monarchy *au grand monarque* whom he copied even to the mistresses and the drinking bouts.[4]

No view of the political world into which Heinrich Brühl stepped as a page in 1720 would be accurate without some reference to the dynastic

---

[1]See Wl. Konopczyński, "The Early Saxon Period 1697-1733", in *The Cambridge History of Poland*, Cambridge, 1941, 1-2.

[2]"Heinrich Friedrich von Friesen, General der Infanterie, Staathalter und Gouverneur von Dresden . . . " (Personenverzeichnis), Albrecht Philipp, *Sulkowski und Brühl*, Dresden, 1920, 120. For the circumstances of the Wettin Conversion see Konopczyński, *op. cit.*, 2.

[3]Ibid., 6-17; also C. T. Atkinson, *A History of Germany 1715-1815*, London 1908.

[4]This makes interesting reading in P. Haake, *La société des antisobres*, (Neues Archiv für sächsische Geschichte, 21) Dresden, n.d.

state as it existed in Germany then. Brühl's own background will introduce us well enough.[5] His father, Hans Moritz Brühl, was a court official, who in 1705 became the *Hofmarschall,* that is, the major-domo, of the cadet Wettin house of Saxe-Weissenfels. This little strip of Thuringian land must have been an administrative nightmare. Its railroad-compartment structure is explained by a reference to a map. The smallish Unstrut river flows along its middle, which is nowhere more than 15 or 20 miles from each side. It must have been of a highly rural and provincial character with little income for its prince. In practice this gentleman lived at Dresden anyhow where *le monde* dwelled—leaving his unpaid major-domo to run his affairs as best he could, eking out a scant living on his family estate of Ganglofsömmern near Weissensee, where Heinrich was born the youngest of five children. Poor Hans Moritz must have been only too glad when the dowager duchess of Weissenfels, Frederika Elisabeth, took Heinrich under her wing in 1713 as her page. She sent him to Leipzig to the *Fürstenschule* or princes' school set up in a previous century by one of the Electors. A probably accurate if somewhat sugared account of his studies there reads:

> "He made great progress in literature and in those studies which befit a person of his birth. His recreation took the form of music and intercourse with people whose taste would develop his own. He often wrote verses, in which both clarity of thought and harmony of diction have been praised."[6]

We can be pretty sure those verses were in French. In Leipzig he must have polished up what French he always knew, read some literature—very likely French, possibly Latin and may even have listened in on lectures on the new science of statecraft, *Kameralwissenschaft,* which taught that improving the wealth and happiness of one's subjects is the true way to the increase of a prince's power and the greatness of his state. In 1720 he was assigned as a "silver page" to the Electoral and Royal Saxon court at Dresden.

By this date Frederick August had decided to have two bases of operations or *Residenzstädte,* Warsaw and Dresden.[7] Perhaps one reason for this was the reversion in 1718 of the five or six fragments of Wettin land in Thuringia which had been held by the Wettins of Saxe-Zeitz. They had died out. This certainly whet the Dresdeners' appetites for the lands of two other Wettin houses, also without heirs: Saxe-Merseburg's Lower Lusatia and Saxe-Weissenfels' portion of Thuringia. About this time the Poles made one of their almost habitual anti-royal confederacies with the result that Czar Peter intervened in Frederick August's behalf. (His aid was probably quite necessary and *still* unwelcome.) This Wettin schemer was therefore

---

[5]Largely from A. Boroviczeny, *Graf von Brühl,* Zurich, 1930, 16-23; see also Philipp, *op. cit.,* 7-8 and O. E. Schmidt, *Minister Graf Brühl und Karl Heinrich von Heinecken,* Leipzig, 1921, 223-225.

[6]Letters of Count Pöllnitz, III, 428, cited in Boroviczeny, *op. cit.,* 17.

[7]The following paragraph depends on material in Albrecht Philipp, *August der Starke und die pragmatische Sanktion,* Leipzig, 1908, especially 1-30.

all the more interested in his projects for creating a unified east German state, *by partitioning Poland* and adding Silesia to his system—if not also Bohemia and Moravia! (Frederick August fancied himself a soldier, but in fact he was a better diplomat. He had entered the Northern War to gain Livonia for Poland—that is for himself and his heirs, which Poland could have if it made him a hereditary king! Militarily he had failed in this scheme. Peter was in Livonia instead of him—soon to make the peace of Nystad which would give Russia its Baltic window.) Therefore Frederick August had turned in 1719 to the Hohenzollerns with an offer to divide up Poland three ways, to Prussia, Russia and Saxony. Naturally he demanded the lion's share, so the cautious Frederick William accepted the Dresdener's "gift" of several *lange Kerls* ("tall chaps") for his famous bodyguard—and tabled the Polish scheme.

But Frederick August had not exhausted his diplomatic repertoire. Simultaneously he had married his son and heir to the ugly Habsburg princess Maria Josepha in 1719 in order to have an iron in the fire of the contested Habsburg inheritance. Of course in this way Saxony became involved in the great controversy surrounding the Pragmatic Sanction. If the Viennese seem to have been silly in marrying off the daughters of Joseph I to the two most likely claimants to their lands, it must be remembered that marriage politics works both ways. The papal representatives who did so much to make the Saxon arrangement stressed the influence a Catholic princess would have in keeping Frederick August and especially his heirs in the Habsburg orbit. It turned out that they were right—not only about Saxony but about Bavaria too—in the long run. In the short run, however, Frederick August I spent the twenties in "bucking" the Pragmatic Sanction.

The essential quality of a dynastic state was its administration as a huge estate, the owner and complete lord of which was the prince.[8] He was advised by his vassals, sometimes regarded as his peers, in a privy council (*Geheimer Rat*) and a war council (*Kriegsrat*). Electoral Saxony had its counterparts of these on which members of the Saxon nobility served as a matter of hereditary right. The prince had his private income from estates, plus his various feudal incomes. To administer this he had his chamber or *Kammer*. By 1700 Frederick August I also had his *Kabinett* (also given as *Cabinet*), a body of administrators appointed by him, whom he depended on for the coordination of the numerous outgrowths of this chamber, especially the secretariat or *Kanzlei* (chancellery). Other outgrowths were various taxing commissions, monopoly-administrating bodies, the organiza-

[8]Piecing the ramshackle organization of a dynastic state like eighteenth century Saxony into a semblance of rationality is a paper in itself. I found most of the material which follows in works describing *reforms* in the system, viz., descriptions "before" and "after"; e.g. W. Behrendts, *Reformbestrebungen in Kursachsen im Zeitalter der französischen Revolution*, Leipzig, 1914, 2-15 ("Die landständische Verfassung") and Ferdinand Plathner, *Behordenorganisation und Kriegskontributionen im Königreich Sachsen während des Generalgouvernements von 1813 und 1814*, Leipzig, 1909, 10-33 ("Ausdehnung des Generalgouvernements Sachsen": "Mittel- und Unterbehorden").

tion of local *intendants* (*Landesregierung*) and the lower levels of what we would call the diplomatic corps. The hereditary lands were divided into large administrative districts, usually called *Kreise* or "circles". In 1700 there were four of these districts with their seats of government at Wittenberg, Meissen, Leipzig and Chemnitz. Upper Lusatia being a fief held from the Bohemian crown was not a *Kreis* but a province—administered by a military governor instead of the usual *Kreishauptmann*. The remnants of religious properties, known as *Stifte,* many of which were acquired from Saxe-Zeitz (Naumburg, Zeitz) were also administered by royal *intendants*. Each *Kreis* had an assembly of two estates, the nobility and the town corporations, the clergy not being represented as in France. Lusatia had an assembly too, and its nobility had retained privileges lost to Saxon nobles in previous centuries, such as governmental authority and regalian rights. Beneath the *Kreishauptleute* (plural of the above-mentioned *Kreishauptmann*) were the *Amtshauptleute,* who were responsible for areas of various size within the *Kreis,* known as *Ämter*. At the lowest level was the *Gemeinde-* or *Flurvorstand,* a village head—or if there were only scattered hamlets, the headman of the agricultural area known as the *Flur*. It is easier to tell what these people did (and easier still to tell what they did not do) than to say where their responsibility lay. The lazy might do very little. The ambitious could draw into their offices authority of every sort. Most of them settled disputes at a pre-judicial level, though this right was often exercised by the local nobility in their own courts. Most ducal officials attempted to maintain some kind of order, sometimes organizing a local gendarmerie, but here again the local nobility either competed with its own law enforcement agents, occasionally paid for police organized by local officials or stepped in to fill a breach left by a lazy official. Sometimes the ducal administrators supervised officials responsible for tax collecting, inspected commercial establishments, and supervised the raising of the militia, if their jurisdictional areas happened to coincide with tax districts, inspection districts, military districts, judicial districts or police districts. But often their field of jurisdiction was based on some ancient feudal aggregate—this was especially true at the level of the rural *Flur*—while the various other jurisdictions had been set up by arbitrary fiats during the span of two hundred years prior to 1700. In one respect they were the outposts of the prince's administrative structure, viz., when they supervized his tax-collectors, etc. But again they were the local representatives of the various feudal councils of the state, especially the *Landesregierungsrat*. Finally, and often in barest fact, they were the henchmen of the local gentry, whose welfare was their own, and whose wrath meant their downfall.

If a ruler like Fredrick August wished to accomplish anything, he needed to be able to control this rusty and complex machinery to produce money, soldiers and food. It is no wonder that the study of statecraft which we know as cameralism was mainly concerned with the problems of getting these necessities out of a state, while keeping it in the production of an

endless supply. Of course this is not the whole story. Back of the principle of the prince as the good "economist" (*Wirth*) is a nebulous mass of Roman law and Germanic tradition. The German dynastic state into which Brühl came was by no means a little model of *Colbertisme,* or of French absolutism, in spite of the prevalence of French political terminology at every step. German absolutism was on the march; in Saxony it had made far greater headway than in Poland; but the Wettins had they been martinets harsher than Frederick William and his son, would still have encountered the wearing opposition of traditional privilege in Saxony as they did in Poland. And they were not martinets. The father Frederick August I was a toper and a petticoat chaser; the son was an *artiste* who only came out of his ivory tower to go hunting and watch French comedy.[9]

The Wettins needed a capable hand in the internal management of their system—the father to supply himself with wealth for new schemes, and the son to keep up the system as he had inherited it. For this Heinrich Brühl seemed well-suited.

> "Brühl demonstrated as a royal page such a moderate behavior and so much enthusiasm that the King soon picked him out from the others, drew him to himself, and when he had remarked the firm and healthy judgment expressed with clarity far above that to be expected from his years, his ability to keep silence, his dependability, coupled with an open manner and his gift for expressing the most difficult and abstruse matters in simple and pleasant form, the King thought such a subject deserved to be employed in important business."[10]

Some time during the twenties he was elevated to the rank of personal page as a result of these qualities. About the time when Frederick August I was making his last grand fling into the unwilling arms of Frederick William of Hohenzollern (1727) in anticipation of a war over the Habsburg succession, the aging Wettin made Brühl first *a* secretary in his *Kammer* or exchequer (*Kammerjunker*) and then in 1730 his private secretary. The same Pöllnitz who wrote honeyed praises of Brühl as page had this to say of him in 1729:

> "Baron (!) von Brühl is still not in the ministry, but the high honors which the King pays to him leave us no doubt that he will soon be taken into the *Cabinet.* He is a man of high station, a Saxon, whose brother is a Knight of the German Order. He was a page of the King. His willingness earned him the attention of the King. At present he possesses his complete trust and it can be truly said that the King has

[9]Not all students agree on the son's character. See Schmidt, *op. cit.,* 229-239 ("August III von Sachsen-Polen und Maria Josepha") and Philipp, *Sulkowski und Brühl,* 29-45. Boroviczeny cannot find it in his heart to criticise him, *op. cit.,* 55-57. A similar approach, arguing for more autonomy and initiative on the younger Wettin's part is given in Bobi Petroff, *Die Politik Friedrich August II von Sachsen 1736-1739,* Leipzig, 1902.

[10]Count Pöllnitz, *Letters,* cited in Boroviczeny, *op. cit.,* 18. Sources for the early years of Brühl's career: *Ibid.,* 19-27, Philipp, *August der Starke,* 104-111, and Schmidt, *op. cit.,* 226-227.

> never shown more friendship to one of his favorites. This favor does not seem to make him arrogant: He is quiet, honest, polite, benevolent, and ready to do favors. He *is* something of a spendthrift and loves display (*Pracht*), but is not avaricious and seems to have no other interest than pleasing his lord and winning friends."[11]

His new position enabled Brühl to do a lot of important people favors, and undoubtedly served to enhance his education.

It so happened that these years 1727-1730 were critical in Saxon foreign policy, and therefore brought about several shake-ups among the top level policy makers surrounding the King-Elector. It was becoming more and more apparent that Frederick August was getting nowhere with Prussia, or against Austria—the policy set for him by his chief diplomats, including Field Marshal Flemming, who had occupied till then a position only a little less powerful than that to which Brühl attained by 1740. Frederick August therefore took over the management of diplomacy for himself in 1730. He began by putting on an enormous military display in a manoeuvring area not far north of Dresden called the *Zeithainer Lager*. This was mainly for Frederick William, who was invited there to inspect troops, enjoy fireworks, drink out of the *Meissenerporzellan* which we know as Dresden china, and receive a squad of Saxon grenadiers, each over six feet tall, as a present. The newly appointed private secretary (*Kammerherr*) was honored for the organizing work he had done at the review by the award of the Prussian *Schwarzer Adler* by the old militarist. Brühl's salary had been raised from 600 *Reichstaler* to 2000, with his new appointment; the same year he got more offices and more money: the oversight of the royal palaces and the inspection of the wood deliveries—not quite sinecures of course. It was in the next year, when Frederick August was preparing to make a *démarche* in behalf of changing the Polish constitution, for which he needed Habsburg support and above all, money to bribe Poles, Russians and Austrians—that the King-Elector put Brühl on the way to becoming financial dictator and cabinet-minister of the interior. He was put in charge of the excise department in May (4500 *Reichstaler* stipend), made director of domestic affairs in July, and appointed to the privy council in September (5000 RT more per annum!) With the latter went another office whose income *was* more important to him than its duties: Controlleur of the Evangelical Court Church—he was a Protestant and most of the Wettin court were Catholics so he was a natural for the position. It was in 1731 that Brühl began his investments in bankrupt estates, which he purchased on credit, refurbished and sold, sometimes for cash, sometimes for bigger ones.[12] He does not seem to have stolen anything or extorted anything (as he was accused of in

[11]Pöllnitz, *Letters*, cited in Boroviczeny, *op. cit.*, 19.

[12]Detailed accounts of Brühl's financial investments can be found in Boroviczeny, *op. cit.*, 82-110, Schmidt, *op. cit.* 266-279 ("Grat Brühl als Industrieller") and in the letters to Heinecken (*ibid.*, 20-222). Boroviczeny conceals the fact that Brühl found it difficult to remain solvent for any length of time, while Schmidt's commentaries ignore the profits Brühl drew from many of his ventures.

countless attacks later on in life and after death); on the other hand he had connections galore by 1731, which must have aided him . . . in obtaining credit and in hearing about likely buys. Sometimes he bought estates which had reverted to the crown. In 1732, the last year of the elder Wettin's life, Brühl became assistant to the tax director and along with the extra stipend for this office received the pay of the personnel director of the Electoral and Royal palaces whose office he also absorbed. This year he made the acquaintance of his future wife, Franciska Maria Kolowrat-Krakowski, the fifteen year old daughter of the directress of the menage of the Habsburg princess Maria Josepha; he was able to obtain an increase in allowance for the mother from the King-Elector, who at this time was anxious to be on good terms with Vienna anyhow. The letter in which he communicated the good news of the raise in the allowance of his future mother-in-law is interesting as an example of the sort of thing Brühl was supposed to be good at:

> "Madam, if I could not have the honor of answering your letter earlier, it was because I took the liberty of waiting until I might be able to report satisfactorily on the errand to the King with which Your Excellency honored me. Madam, I certainly should have wished to obtain a much larger increase in your allowance than the one thousand Gulden which His Majesty was pleased to add to your yearly income. However I dare hope that Your Excellency will not be less convinced of the lasting desire which inspires me to demonstrate my respect and serviceability again and again—with which I remain, Madam, Your Excellency's most devoted and obedient servant,
>
> H. v. Brühl[13]

Frederick August I died suddenly on February 1, 1733, after a trip to Warsaw, where he was to preside at the Diet.[14] He had not been ill previous to the trip and seems to have intended to make his *démarche* at this session. Courland was to be offered to the new Czarina Anna's favorite, Biron, as a Polish fief, and Saxony might offer to adhere to the Pragmatic Sanction to win Austria for the change in the Polish constitution. It would have been a long shot, of course. In any case, the death of the old schemer left Heinrich Brühl in Warsaw with about four thousand Saxon officials and troops. (So little had the Wettins penetrated into the ramshackle Republic's political structure!) Meanwhile the new Elector, Frederick August II, sat in Dresden with his chief advisor—an old Saxon field-marshal named Wackerbarth, and with his favorite courtier, a Pole named Joseph Sułkowski. Brühl was ordered to safeguard the important documents and valuables, and to "look out for the interests of the Elector" in letters from Wackerbarth and Sułkowski. He was not immediately recalled to Dresden—in fact he was asked to stay and supervise matters. He finally left Warsaw on February 18 and arrived in Dresden February 22, having sent the royal

---

[13]Printed in Boroviczeny, *op. cit.*, 27.

[14]Description of the circumstances surrounding the sudden illness and death and of the ensuing crisis: *Ibid.*, 30-38, 42-52. See also Philipp, *Sulkowski und Brühl*, 13-29.

effects on a slower journey by carts and pack animals. Frederick August II heard good reports on his loyalty and dispatch in the emergencies created by Polish hostility to the Saxons; both Wackerbarth and Sułkowski seem to have recommended him to the new Elector.

Of course Brühl had not neglected to woo a man like Wackerbarth. He had written from Warsaw:

> "The continued illness of Your Excellency strikes at my heart, and I am all the more anxious to hear of your improvement, because with conditions as they now are, and my opponents far from asleep but rather twisting everything I do in pursuance of my duty into error, I am in so much need of it myself! I certainly hope that Your Excellency will vouchsafe me continued benevolence and assist me where possible, for which I make most humble and obedient request, assuring Your Excellency as always of my deepest respect, etc . . ."[15]

But Brühl was valuable to the Elector in his own right. He had set up a private espionage network (the *Cabinet Noir*) during the past three years which was to prove invaluable during the struggle to get the young Wettin elected King of Poland. Brühl's agents, under the direction of a capable crook named Siepmann, opened the letters of the Polish magnates as well as of visiting foreigners, which they obtained from vantage points within the established courier service.[16]

Brühl had also obtained from Frederick August I in January 1733 an appointment to the presidency of the mining monopoly control board of Saxony, which controlled a very valuable source of ducal income—so that displacing him would have had a shattering effect on the state finances just at the time when cash would be needed in quantity. On the contrary, all Brühl's old positions under Frederick August I were confirmed on his arrival in Dresden. In June he was made *Kabinettsminister,* a title and rank he had heretofore lacked, while filling the office of interior minister in very fact. By 1733 Brühl was in closest contact with the whole Saxon state structure, including the department of foreign affairs—which was a necessity, since he was asked to provide the huge sums for bribery in the "free" Polish election. The leading persons in foreign affairs after the death of the real head of the diplomatic corps were Wackerbarth's adoptive son Gabaleon Wackerbarth-Salmour of Piedmontese antecedents, and Joseph Sułkowski, who being a Pole, was valuable in the Polish area. Brühl was actually drawn into all questions of policy from this date, however, especially since Sułkowski did not care for the atmosphere of bureaux or take time to read diplomatic memoranda. He liked to hunt and most of all desired to ride into battle at the head of finely dressed infantry regiments.[17]

---

[15]Boroviczeny, *op. cit.,* 48.

[16]*Ibid.,* 51-52, 158-160; Schmidt, *op. cit.,* 262-264.

[17]Philipp, *Sulkowski und Brühl,* 1-7, 29-64. The picture given by this author is favorable to Sułkowski, antagonistic to Brühl; Boroviczeny (*op. cit.,* 39-41) and Philipp agree however as to the character of Sułkowski.

Wackerbarth-Salmour and a Saxon general of an old Lusatian noble family, Count Wolf Budissin (= Bautzen) were sent into Poland as plenipotentiaries with letters of credit for the various Polish magnates and other epistles.[18] The chief opposition to the Wettin successor centered around the Potocki family, one of whose members, Theodor, an Archbishop of Gniezno, held the primacy of Poland and therefore the political power during the interregnum. This opposition was in the pay of Louis XV who was pushing Stanislaus Leszczynski for reelection to the throne he had held briefly, 1704-1709. It was of course not entirely a case of bribery. To many Poles a Pole who was a French puppet was preferable to a Russian puppet who was a German. France was farther away. After a hectic spring and summer of bribery in Poland, and a considerable Saxon kowtowing to Vienna and St. Petersburg, in treaties guaranteeing the Pragmatic Sanction (July 1733) and signing away Courland (September 1733), the Poles finally elected Leszczynski. With this, the Russian troops swept across Poland under General Lascy, took Warsaw, after which a rump Diet quietly elected Frederick August II on October 5, 1733. Thus began a general European war which lasted in the Mediterranean theater for five years thereafter. In the next two years Poland was cleared of insurgent Leszczynskiites with Russian aid, during which a great deal of looting and destruction marked the wake of both Poles and Russians. Fortunately for Saxony, Frederick William allowed himself to be "neutralized" during these years by the gift of a few tall grenadiers.[19]

In 1734 Brühl's services in raising cash for bribery from Polish and Leipzig Jews, his clever employment of sets of Meissen-ware as gentle hints to Polish squires and his attention to the business at hand of finding the wherewithal to manage the whole Saxon fiscal system in an emergency were rewarded by his nomination to the presidency of the "chamber" or exchequer.[20] With the tidy income he now enjoyed from offices and lands, he got married—to the Catholic countess Kolowrat. Her mother's connection with Maria Josepha could not but have been valuable to him. Her husband, the Elector and King, was inclined to leave affairs of state to others, which during the thirties meant cabals similar to those of the later twenties. Maria Josepha, very pious, but also ambitious, was not beyond their reach. Also involved in this court plotting was a Neapolitan Jesuit named Guarini, brought to Dresden by Sułkowski in 1736. Sułkowski at this time was closest to the royal person—in fact in terms of influence was probably at the height of his career. Wackerbarth-Salmour also must be numbered among the ambitious. Many of the higher administrative officials

[18]For different versions of the struggle for the nomination, cf. Konopczyński, "The Later Saxon Period 1733-1763", *Cambridge History of Poland*, 25-29 and Rudolph Beyrich, *Kursachsen und die polnische Thronfolge, 1733-1736*, Leipzig, 1913.

[19]For the general European political situation see Atkinson, *op. cit.*, 97-102; on Poland: Konopczyński, *op, cit.*, 28-30; relations with Prussia: Philipp, *August der Starke*, 98-120.

[20]Boroviczeny, *op. cit.*, 58-60; Philipp, *Sulkowski und Brühl*, 30-39.

naturally came into these circles and cliques. Part of the interest centered in a pro-Austrian or a pro-Prussian orientation, part was a struggle for power, and part was a means of getting rich. Heinrich Brühl played everybody's game and let himself get in nobody's pocket.[21]

The years 1736 to 1740 were, on the whole, years of peace for Saxony and Poland. In 1735 some 6000 of Saxony's 20,000 troops had been sent to the Rhine against France—the rest were in Poland—according to the military aid stipulations of the treaty with Austria. But France got out of the war that year and the Leszczynskiites lost their hero, who settled down at Lunéville as Duc de Lorraine. Poland quieted down gradually, as the magnates found it better business to take the oath of fealty. In 1737 Saxony sent 8000 troops under Sułkowski to join the Austrians in their Danubian campaign against the Turks. This was a complete loss to Austria—and incidentally to Sułkowski—who not long afterwards found himself in disfavor at the Wettin court and had to withdraw ("with honor") to the Polish estates confiscated from Leszczynski.[22] He and Brühl had cooperated heartily in the years 1733-1737; Sułkowski never really took an interest in the foreign affairs section which was supposed to be his responsibility, preferring trips to battlefronts and troop reviews. Naturally Brühl's "people" (his contemporaries referred to them as his "minions") in the *Kanzlei* did the paperwork for the foreign "office"; thus Brühl acquired the necessary know-how which soon made him indispensable to his *roi fainéant* master—"mon Auguste Maître", as he playfully referred to him in his letters to Heinecken.

Brühl was still acquiring titles and emoluments too. In 1737 he got the title of Chief Tax Collector, with all fees due that official—around 6000 *Reichstaler*. The same year he secured for himself the title of Count of the Holy Roman Empire from Charles VI. In 1736 he had leased several leading salt mines in Poland, in collaboration with Sułkowski and a Polish count Mosczyński, the latter two supplying the initial cash. First Mosczyński (1737) and then Sułkowski (1739) sold him their shares. By 1743 Brühl was able to return the mines to the state with greater productive capacity than they had had when he leased them. Of course he received an indemnification for the income he was thenceforth forgoing. He used this to buy the castle and estate of Pförten in Lower Lusatia, to which he added those hereditary holdings of the Merseburg Wettins purchased by him from the exchequer some time after their reversion in 1738. These Lower Lusatian holdings comprised the town of Forst ("Forsta") and extensive estates, as well as tributary vassal estates.

By 1739 Brühl had two notable assistants in both his "public" and his

[21]Every author consulted differed in the interpretation of the cliques, but all have to agree that Brühl survived by his wit.

[22]On Saxon military history (with the inevitable anti-Brühl slant) 1730-1740, see O. Schuster and F. U. Francke, *Geschichte der sächsischen Armee, Drei Teile,* (2 v), Leipzig, 1885, 200-226 (In parts one and two, vol. I); on the Turkish campaign and Sułkowski's fall see Philipp, *Sulkowski und Brühl,* 64-80.

"private" business. (Indeed he never seemed to make much distinction!) The first one of these assistants was an adventurer who began life as a valet in the Wettin household at Zeitz, Johann Hennicke.[23] Hennicke had become a kind of secret agent for the Dresden branch of the family operating inside the Zeitz household. After the reversion of the Zeitz lands in 1718 he became a valuable if rather shady state servant—well before Heinrich Brühl came along and found use for him. He seems to have helped Brühl secure the above-mentioned *"Herrschaft"* of Forst from the reverted Merseburg estates in his office of commissioner for the transferral of the lands to Dresden administration. With the last of the series of reversions, that of Weissenfels in 1746, he again served as commissioner, and again Brühl received properties—this time the old Brühl estate of Ganglofsömmern, which had been sold by Heinrich and his brothers to the last duke of Weissenfels, Johann Adolph, in 1738. Accusations have been made to the effect that the reversion of all three cadet lines (with all of which Hennicke seems to have dealt before and after the event) was strange. In his later years (1746-1752) Hennicke had control over the Saxon treasury out of which it is likely that he aided Brühl's projects—and not merely those associated with the welfare of Saxony, but then Brühl could never distinguish between the welfare of Saxony, the comfort and pleasure of its prince, and the "necessities" of that prince's chief minister. Brühl could not merely turn to Hennicke and the state coffers, even when it was a case of defraying the costs of a royal trip. He had to suggest, wheedle and even bow and scrape to get some disbursements. Here we have a kind of intra-administrative diplomacy—at which, of course, Brühl was adept.

Sometimes Brühl turned to the second of his assistants, Karl Heinecken, to aid him in this kind of diplomacy.[24] Heinecken was a student of Greek and Latin antiquities, and incidentally a man much influenced by the cameralist doctrines which he had imbibed at Lübeck and Leipzig. Brühl "discovered" him in the capacity of private tutor to the Sułkowski children. With the fall of their father from favor, the young Sułkowskis lost their tutor who became Brühl's librarian. During the forties as Brühl picked up more and more property, built several palaces and collected books and *objets d'art,* Heinecken became his *intendant.* They maintained a warm relationship right up until the time of Brühl's death in 1763.

After the removal of Sułkowski from the scene in 1738, Brühl still had a potential rival in the person of Gabaleon Wackerbarth-Salmour.[25] Two

[23]Schmidt, *op. cit.,* 227-228; there is scarcely a letter in the correspondence between Brühl and his private secretary and business agent Heinecken (*note different name*) in which Hennicke's name does not appear—usually as a source of money. Boroviczeny takes issue with Schmidt's somewhat over-critical picture of Hennicke as a rascal (considering the era!) *op. cit.,* 82, note 1.

[24]Schmidt, *op. cit.,* 239-256, 322-329.

[25]On Wackerbarth-Salmour see Martin Paul, *Graf Wackerbarth-Salmour, Oberhofmeister des sächsischen Kurprinzen Friedrich Christians,* Rudolfstadt, 1912. The picture of Brühl as a plotter of other men's dismissals (cf. Philipp, *Sulkowski und Brühl,* 32, including notes 3 and 4) seems to me melodramatic and to say the least overdrawn.

leading civil servants of the pre-1733 era, Thioly and Gunther, were pensioned off by this time. Brühl may not have actually made any arrangements for the removal of Salmour—just as it is not at all necessary to posit his leadership in the cabal which led to Sułkowski's "honorary dismissal". Sułkowski had enemies. In the case of the Piedmontese the man who had done so much for the Polish negotiations was ill. He had been entrusted with the care of the lame crown prince as tutor and travelling companion. In 1738 (May) he left for Italy with the sixteen year old boy and his sister, Maria Amalia who was to be delivered to her fiancé, the Duke of Naples. (Here we detect some of Guarini's—and the papacy's—work.) When Salmour left, *Brühl was already master in the house;* the return of this sick man with the prince, finally, in 1740 brought with it a request for a pension, that was granted. There was no rupture of his relationship with Brühl—just as Sułkowski and Brühl remained good friends, as their correspondence shows. Wackerbarth-Salmour, moreover, retained a voice in Saxon diplomacy right through 1763, and that in spite of a real difference of attitude in foreign policy, from Brühl's own.

Salmour had always believed that Saxony required an understanding with Prussia in order to carry out its union with Poland via Austrian Silesia. Brühl, without guessing the plans of young Frederick Hohenzollern toward Silesia, inclined to distrust a Prussian solution to the Saxon-Polish problem.[26] Family and court connections also pre-disposed him to seek the friendship and cooperation of Vienna, if at all possible. Russia seemed to have been tied to Saxony through Biron's investment with Courland by Frederick August II in 1737. This is not to say that Brühl was ignoring Frederick William. He corresponded with the pro-Prussian ex-Saxon diplomat Manteuffel and with Salmour in Italy in the late thirties on the subject of Prussia—and of course, on the prospects of the Austrian succession. He kept in close touch with events at Versailles through correspondence with a natural son of Frederick August I, the well-known Marshal of France, Maurice de Saxe—for whom he did favors in return for intelligences and advice. The period before and around 1740 was a time of diligent paper work for Brühl. A twentieth century biographer of his, who examined the various types of documents in Brühl's personal files, lists the following kinds of paper work with which the man was almost daily concerned:

1. Diplomatic correspondence to be read and answered
2. Important requests and projects submitted to be read and acted on
3. Reports to be made to the King

[26]My interpretation of Brühl's foreign policy is based on Boroviczeny, *op, cit.*, 161-188. Brühl's actions seem to support the thesis that he had *some* policy rather than being a stupid bungler or an absolutely unprincipled opportunist. The latter charges seem to be the by-product of Prussian-oriented historiography, copied and re-copied *ad infinitem* without criticism, even by an author like Philipp.

4. Briefs for directives and ordinances to be studied, re-written or signed[27]

It is true that as the decades advanced—especially by the time of the Seven Years War—Brühl delegated much of his responsibilities, appearing to be more concerned *"comment amuser le Roy"* and even tending to surround Frederick August with an iron curtain of guards and pages to prevent unauthorized persons from getting to him with unpleasant complaints. During his "prime", however, Brühl is the very mirror of a hard-working administrator and many-sided politician. To say the least: He *was* an opportunist.

In terms of foreign policy Brühl seemed determined to manoeuvre Saxony parallel with developments so as to play into no single power's hands, but to draw the benefits for the system of which he was a part from the cross-currents of power politics. He never seems to have had the grandiose schemes of Frederick August I, though his policies also were predicated on good diplomacy rather than on trials at arms. Perhaps the scheme of the late forties and the early fifties of reconciling Vienna and Versailles approached the strategical imagination of his old master. In general it is better to say that Brühl was a diplomatic tactician, good at short jumps and quick runs.[28]

Two prime necessities in Saxon foreign policy seem to have been the creation of a land-bridge between Saxony and Poland, and the "reform" of the Polish constitution to permit a hereditary kingship which could be secured to the Wettins. Frederick August I had pursued these ends, among others. Brühl followed the same aims, although distracted (like him) by the temptation which the doubtful Habsburg succession seemed to offer Maria Josepha, the eldest daughter of Joseph I, and her husband Frederick August II.

In the years before 1740, when the deaths of the monarchs of Austria, Prussia and Russia precipitated the grand scramble for new power positions in Europe, Brühl was attempting to trade certain outlying pieces of Wettin property which were enclaves in Prussian territory for a small area known as the County of Krossen—which would have given him a ten-mile corridor into Poland from the newly reverted Lower Lusatia.[29] He was also negotiat-

[27]Boroviczeny, *op. cit.*, 76; for Brühl's diplomatic correspondence in this period see Beyrich, *op. cit.*, passim (Manteuffel and Wackerbarth-Salmour); Paul, *op. cit.*, 94, 97-98 (Wackerbarth-Salmour); and Count C. F. Vitztum d'Eckerstadt. *Maurice Comte de Saxe*, Dresden, 1867 (letters to Brühl) NB: Eckerstadt's conclusion repeated uncritically by Sainte-Beuve in his *Nouveaux Lundis*, Paris, 1869, that Maurice had little or no use for Brühl except as his errand boy does not seem to me justified by the amount of advice which Maurice showered on "mon petit Monsieur Brühl."

[28]Albrecht Philipp writes of Frederick August I, who set even Brühl's later policy to some extent: "Now here, now there he popped up with crazy projects, not with a conscious realization of his own powers, but more in the hope of being carried upward by the fortunes of the international situation." Philipp, *August der Starke*, 5.

[29]Lusatia, Silesia and western Poland are naturally united as a glance at a topographical map will show. A ten-mile corridor is of course strategically nonsense, being dependent on military alliance with either Prussia or Austria to give a defensible line. Brühl could only have regarded such a strip as a beginning—a typical tactical move. Lusatia and Silesia, once loosely connected to the medieval Poland had become Bohemian crown lands,

ing with Anna Ivanovna of Russia via her favorite, Biron, for Russian support of a Saxon coup against the Polish constitution, while at the same time he was seeking Russian support of the Wettin claims to the whole Habsburg heritage "in case the Pragmatic Sanction should not be respected by some other European power."

Nevertheless, his relations with Vienna continued to be as cordial as before: soon after Charles VI died on October 20, 1740 Brühl set about offering Saxon aid (about 24,000 troops, according to the Austrian ambassador's report from Dresden) to the young Maria Theresia in return for a promise of a corridor-strip of land in Silesia; by November Brühl could ask for the County of Krossen as "pay". Brühl was certainly not compelled by necessity to support Maria Theresia.[30] The Elector-King's half-brother, Maurice de Saxe, was making Brühl offers of Bohemia on behalf of the King of France, if Saxony would *but remain neutral.* Maria Theresia hesitated too long over Brühl's offer; the news of a palace revolt in St. Petersburg led Brühl to abandon hope of immediate action in Poland (for which he needed both Russian and Habsburg support); and Frederick's success at Mollwitz in April 1741 precipitated Bavaria and Spain into the war. Brühl could not resist the opportunity: on being refused the "mortgage" he demanded against the day of reckoning with Frederick II, in the form of several Sudeten *Kreise* lying near Saxony, he flung his troops into Bohemia against Maria Theresia. In cooperation with Maurice de Saxe, commanding French troops, Count Rutowski, another of Frederick August I's bastard sons, took Prague at the head of Saxon troops in November 1741.[31]

In December, however, Karl Albert of Bavaria was elected German Emperor as Charles VII, claiming to be King of Bohemia by virtue of his wife's being the younger daughter of Joseph II—to Brühl's and Maria Josepha's disgust. Saxony therefore had neither Silesia nor Bohemia; Brühl and Frederick August II seem therefore to have decided to send Rutowski *under Frederick II* to take Moravia "for Saxony" as Frederick promised. This campaign, fought out in the early spring of 1742, failed. Brühl soon joined Frederick II in the separate peace he made with Maria Theresia in July 1742, feeling fortunate that no more had been lost than a 20,000 man army.

This experience meant for Brühl the end of any ambition to profit by Maria Josepha's claim to the Habsburg heritage, though she herself and Guarini did not give up in their attempt to influence Saxon foreign policy

---

the former being detached to the Wettins in the Thirty Years War. The current Elector, John Gorge II (died 1656) divided his lands four ways, among his sons, giving the *Oberlausitz* to his eldest, and *Niederlausitz* to the cadet house which came to be named Saxe-Merseburg.

[30]Boroviczeny, *op. cit.*, 189-250 gives a prettied-up version of this complicated and not very edifying negotiation, as well as the numerous "betrayals", which I checked against Atkinson, *op. cit.*, 104-123.

[31]The Saxon army was not doing so badly by itself, and it certainly was in as good shape as the other contesting armies before Frederick II wore it out along with his own in Moravia, Schuster and Francke, *op. cit.*, II, 1-63 (The first and second Silesian Wars).

against Maria Theresia. Brühl followed an anti-Prussian course from 1742 on, for with Prussian troops in Silesia, the only hope for a geographic union with Poland lay in a victory over Frederick II.[32] Maria Theresia likewise discovered in herself a greater willingness to offer part of Silesia to Saxony, now that she lacked it—signing a defensive agreement with Saxony in December 1743 which promised such a settlement, *if* Frederick should attack one of them again. Brühl returned to the attempt to win St. Petersburg to a policy of Saxon friendship, under Elisabeth Petrovna, which was successful insofar as he got a defensive pact signed in February 1744. When Frederick pushed the troops of Prussia through Saxony in August of the same year, to re-join the anti-Pragmatic coalition, Brühl waited until Frederick had entered Bohemia and then joined forces with Austrian troops, unfortunately for Saxony *and* Maria Theresia— under the hesitant leadership of Charles of Lorraine. Frederick was compelled by this move of Brühl's to withdraw from Bohemia, without being harmed however, owing to the failure of Charles of Lorraine to move against him. When the death of Charles VII in January 1745 reopened the rivalry for the Imperial Crown, Brühl forwent the temptation of placing Saxony under the tutelage of Louis XV, who now offered the imperial dignity to Frederick August II through his half-brother. Of course Brühl used such an offer to press Maria Theresia for further promises of Silesia during that spring. Charles of Lorraine reopened the war with Frederick II in Silesia itself in the summer of 1745, only to be defeated, along with Saxon contingents at Hohenfriedberg, Soor, Gross-Hennersdorf and at Kesselsdorf, very near Dresden. Saxony signed a peace with Prussia on Christmas Day, 1745, Brühl and the court having had to flee from Dresden and take refuge in Prague. Russia had simply failed to come in against Frederick as promised. Saxony had to pledge an indemnity of one million gold *Reichstaler*.

One might guess that the man who had had so much to do with Saxon defeats twice in five years would have to worry about his position. He wrote to his private secretary from Prague, on the day after the Peace of Dresden was signed:

> "Les cabales qu'on fait contre moi, ne me surprennent pas, mais je n'ay non plus a les craindre, et suis seulement charmé de connoitre par la le monde . . . . Un honnethomme n'a besoin d'aucune excuse, et les grands Princes ont tort de se facher contre ceux qui servent fidelement . . . "

At any rate we know he won out again against the cabals, for the following year we find him sporting the title *premier-ministre*, another French addition to an already Frenchified administrative vocabulary. (The three *Départements* of the *Cabinet* were *Domestique, Militaire, Étranger*—all

[32]My narrative is based on Borovicreny, *op. cit.*, 275-339, corrected in perspective by Atkinson, *op. cit.*, 146-163, who, however, agrees that Saxon troops employed in the Second Silesian War were as good as they should have been. He blames Austrian military incompetence—especially Charles of Lorraine—for their strength going to waste, as at Hohenfriedberg in 1745.

headed by Brühl, of course.) Needless to say French was the language of the courts of "Dresde" and "Varsovie", as well as of diplomatic correspondence. Even when Brühl wrote to his well-educated private secretary about routine matters he used French—except that sometimes he broke down here and lapsed into German.[33]

Burdened with payments to Prussia, the Saxon financial administration barely managed to pay the costs of the court. Something had to be cut in the years following the Dresden Peace, and it is not very surprising that Brühl made reductions in the military establishment.[34] He had seen that the number of troops Saxony threw into the balance were as nothing compared to the large political factors involved in great-power politics. The observation, valid enough—or so it seemed, fit in beautifully with the predisposition of Brühl to diplomatic rather than military adventure. In fact, from 1746 on, Brühl's foreign policy centered around the possibility of bringing about a reconciliation between the two courts of Vienna and Versailles, in the hope of isolating Frederick II.[35] He never abandoned his "line to St. Petersburg", but he concentrated on getting French subsidies for the Saxon army, and he married off the Wettin princess Maria Josepha to the French Dauphin. He actually helped to make the Austro-French phase of the settlement of Aix-la-Chapelle possible—the first step on the way to the reversal of alliances of 1756. In general, Brühl like Frederick II, was following a policy of watchful waiting within the shifting power constellation of the early fifties.

---

[33]"A Monsieur Heinicke, Secretair privé du Roy à Dresde: (probably from the fifth of October 1743 at Hubertusburg) Monsieur, J'ay recu votre lettre avec le dessin et le promemoria en partant pour la chasse. Je trouve votre idee fort bonne, il n'y a qu'une chose a considerer que la chatouille ne sera jamais en grande sureté, cependant cela me plait d'autant plus qu'il y aura du jour suffisant pour voir. Que vous cachez le mauvais trou ou on doit faire le feu dans l'autre chambre est fort bonne, il n'y a que le fourneau, der Wind Offn, fürchte ich, wird nicht gut aussehn, zum wenigsten wird es ein Porzelainer hübscher Offn seyn und soll in Acht genommen werden müssen, dass es nicht raucht. Der Offn ist sehr gut in das Zimmer, denn wann ich die Thur offen lasse, kann ich die Retirade zu gleicher Zeit warm haben. Die Klingel wird freylich müssen gemacht werden, zumahl da man sonst die Domestiques nicht errufen konnte. Je me remets a votre gout et invention, tout ce que je vous prie est de presser et de faire encore les Portiques au petit gardin a l'entrée de la nouvelle Galerie, et den Platz planer und reine machen zu lassen. Es ist in grosster Eyl, denn ich gehe gleich auf die Jagdt. Den Riss behalte und verharre alle Zeit mit Plaisir.

Monsieur
votre adonné serviteur
Conte de Brühl"

Printed in Schmidt, *op. cit.*, 23; the other letter referred to in the text, *Ibid.*, 43-44. Apparently French failed to express the demands of Brühl's German soul for comfort and convenience in his new Dresden *Palais*: the *Retirade* which he desired to have heated is described by Schmidt as a "green and gilt closet, equipped as a night toilet".
French administrative vocabulary in Brühl's Saxony cited from court calendar for Saxony, in Philipp, *Sulkowski und Brühl*, 90:

> "Das Cabinet dirigiret und hat den Vortrag und Anordnung derer drey Departements als: Domestique, Militaire und Etranger, le premier-ministre, Se. Exzellenz, Graf von Brühl."

[34]Schuster and Francke, *op. cit.*, II, 63-72.

[35]Four days after the peace was signed at Dresden, the Austrian plenipotentiary, Harrach wrote home:

In Poland Brühl was attempting to build up a machine he could control. From 1743 until 1752 he tried the Czartoryski family since they were the spearheads of the Polish reform movement.[36] By the latter date it was clear that they were following their own ends, and *not* winning out against the Potockis, Saxony's old enemies, the allies of France, and the exponents of Polish decentralization. Brühl therefore shifted his emphasis while retaining his scheme of building a dependable machine. He married his only daughter to one of the important magnates of the Potocki family system, George Mniszek, who promised to conciliate the Potockis and their kin in return for control over all appointments to vacancies in Poland. With this huge spoils system Brühl hoped to create a loyal force, which with French subsidies, could be armed for a coup at the proper moment. The great "moment" for all Brühl's schemes arrived in 1756, but the cards turned out all different from the ones he had bet on.

Ironically a diplomatic "leak" from Brühl's own chancellery was the match which started the powder train of the Seven Years War, a war from which Saxony emerged in despair and ruin.[37] Frederick II, by means of a paid agent in Dresden, learned of Saxon-Russian negotiations which were part of the broad coalition being cooked up against him. He therefore launched across Saxony in August 1756 toward Bohemia, with 70,000 troops. Saxony by now possessed 18,000. Some of this 18,000 were able to hold up the Prussians at Pirna, south of Dresden, against all expectations, until October 16, 1756, their capitulation being partly due to lack of supplies. Frederick then occupied Saxony, which he mulcted efficiently for the next six years, of men for his armies and of supplies and wealth.[38]

Brühl, having fled to Warsaw with Frederick August II, was thrown back on his Polish machine, which, however, refused to function to aid Germans against Germans. In fact the rejected Czartoryskis had centered their might behind Stanislaus Poniatowski, a young man who had been sent upon the outbreak of the war as the Wettin's envoy to St. Petersburg with instructions to hasten Russian aid against Frederick II. His aim and that of

---

"Le C. de Brühl m'a toujours parlé sur le ton, comme s'il desirait que nous fissions la paix avec la France pour recommencer la querelle avec le Roi de Prusse . . . "

Cited along with four other communications of a similar purport in Reinhold Becker, *Der Dresdener Friede und die Politik Brühls,* Leipzig, 1902, 131, note 1.

[36]Konopczyński, *op. cit.,* 30-38.

[37]The remainder of the narrative is based on Atkinson, *op. cit.,* 194-293 ("The Seven Years War"), Boroviczeny, *op. cit.,* 443-486, Schmidt, *op. cit.,* 301-314 ("Brühl und die Seinen wahrend des Siebenjährigen Krieges"), and Konopczyński, *op. cit.,* 39-45.

[38]The letters of Maria Josepha, the Habsburg consort of Frederick August II, and of Maria Antonia, her Wittelsbach daughter-in-law to and from Maria Theresia in the years 1756-1763 make exciting and interesting reading. They were left in Dresden when the "court" and the "administration" moved to Warsaw. (Maria Josepha died in November 1757) Maria Antonia often expressed veiled dislike for Brühl and "his minions" although she was beholden to him for favors just as were the others of the court, *Kaiserin Maria Theresia und Kurfürstin Maria Antonia von Sachsen, Briefwechsel 1747-1777 (mit einem Anhang ergänzender Briefe),* Woldemar Lippert, ed., Leipzig, 1908, 22-195, 302-309, 314-315.

the Czartoryskis became the removal of the Wettins from the throne of Poland. Poniatowski's liaison with Catherine only aided this. By 1762 when Elisabeth died, the "young court" of Peter III and Catherine II was ready to break with the long-standing Russian policy of supporting the Wettins in Poland. Brühl had relied on the "unbeatable" great powers of France, Austria and Russia to extricate him from the "temporary" defeat and the Prussian occupation which began in 1756. He came close to seeing Frederick defeated.

The years 1758-1760 were times of great hopes and disappointments. In 1760 Frederick was outside Dresden trying to get back in, while Russian troops were looting Berlin. But the war dragged on. Events far away from Germany shaped the will of the great powers. When the principals of the struggle were ready to make peace with Frederick, Saxony could only accede —in the treaty of Hubertusburg of 15 February 1763. Brühl was a sick man when he returned to Dresden that April. The Saxon administrative system was at a standstill. The financial system was a shambles. The last straw was the death of the Elector-King on October fifth, which reopened the Polish political sore at a fatal time. Brühl resigned immediately afterwards, living only three weeks in the atmosphere of vilification and rising anger against his supposed "enormities". The lame Frederick Christian lived as the new Elector only into December, when his death left Saxony in the hands of his Wittelsbach widow, Maria Antonia. The Poles chose Stanislaus Poniatowski for their king—a Russian puppet. Saxony entered upon a sober and almost "isolationist" period of reconstruction after 1763—a reaction which contributed to the view sponsored by Frederick II that Brühl, and not a long occupation by his Prussian troops had ruined Saxony. There was to be one more trial at great-power politics under the tutelage of Napoleon, after which Saxony sank back into the ranks of the *Mittelstaaten* of Germany, from which it had emerged under August "der Starke". Nineteenth century Saxons recalled Brühl with a smile of tolerance: "Ein ganz grosser Gauner!" a big crook.

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

LORD CURZON AND PASHITCH
LIGHT ON JUGOSLAVIA, TURKEY AND GREECE IN 1922

A personal record by Lazare Marcovitch

1

IN October 1922 the Prime Minister of Jugoslavia, Nikolas Pashitch, had left for Paris, in order to meet the French responsible factors. He wanted to get direct knowledge of various aspects of the post-war situation in Europe, particularly of French-British divergencies on many vital points of European policy. Pashitch had good reason for anxiety. Only four years after the end of the war the allied solidarity seemed indeed to have gone forever. The cabinets of London and Paris seemed willing to return to old methods of purely nationalistic, *i.e.* egoistic, political aims and tendencies. Friendship and mutual confidence between the two principal democratic powers were not formally denied, but practically and effectively Paris and London, in some important matters of international policy, had adopted separate and even conflicting lines of conduct.

For a while this very regrettable discord was guarded in diplomatic circles as a great secret. Public opinion of the two countries lived in the illusion that the unity of views and of action, which had so brilliantly distinguished the allied military operations in 1918, and which alone could lead to the crushing victory over German militarism, would continue after the war. The Allies badly needed such unity for the successful post-victory settlement of the important questions of organizing and securing a just and lasting peace.

But the failure of the Genoa Economic Conference in the first half of 1922 revealed the split, producing great confusion in all former allied countries. It was a very bad omen for the anticipated organization of Europe, on the basis of solidarity, and in accordance with the high ideals which had inspired the allied nations in their hard fight against the German aggression.

In the fall of 1922 the outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East, between Greece and Turkey, disturbed the former Allies even more. This war in the vicinity of Jugoslavia brought a new proof of the absence of any common French-British policy for Europe. The Turkish army, reorganized by Kemal Pasha, had inflicted heavy losses on the unprepared Greek troops which were concentrated in Smyrna and other coastal cities having a numerous Greek population. These territories in Asia Minor were considered by Greece as a part of her national property, but Kemal Pasha was strongly opposed to any idea of their separation from the Turkish Republic.

In this conflict Great Britain stood openly on the side of Greece. The British fleet, stationed in the Straits, was ready to intervene and to check the Turkish advance. The British government was interested in the fate

of Constantinople, and of the Straits, and apparently did not wish to leave the Straits in the possession of a regenerated Turkey. The Turkish government, on the other hand, enjoyed the sympathy and the support of France, whose oriental policy, linked with the protection of the Islamic world, ran counter to the British plans. The continuation of the Greco-Turkish war threatened to compromise definitely Anglo-French relations, and to paralyze the only positive forces capable of restoring peace in Europe.

As regards Jugoslavia, she was deeply impressed by the events in Turkey. We were manifestly interested in the maintenance of peace in the Balkans, and in the Near East in general. If the French-British solidarity should be destroyed, the position of Jugoslavia would become precarious in many ways. We had therefore serious reasons to fear for our security. The question of the Straits, alone, could effect the Southern Slavonic navigation interests, in connection with the Danude and the Danubian water-way.

So the Southern Slav Prime Minister had much to do in Paris, and he did not go there alone. He invited his foreign minister, Nintchitch, who was in Geneva attending the second General Assembly of the League of Nations, to come to the French capital at the end of the session of the League, in order to assist him in his consultations. One other member of the Southern Slavonic government happened to be in Paris—the author of this memoir. In 1922, as Minister of Justice, I had been a member of Mr. Pashitchs' cabinet, and Mr. Pashitch considered me among his useful and reliable collaborators.

But I had not come to Paris on the invitation of Pashitch. On the contrary, I had myself asked Mr. Pashitch for permission to go to the French capital, for as Minister of Justice I had to settle personally a very important problem of my administration. The Ministry of Justice was concerned with all questions pertaining to the problem of reparations from Germany. In particular I wanted to get from the French government their agreement and their support for a special plan elaborated by myself, designed to secure for Jugoslavia deliveries in kind, in a much greater proportion than was forseen by the general plan of reparations. It was a matter of great economic importance for my country.

In Paris I had taken care to precede the reception of Mr. Pashitch by Mr. Poincaré, and through our Legation I had begged the French Prime Minister for an immediate audience, which was granted. Mr. Poincaré received me cordially, and listened very attentively to my exposé. He promised, in a most friendly way, to give me his support. I reported to Mr. Pashitch on the success of my mission, and I was happy to have been able to procure for my country a great quantity of railway material, electric and other industrial installations, motors, cars, agricultural, textile and many other machines and tools, telephonic material and equipment, sanitary material and equipment, and all kinds of other useful goods badly needed by Jugoslavia. I had secured the delivery of these goods on the account of reparations in kind, from Germany, without having to pay for it.

II

In Paris Pashitch had taken up his residence in the Hotel Continental, where I also used to stay when I visited the French capital. A suite was reserved in the same hotel for Nintchitch, so we had the opportunity to be together at any moment of the day. The Southern Slav minister in Paris, Spalaïkovitch, called every morning at our hotel, at the "seat" of the government, as he liked to say in jest, but even in the afternoon we did not fail to appear in the rooms of the Prime Minister. An old man not interested in Paris itself, Pashitch requested our company when he was free from official calls and duties, and we were obliged to conform to his wishes.

In the second week of our stay in Paris, King Alexander, accompanied by the queen, arrived from Carlsbad and took lodgings in the Hotel Meurice. From that time on our daily conferences had the form of official sittings in committee, to expedite urgent questions of policy or administration. We acted as if we were in our own country, and we awaited the opportunity to be united in council, in the presence of the king, and to report officially on the results of our actions abroad. Nintchitch had prepared a short report on the session of the League of Nations, and Spalaïkovitch, for a long time our minister in Paris, was due to explain the French policy and the general situation in France. I wanted to inform the king of the very friendly reception by the French Prime Minister, of my request, and of the promise made by Mr. Poincaré. As regards Mr. Pashitch, he reserved his views. He said he would have to consult the king before deciding what he should tell the committee of his Parisian talks.

One afternoon we were so assembled in the working room of Mr. Pashitch, talking of the divergencies between London and Paris, which, no longer secret, formed the main topic of conversations in political circles in Paris. The papers were full of comments on the situation in the Near East, and on the retreat of the Greek army. Pashitch listened silently to our remarks, and he informed us that on the following day we should be ready for the council that was to be held under the presidency of the king. We were on the point of leaving when the secretary of the Prime Minister, Mr. B. Christitch, entered the cabinet and said that a representative of the British Embassy had just telephoned. The British Minister for Foreign Affairs, Lord Curzon, had arrived in Paris that afternoon, and wanted to see Mr. Pashitch before he met the French political leaders. We were greatly surprised to hear it, but Pashitch's placid face did not change at all. He said to Cristitch:

"Well, I am prepared to meet Lord Curzon when and where he wishes." The secretary replied that Lord Curzon would be pleased to call at the residence of Mr. Pashitch that afternoon, if the President was free to receive him.

"You can telephone that I shall receive him with great pleasure." A

few minutes later the secretary came back to say that the British Minister would call at the Hotel Continental in fifteen minutes. We got up to leave, but Mr. Pashitch told us to stay until the arrival of Lord Curzon was announced. The traffic in the streets of Paris was rather difficult, he explained, and Lord Curzon might arrive later than he expected. We remained, therefore, in the cabinet of Mr. Pashitch, but we did not speak any more, as our thoughts were absorbed by the coming call. What was the object of his visit, and why did he say that he needed to see Mr. Pashitch before Pashitch called on Mr. Poincaré? We were very anxious to know, but we did not dare to put a direct question to the President. We hoped that he might say something himself, but we were disappointed. He sat silently in his chair, looking rather more serene than before. His widely open eyes expressed some mysterious feeling that we were unable to penetrate.

The silence was broken by the reappearance of the secretary to announce that Lord Curzon had arrived. We jumped from our seats to leave the room, but Pashitch retained us again by a movement of his hand.

"Please don't go yet for one or two minutes." And turning to the secretary he said:

"Tell His Excellency that I shall receive him in two minutes, as soon as I have taken leave of my ministers."

When the secretary disappeared, Pashitch looked at our rather astonished faces, and said in his quiet and grave voice:

"Don't stop talking, and talk loudly until you leave. Remember, this is the first time in the history of Serbia and Jugoslavia, that an outstanding member of the British government has called personally to request something from us. I am letting the noble lord wait in the ante-chamber to make him feel that he is the requesting party."

We could hardly speak for surprise, but Pashitch did not reveal any nervousness. After two or three minutes, or perhaps four—I could not judge —he rose and said:

"Now you can go."

We left hurriedly, and while I was standing in the doorway, I looked back to see Pashitch opening the door on the opposite side and saying in his broken French:

"Come in, please. I beg you to excuse me. I had a conference . . . . " Closing the door behind me, I could neither see Lord Curzon nor hear what he said. I reached my colleagues in the small salon, and we waited there until the secretary appeared to inform us that the British Minister had gone. The conversation had lasted forty minutes. We rushed into the cabinet of Mr. Pashitch, but we were deeply disappointed, as the Prime Minister was quite reticent.

"I am tired," he said. "I wish to rest a little, as I have a very important appointment in the evening. Please come to-morrow morning at a quarter to ten exactly. The king will receive us at ten. I shall report in his presence on the visit of Lord Curzon, and of the proposals he made to me."

IV

It was useless to insist or to ask any further questions. Pashitch had ordered tea, and he told us to take it in his salon. After that we could leave. He retired immediately to his bedroom without having said anything more. While the tea was served, the secretary Christitch who had joined us, was called to the telephone. He brought us a new surprise. The British Embassy had telephoned that Lord Curzon wished to see our foreign minister Nintchitch. He begged Nintchitch to call at the Embassy at whatever hour he liked, but as soon as possible, for a very important matter.

Nintchitch was perplexed. He could not go without having informed the Prime Minister, but he was hesitant to trouble the old man in his rest. Necessity prevailed, and he knocked at the door of the bedroom. Pashitch was not asleep. He told Nintchitch to go immediately, and he advised him to listen carefully to the words of the British Minister, but not to engage himself in any way. He had to say that he had not seen Pashitch after the visit of Lord Curzon, and that he should meet him only the following morning. In some way it was true, as even now Pashitch did not describe to Nintchitch the real object of the British call. There was no time for a longer conversation, and besides Pashitch was resting in his bed. But I presume that the real reason for Pashitch's reticence was his wish to inform the king in the first place.

I waited with Spalaïkovitch for the return of Nintchitch. He remained in the Embassy for half an hour, but when he came back he was unable to see the Prime Minister at once. The secretary said the old man had forbidden anyone to disturb him until seven o'clock in the evening.

Spalaïkovitch and I had plenty of time to talk with Nintchitch. He told us that strange things were happening, and that he did not quite understand what it all meant. He related his conversation with the British Minister. Lord Curzon had received him very cordially.

"Dear Mr. Nintchitch, you will oblige me if you help me to present correctly the policy of your government. I made to your President a formal proposal on behalf of the British government, to join the British Empire in an eventual war against Turkey. I have talked with Mr. Pashitch for forty minutes, but I am unable to say exactly what answer he gave me. Either he does not know French, or I don't understand it. I believed in the first moment that he agreed with me, but later in the conversation he made reservations and he put in so many "if's" that really I do not know what to think of him. I am expected to send Mr. Pashitch's response to London this evening, and I beg you to indicate to me at least the main points of his reply."

But Nintchitch could not fulfill this request. He explained to him that he had not seen Mr. Pashitch after the departure of Lord Curzon, and that he would be in the position to inform the British government of

the formal answer of Jugoslavia only the next day, in the afternoon. He was very sorry that even personally he could not express any opinion on a matter of such exceptional importance.

I left Nintchitch to wait for the Prime Minister, and I took a solitary walk in the Tuileries Gardens. I recollected all elements of the international situation, in an effort to penetrate the mystery of the British policy. The London cabinet, it was clear, asked for allies, and they had in view Jugoslavia, although our relations with the British Empire did not justify the supposition that in case of a British-French divergency, we might join Britian and not France. At the Conference in Genoa, in a similar situation, we had defended the French point of view, but Lord Curzon might have ignored it. I could now understand why Pashitch gave an evasive answer to the British proposals.

V

The next day we were assembled in the salon of the royal suite in the Hotel Meurice. The king, after having graciously exchanged some polite words with each of us, invited us to present the reports of our activity abroad, and of the objects of our missions. Pashitch spoke first, limiting himself to the visit of Lord Curzon and to the conversation he had had with him. The British Minister had insisted on the necessity of definitely expelling the Turks from Europe, and particularly from the Balkans. He recalled the Serbian slavery under Turkish domination, and he thought that the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, as the continuation of Serbia, should be glad to see the Turks pushed back to Asia. He invited our government to take part in the military action which Great Britain was intending to undertake, in order to alleviate the position of the Greeks, and to hamper and break the revival of Turkish militarism.

Lord Curzon considered the possession of Constantinople and of the Straits to be the main support of Turkish power in Europe and he felt that they should be deprived of this possession. The British government was offering to our kingdom a permanent seat on the international commission which would be endowed with the administration and control of free navigation in the Straits. In the war with Turkey we would participate with one complete division with all armaments, munitions, and war expenses to be furnished by Great Britain.

Pashitch explained that he had only listened to the proposals of the British Minister. The remarks he had made concerned some particular points on which he had expressed his agreement or his opposition. He did not engage either himself or the government of Belgrade. He said that he had expressed his willingness to join Great Britain as the allied power, but he pointed out the necessity to consider an eventual war against Turkey as a

common allied action, conducted in the first line by the joint efforts of France and Britain.

In the course of the conversation Pashitch had told Lord Curzon that in his opinion the question of the Straits was an international affair, and that the interests of all states bordering on the Black Sea should be taken into consideration. He had Russia in mind particularly, but he did not mention her expressly. He had spoken only hypothetically, and had promised to give his definite answer after the consultation with the king and with the ministers then present in Paris.

In the discussion which followed our attention was centered on the necessity of maintaining French-British solidarity. We were unanimous in thinking, in conformity with foreign policy since the creation of Jugoslavia, that we were unable to do anything without the approval of France. Our peoples knew that Great Britain had also contributed to the formation of the Salonika front, and to the liberation and union of our nation, but nevertheless everybody considered France as the truest and most sincere friend of our country. A quite sentimental link existed between us and the French nation, and it dominated our post-war policy.

For that and other reasons it was out of the question that we could be induced to take part in a purely British action, undertaken without French approval and directed, in some way, also against the French policy in the Middle East.

We proceeded thus to formulate a polite but negative reply to the British proposals. It contained three main points: in the first we expressed our thanks to the British Government for their confidence in Jugoslavia, and for the kind invitation to join them in a common action. We said that as an allied state, and in remembrance of the aid given by Great Britain to Serbia in the last war, we were always disposed to march shoulder to shoulder with Britain, on the path toward a peace based on liberty and democracy.

In the second point, we stressed the necessity to maintain the unity of the allied action. We observed in this connection that our position was very delicate, as we felt attached to France and to the French nation. We expressed the hope that in conversations Lord Curzon was expected to have in Paris, an agreement with the French government would be reached, and we concluded that we were afraid that in case of a split between our great friends and allies, we should be unable to play the arbiter, or to take the part of either of them.

In the third point, we agreed with the British government that the problem of the Straits had an international character, and that Jugoslavia as a Mediterranen State, and also because of her Danubian water-way, was interested in its solution. An agreement of all interested powers appeared therefore to be indispensable.

Here, Mr. Pashitch suggested adding that Russia, with a free outlet from the Black Sea through the Straits, had a vital interest, but the king objected. He said that Russia was included among the "interested powers," and that it was not necessary to mention her particularly. It was sufficient that in the conversation with Lord Curzon, Pashitch had made an allusion to her. If we insisted, it could give to our reply a special significance, without any practical value for us. The king was opposed to the inclusion of things which had no actual importance. We should not extend the problem beyond the limits indicated in the point two of our answer. What mattered now was a joint British-French action, and the unity of views between London and Paris. But the king did not deny that Pashitch was right in thinking of the Rusian nation and of their vital interest in a just and practical solution of the question of the Straits. Pashitch was satisfied with this admission, and he withdrew his suggestion.

VI

We had charged the foreign minister with personally transmitting our answer to the British offer, and he did so on the same afternoon. I have reason to believe that our firm and quite objective stand contributed to the restoring of British-French unity. The British government abandoned the project of a separate action, and they yielded to the French arguments. An agreement was reached in Paris, and the hostilities between Turks and Greeks were suspended. The Turkish and the Greek governments entered into negotiations which resulted in the conclusion of a solid and lasting peace between the two countries.

Jugoslavia had scored a positive point in international politics. We had shown that we were loyal to our friends, to France and to Britain. The government of Belgrade could not be drawn into any particular or adventurous policy.

As for Great Britain and France, their responsible leaders were wise enough to return to the policy of European solidarity, and to form in the forthcoming Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs and the treaty of peace with Turkey (December 1922—August 1923), a united front against the excessive pretensions of the Soviet Union.

But the most profitable use of the experience of 1922 has been made by Greece and Turkey. After many scruples and hesitations, they made the bold resolution to turn over a new leaf, and to follow another direction. Their leaders saw the futility of any further quarelling and fighting, and they agreed to arrive, by mutual concessions and adjustments, at the peaceful settlement of all questions, even the most delicate questions of territorial possessions, of national minorities and of similar problems which had divided them. A real peace was restored, and the two countries became friends. In the following years they matured even more, and together with

Romania and Jugoslavia, in the thirties, they formed The Balkan Entente.[1] Unfortunately the hostile and reluctant attitude of the Bulgarian rulers did not permit the Balkan countries to realize a big peaceful bloc capable of protecting the Balkans against any interference by great powers.

Today Greece and Turkey give to the world a high example of political culture. The western peoples should learn from the lesson offered by these two states, one Asiatic and the other Balkan; one Islamic and the other Christian. The notion "European" does not seem to possess any more its former significance, as we see two peripheral states, old foes for centuries and usually belittled by the "western" world, marching in the van of political progress, on the way to a real international community.

Belgrade, Yugoslavia

[1]See the author's article in French: "Deux remarques sur le Pacte d'Entente Balkanique" published in the *Annuaire de l'Association Yugoslave de Droit International*, 2 vols. (Paris 1934, Les Editions Internationales, 4 bis, rue des Ecoles).

THE TRANSYLVANIAN QUESTION: ROMANIA AND THE BELLIGERENTS JULY–OCTOBER 1914

by Zoltan Szaz

THE fatal shooting of the Austro-Hungarian heir-presumptive in Sarajewo was regarded by the diplomats of the Ballhausplatz not only as a political and dynastic calamity, but also as a dangerous threat to the territorial integrity of the Monarchy, and to the maintenance of law and order in Bosnia and Hercegovina. Berchtold, Stürgkh and von Hötzendorf were convinced that any conciliatory attitude would be interpreted as a sign of increasing Entente-superiority, and would accelerate the re-emergence of a Balkan alliance under Russian auspices. This, in turn, would have imperiled the position of Austria-Hungary as a European power and would have decreased the importance of the Triple Alliance in the balance of power system of Europe.[1]

Due to the reluctance of the old Emperor, Francis Joseph, and the Hungarian Prime Minister, Count Stephan Tisza, no immediate action was taken, in spite of the fact that warlike action in the days after June 28 would have aroused less opposition than one month later.[2] Tisza, greatly disturbed by these events, was unwilling to agree to the harsh measures which Berchtold wanted to employ, and advised moderation. On July 1, he brought up two objections: first, that there was not enough evidence to hold Serbia officially responsible, and therefore, in case of a war, the Monarchy would have the worst possible *locus standi*; and second, that Romania was practically lost as an ally and there was no substitute for her because Bulgaria, the only potential ally, was defeated in 1913. Tisza wanted to postpone any decision until the Balkan situation was cleared up. He expressed similar views at the meeting of the *Ministerrat für gemeinsame auswärtige*

---

[1]Bittner, L. and H. Übersberger, edd., *Österreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik von der bosnischen Krise 1908 bis zum Kriegsausbruch 1914. Diplomatische Aktenstücke des österreichisch-ungarischen Ministerium des Äusseren*, Volume VIII (1.Mai bis 1. August 1914) Wien und Leipzig, 1930, pp. 250-261. Handschreiben Kaiser Franz Josephs an Kaiser Wilhelm II von July 2, 1914 with an Appendix: "Auch Du wirst nach dem jüngsten furchtbaren Geschehnisse in Bosnien die Überzeugung haben, dass an eine Versöhnung des Gegensatzes, welcher Serbien von uns trennt, nicht mehr zu denken ist, und dass die erhaltende Friedenspolitik aller europäischen Monarchen bedroht sein wird, solange dieser Herd von verbrecherischer Agitation in Belgrad unbestraft fortlebt." The appendix also warns of the menace of a Balkan alliance: "Ein Bündnis der Balkanstaaten kann sich . . . da eine gemeinsame Aktion gegen die Türkei nicht mehr in Frage kommt, nur gegen Österreich-Ungarn richten, und nur auf der Basis eines Programmes zustande gebracht werden, das in der letzten Linie auf Kosten der territorialen Integrität der Monarchie allen Teilnehmern durch eine staffelweise Verrückung der Grenzen von Ost nach West Gebietserweiterungen in Aussicht stellt. Eine Einigung der Balkanstaaten . . . ist . . . auf bestem Wege, zur Tatsache zu werden."

[2]"On aurait pu penser que, le lendemain, dans un moment d'excitation l'Autriche addressait à la Serbie un ultimatum brutale."—Viviani, at the session of the French Chamber of Deputies, July 5, 1922, as quoted in Horváth, Eugene, *A magyar kérdès a XX. században; I. Felelösèg a világháborúért és a békeszerzödésért*, Budapest, 1939, p. 193.

Angelegenheiten, but his opposition was overridden by the united efforts of Berchtold, Giesl, the Minister in Belgrade, and the overzealous German ambassador, von Tschirschky. He still insisted that the Monarchy should inform the European Powers that she did not intend to annex any Serbian territory.

The Hungarian Prime Minister was part Western intellectual and part Hungarian nationalist. He did not look forward with pleasure to leading his country into a war, and he expressed these views in a letter to his niece:[3]

"Für meine Seele bedeutet jeder Krieg Elend, Qual, Verwüstung, das Vergiessen des unschuldigen Blutes, die Leiden unschuldiger Frauen und Kinder. Mich erbittert es, dass ich teilhabe an der Leitung eines solchen Krieges."

Yet no one could accuse him of pacifism. He was afraid to expose the realm of St. Stephen to the changing fortunes of war because he was convinced that peace alone could save the weakened structure of the Hungarian nation-state. He considered it to be his duty to remain Prime Minister, because he suspected—and not without reason—that other politicians would pursue egoistic policy instead of acting solely in the interests of the Hungarian nation; thus he was not influenced by the loyalty declarations of the opposition parties.[4]

Considering the relations between Austria-Hungary and Romania, we have to bear in mind that Romania had formed a part of the Bismarckian system of alliances since 1882. Until 1912, despite the rising unpopularity of Austria-Hungary among the public, Romania was a reliable ally of the Triple Alliance. The absolute loyalty of the old king, who was a Hohenzollern, and the military weakness of Romania compared with the great armies of Germany and Austria-Hungary, were safeguards for Romania's attitude in case of a world conflict. Between 1905 and 1912 Russian military power was not held in much esteem, due to the loss of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 and the Revolution of 1905. Thus the Francophil Liberal Party could hardly change the basic attitude of Romania's policy, even if the alliance was held secret. The wars of 1912-13 changed the situation. Romania, participating in the war against Bulgaria, gained military victories that raised her confidence tremendously; notwithstanding the fact that the Romanians were attacking a state which had to fight against the armies of four states and whose main forces were deployed in Macedonia. Bulgaria now lost her territorial gains and for the moment was removed as

[3]For Tisza's attitude, see: Vortrag of 1. Juli: *Graf Stefan Tisza, Ungarischer Ministerpräsident, Briefe (1914-1918)* ed. by the Ungarische Akademie der Wissenschaften. Berlin, 1928. Vol. I, 37ff. In the Council for Common Foreign Affairs on July 8: *Diplomatische Aktenstücke zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges 1914. Ergänzungen und Nachträge zum Österreichisch-Ungarischem Rotbuch.* Part I. *28 Juni bis zum 23. Juli 1914.* Wien, 1919, (abbreviated as *Rotbuch*), pp. 42-46. Cf. also *Inmediatbericht zum Kaiser* on July 8, and in the Council on July 19, *ibid.*, pp. 62-67. For his letters to his niece, see *Gróf Tisza István összes munkái*, ed. by the Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, 4th series, Vol. II. *Levelek, táviratok, távbeszélön küldött üzenetek, egyes elöterjestések 1914 júniusától december végéig.* Budapest, 1924, pp. 89-90.

[4]*Parlamenti Napló,* Vol. XXVI, Budapest, 1915, 209-211. and Vol. XXVII, 58.

a potential threat. But the Monarchy, fearing the continuous increase of Serbian power, was unwilling to abandon Bulgaria as a counterweight against Serbia and tried earnestly, but unsuccessfully, to bring about a Congress of the Great Powers. These attempts were regarded as unfriendly acts by the Romanian government, and produced lasting ill-will in Bucarest. The German opposition, however, prevented Austria-Hungary from redistributing the spoils which would seriously have interfered with the Romanian gain of Dobrudja in the Second Balkan War. Nevertheless, easily aroused public opinion regarded the Monarchy as a natural enemy of Romania who wanted to thwart any of Romania's ambitions. Some circles began openly to plead for a Balkan alliance or even for a treaty with Russia. The leader of the Liberal Party, Bratianu, took over in 1913, and protected by the secrecy of the treaty with the Triple Alliance, declared openly that Romania possessed complete freedom of action. Even the Ballhausplatz was aware of the fact " . . . that broad circles of the army, of the intelligentsia, and of the people were won over to a political reorientation of Romania which would aim at an alliance with Russia and at the liberation of the brothers beyond the Carpathians."[5]

Until June 28, 1914, the situation still failed to arouse any deep anxiety in Vienna. The reason was that Berchtold had the impression that Romania still hoped for a settlement of the Transylvanian question along the lines of the policy projects of Francis Ferdinand, as soon as the old Emperor died. The heir-presumptive, according to members of his household and his political associates, was determined to bring about a reorganization of the Empire on new premises and was generally considered pro-Romanian. Romanian hope was greatly based on the personality of Count Czernin who was appointed as envoy to Bucarest in 1913. According to him, most of the Romanian politicians believed that the transformation of the monarchy after the accession of Francis Ferdinand would satisfy Romanian demands. Even the later warmonger Filipescu, reported Czernin, was willing to wait for the realization of his aim that Transylvania should be united with Romania and that this Greater Romania should eventually be united with the Habsburg Empire possessing a similar status to that of Bavaria in the German Empire.[6]

All in all, the Romanian politicians were already disloyal to the idea of the alliance, but still believed that they could make a better bargain with the Triple Alliance than with the Entente, and respected the military and economic strength of Germany. But the assassination of Francis Ferdinand deprived them of any possible Habsburg help, and from then on the anti-Magyar Romanians who heartily desired the unification of all their fellow-

[5] *Dipl. Aktenst.* VIII, 258.

[6] Czernin, *Im Weltkriege*. (Berlin, 1919) declares that he reported the situation to Vienna. Of course, he did not fail to realize that the alliance was "unter den obwaltenden Umständen nichts anderes als ein in haltloser Fetzen Papier," pp. 106-107. Cf. *Dipl. Aktenst.* VIII, 13-15 of May 2, 1914, concerning German optimism. Czernin attempted to revive the alliance, but failed to arrive at a positive solution. Reports 9600, 9601, 9615 *ibid.*, VII, 1073-79; 1092-93.

nationals in a "Greater Romania" could hardly cherish any hope of aid from Vienna. The expressions of condolence for the Archduke were certainly genuine, and there is little doubt about the sincerity of Take Ionescu's weeping in the drawing-room of the Austrian Embassy. But the heir-presumptive's death decided the future of Romania's foreign policy.

If we look at the political scene in Romania in July 1914, the situation was just at Tisza had warned. Next to a hostile public opinion, Bratianu himself was known as a Francophil, and only a fraction of the Conservative Party under Peter Carp was still in favor of the continuation of the alliance.

A good insight into the Austrophobia of the masses may be gained from reading the report of the German enovy von Walthausen of April 1914, describing the meeting of the Liga Culturâlea. The decision of the annual convention declared that every Romanian should protest within his vocational group against the insult given to Romanians in Transylvania where Magyar philanthropy tried to substitute itself for the Romanian rights in Hungary. One of the speakers, Antonescu, declared: "Now the hour has struck for awakening." The representatives of the university students expressed their wish to cross the Carpathians together with the same soldiers who had advanced over the Danube into Bulgaria in 1913. Following the meeting of the Liga Culturâlea the mob shouted "Down with Austria" in a demonstration before the Austrian Legation.[7]

Bratianu also gave an example of his hostility toward the Triple Alliance in June 1914. In this month, Tsar Nicolaus II visited Constanza and Sinaia, and during the visit his foreign minister Sazonov attempted a new overture for securing Romanian assistance. He also asked Bratianu to agree to a trip into Hungarian territory in Transylvania. Bratianu asked Count Czernin whether he could make a trip by car into the Southern Carpathians and eventually cross the Hungarian frontier somewhere. Czernin, anxious to remain on good terms with the Romanian Prime Minister, consented, but he heard rumors that the Prime Minister had abandoned his plan and had committed the mistake of not reporting his promise to Vienna. On June 16, however, Bratianu and Sazonov went to Nagytömös, which amounted to a demonstration of the community of interest between Romania and Russia regarding the former's claim to Transylvania. It was certainly taken in this sense by Tisza and Berchtold.[8]

Thus the relations between Romania and Austria-Hungary were far from satisfactory when, on July 28, Francis Joseph sent his telegram to King

[7] *Die Grosse Politik*, XXXIX, No. 15818, 487-497, April 8, 1914.

[8] In his memoir, Czernin stated erroneously that he did not know in advance about the visit of Sazonov to Transylvania. For contrary evidence see: *Dipl. Aktenst.* VIII, No. 9863, 147, June 15, 1914 (answer to Count Berchtold), and *ibid.*, No. 9873, 151-52, June 17, 1914, where he openly admits his *faux pas*. For the journey see *Budapesti Hirlap* June 17, 1914. About the indignation of Berchtold and Tisza, *ibid.*, p. 146, and von Tschirsky in *Die Grosse Politik* XXXIX, 520: " . . . dass aber der russische Minister der Auswärtigen in ein fremdes Land geht . . . und gerade auf das heisse Terrain Siebenbürgen, trotzdem er sich sagen musste, dass er damit irredentistischen Strömungen Vorschub leiste, das sei nicht zu verantworten, und gegen jede internationale Höflichkeit."

Carol, explaining his actions toward Serbia and asking for Romanian assistance in the spirit of the Alliance treaty. Between July 28 and August 3, Germany and Austria-Hungary exerted strong diplomatic pressure on Romania in order to encourage her to fulfil her obligations. As a first step, on July 28, Count Czernin visited King Carol and gave him the message of Francis Joseph, but he was told that Romania was hardly able to declare war on Russia. Carol alleged that, in that case, Russia would bring about an overthrow of the Austrophil government in Bulgaria, and then the latter would attack Romania. He also pointed out that public opinion was strongly excited and unfavorable to Austria-Hungary. The only promise he could give was that during his reign the Romanian army would never fight against the Powers of the Triple Alliance.[9] The next démarche was the visit of the German ambassador on July 30.

He tried to obtain the consent of the King to the publication of the secret treaty between Romania and the Triple Alliance. He also transmitted the telegram of William II who, as the head of the House of Hohenzollern, demanded a Romanian declaration of war against the Entente from Carol. After a meeting with Bratianu, the King refused for the time being to accede to the request to publish the treaty. On the same day he told Czernin that Romanian intervention is "so gut wie unmöglich." To remove the alleged obstacle of a Bulgarian menace, Bulgaria herself joined the démarche. The minister of Bulgaria transmitted a note of his government to the King which guaranteed Bulgarian neutrality for the duration of the Austro-Serbian war and friendly relations to Romania.[10] This meant the climax of German-Austrian pressure, and even Bratianu had doubts whether he could prevent Romania from joining the ranks of the Central Powers. He contemplated a journey to Vienna in order to secure the best possible deal, but within a few days the situation changed, and there was no need for him to leave his country for a visit to Berchtold.

The main reason for the decision against an intervention on the side of the Triple Alliance was military. By August 2, England had decided to join the Entente and this greatly disturbed the Romanian leaders who now ceased to believe in the possibility of a German-Austrian victory. Also, the wife of the Crown-Prince Ferdinand, Maria, was of English origin and her presence served as an influence on the neutrality party even in the royal family. A second reason was that Romania wanted to wait for the answer of Italy regarding the question of *casus foederis*. Thus no decision was taken until August 3. In spite of the optimism of Emperor William II, who on July 31 considered Romanian intervention to have been assured, and told

[9] *Dipl. Aktenst.* VIII, Nos. 10876-9, 831-33, July 28, 1914.

[10] Bulgaria: Czernin's conversation with Carol: *ibid.*, pp. 912-916. Nos. 11036-7 of July 30-31, 1914. Bulgarian démarche: *ibid.*, No. 11140-42, also "Bulgarien werde seine Neutralität nicht mehr aufrechterhalten, wenn im Falle einer allgemeinen Konflagration Rumänien sich von dem Dreibund trenne."

Szögyégy, the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in Berlin, to advise his government to promise Bessarabia to Romania.[11]

The Conservative Party, now in opposition, was divided. In the first moment, some of its leaders, including Marghiloman, agreed that Romania should fight on the side of the Triple Alliance, because a gentleman has only one word of honor, and this had already been pledged. But most of the politicians were converted to the idea of neutrality, because it was only their sense of honor, and not their mind or heart, which was pledged to the cause of the Central Powers.

On August 3, the dramatic Crown Council convened in order to decide on neutrality or intervention, in which the members of the Cabinet, the leaders of the opposition party, and the King's counsellors participated. The King opened the meeting with a short speech summarizing the situation as follows:

a. Public opinion and the army is anti-Austrian.
b. If Romania joins Austria-Hungary, Russia may win over Bulgaria, and then Romania will have to fight on two fronts and will be cut off from the sea.
c. To fight against Austria-Hungary is forbidden by the honor of the nation, because Romania is bound to the Triple Alliance by a formal treaty.

He also stated that:

1. Public opinion is not in favor of Russia.
2. Neutrality would mean to be satisfied with a secondary role.
3. The final victory of the Triple Alliance is assured and to fight on their side is a moral obligation for Romania.[12]

The moderate representatives of the Conservative Party, the former Prime Minister Rosetti and Marghiloman, objected to the conclusions and requested the maintenance of neutrality, but they encountered old Peter Carp who maintained that Russian victory would be tantamount to the death of Romania.

Prime Minister Bratianu protested and declared that "We cannot wage a war that is not understandable to the national consciousness of our people and is opposed by them." Once more the solemn answer came from Carp: "This would be a policy of cowardice; you do not have the courage to bear the responsibility of this hour, and seek refuge behind the smokescreen of public opinion." The sincere resoluteness of Carol and Carp's rhetoric induced some of the members to reconsider their views, and it seemed as if the king had won the argument.

[11] *Dipl. Aktenst.* Nos. 11133-34, 947-49. Szögyégy wrote: "Der soeben aus Rumänien zurückgekehrte Graf Hutten-Czapski habe Kaiser Wilhelm seine vollste Überzeugung ausgesprochen, dass Rumänien aktiv auf der Seite des Dreibundes eingreifen werde. Kaiser Wilhelm fügte daran die Bemerkung, Österreich-Ungarn solle doch Rumänien Bessarabien versprechen."

[12] Szász, Zs., "Románia és a központi hatalmak I. Károly király haláláig." II. Az 1914. augusztus 3-i koronatonács", *Magyar Szemle*, XXII (1934), 94-104. Brings a complete recapitulation of the Crown Council on the basis of Romanian sources.

As already mentioned, most of the wavering politicians were waiting for the Italian answer to the German-Austrian request of *intervention*. In the midst of the session of the Crown Council, a telegram was given to the king, and it reported the decision of Italy to remain neutral in the war. The decision of the Crown Council was now nearly unanimously in favor of neutrality. Carp, the only dissenter, stated bitterly:

"Sire, I want to state that in the gravest moment regarding the future of the country, and after a reign of fifty years which meant a long and continuous national development, Your Majesty was left alone by each party and every party leader."

Carol's attempt to resign failed to move the politicians, and with the exception of Carp, everybody voted for the maintenance of neutrality. Carol, as a constitutional monarch, had to acquiesce. Such was the tragedy of a ruler who, for fifty years, had tried to transform his country from a Balkan principality into a Central European power. Czernin and Queen Elizabeth both described the scene when Carol, after the Crown Council, with tears in his eyes tried to tear off the order of the "Pour le mérite" from his chest.[13]

But the King's emotional display did not alter the situation. The attitude of watchful neutrality was adopted, and Romania tried to make the best of the murderous struggle between the Great Powers. These attempts were directed by Bratianu and Marghiloman toward two different goals:

1. Bratianu wanted an alliance with the Entente Powers, if the latter would guarantee Transylvania, Eastern Hungary, the Banat and the Bucovina, and Romania would be allowed to join the war at that moment when Allied victory seemed to be certain.

2. Marghiloman attempted to bring about a revival of the alliance with the Central Powers, but on different premises. Romania should receive Bucovina as a compensation for her intervention on the side of Austria-Hungary, and Transylvania should be either given to Romania, or at least should be made independent from Hungary, and new electoral laws should guarantee Romanian primacy in the province. The acquisition of Bessarabia, in case of victory, should also be publicly guaranteed.

As a consequence, between August and November 1914 a period of hesitation followed, and in order to understand the ultimate success or failure of these parallel trends, we have to suspend the chronological order and pursue a more topical analysis of the two trends involved.

Romania and the Entente in 1914

Since the days of the first Balkan alliance, Russia and France were busy courting Romanian public opinion and strengthening the position of their friends in the Romanian government. France had a peculiar advantage in that respect since she was the big Latin power, and also set the cultural trends for the small Eastern Latin state in the Northern Balkans. Many

[13]Czernin, *op. cit.*, p. 120.

intellectuals and many high-ranking military men of Romania had received their university or professional education in Paris and other French cities. French was universally recognized not only as the diplomatic language, but also as the language of the educated in Romania. Of course there was also a pro-German faction which admired and respected German talent, military power, and industry, but while the Romanians felt respect toward Germany, they showed love and enthusiasm for France. On the other hand, Romanian feelings toward Russia were not favorable either. The betrayal of 1878, when Russia forced her ally who had helped her to victory at Plevna to cede part of Bessarabia to her, was still much too alive in the minds of the politicians, and the uneasiness of a small power against the power colossus of the East was understandable. A certain feeling of "cultural superiority" toward the Eurasian power of the Tsars did not create the needed beneficial sympathies either. But if we compare the attitude of the Romanian public toward Russia with that toward Austria-Hungary, we fail to find that accentuated and sometimes fiery hatred that animated many of the inhabitants against the Dual Monarchy. The doctrine of the Dacian kingdom and of the oppressed fellow nationals who expected liberation from their brothers in the Old Kingdom, had been repeated over again since 1868, and especially since the renewal of the *Liga Culturâlea*. Their hope and expectation was the liberation of the Transylvanian Romanians, and the annexation of this province which possessed a higher cultural and economic level than the Regat[13a] and which would transform Romania into a middle-sized power in Central Europe and strip from her the enigma of being a Balkan state. However, the fact that only 53% of the provinces were of Romanian nationality, and that 42% would actually oppose or despise the rule of the Romanians, was overlooked or ignored. The irredentists referred to 60-65 per cent Romanians, who pictured the Magyars only as oppressors who deserved their fate fully and completely.

Thus, the Entente Powers had a firm basis on which to build. By 1914, Russia attempted, by bribing journalists and by exerting pressure on the government, to bring about Romania's secession from the Triple Alliance. Unable to come to terms with Austria-Hungary, Romania could have had no active interest in an anti-Bulgarian bloc under Austro-Hungarian auspices, because this would have meant war against the greatest single land-power, Russia. Since 1913, she had had a common interest with Serbia, because both states had wanted to defend the Peace of Bucarest of 1913.

Furthermore, the Entente Powers, being the more generous in promising territories of their enemies to wavering neutrals, had more to offer in case of a victory. Transylvania, the Banat, and Eastern Hungary, together with the Bucovina on the other side of the Carpathians, were much more valuable and much larger territories than the plains of Bessarabia with their mixed Romanian-Yiddish-Ukrainian population.

[13a] Old Kingdom, Romania as before 1918.

The visits of Tsar Nicholas and Sazonov were attempts to find out how far Romania would go in case of the world conflict which seemed impending. The Transylvanian visit was designed to demonstrate once more the generosity and tender feeling of the northern neighbor toward the lively irredentism of the Romanians. But Sazonov, at the same time, wanted guarantees from Bratianu. According to the memoirs of Diamondy, the Romanian envoy at St. Petersburg, and other sources, Sazonov received the promise that Romania would not consider a war of Austria-Hungary against Serbia as *casus foederis.*[14]

In spite of this promise both Sazonov and his envoy in Bucarest, Poklewski, were afraid of the possibility of a Romanian intervention on the side of the Triple Alliance. Thus, at the same time that Czernin and von Waldthausen requested Carol and Bratianu to follow the path of honor, Russia exerted pressure to prevent them from doing so. The Russian démarche of July 28-29 contained both friendly gestures and threats. It offered to support Romanian claims toTransylvania, but the instruction of Sazonov to Poklewski also contained the veiled threat to expose Romania as a liar in case she should join the ranks of Russia's enemies, and here Sazonov referred to the agreements of Sinaia.[15] In spite of all this, on July 31, Poklewski was afraid that he could not change the inevitable.[16] His hope rested with Bratianu, who, as reported to St. Petersburg, wanted to delay the decision. This aloofness of Bratianu and the King brought Poklewski to the conclusion that Romanian neutrality would also be a valuable asset to Russia. But cautiously, he sent the secret archives of the legation to Odessa.[17] Blondel, the French envoy, also supported Poklewski and Poincaré urged Sazonov not to be avaricious in offering territories to Romania. On August 3, before the Crown Council started, Poklewski had a chance to see his protégé, Take Ionescu, who was depressed and confused, and who told him that the only choice left to Romania was not whether to intervene or to remain neutral, but whether the country would prefer to become a Russian or Magyar province during the war.

The obvious success of Entente-pressure, and the unwillingness of Romania to cast her lot with the Central Powers meant a great moral victory for the Allies. The latter now systematically proceeded to exploit

---

[14]In the *Fateful Years* (1923) Sazonov concedes only "that as we entered Transylvania the same thought probably flashed into our minds—namely, this, too, was Romanian territory, a country whose inhabitants still awaited deliverance from the Magyar yoke and reunion with their brothers across the frontier." Diamandy has following notes on this trip to Transylvania: "Sazonov: Nous savons que vous êtes liés à la Triple Alliance par un traité. Mais que ferait la Roumanie au cas ou Autriche-Hongrie attaquerait la Serbie? Le *casus foederis* jouerait-il? Bratianu: La Roumanie agirait conformément à ses intérêts,"—"La grande guerre vue du versant oriental," *Revue des deux mondes* XLIII (1928), 133-35.

[15]Sazonov's instructions to Poklewski: A. von Wegerer, *Das russische Orangebuch von 1914*. Berlin, 1915, p. 70. "Wir möchten diesen Nachrichten keinen Glauben schenken, denn, falls sie sich bestätigen sollten, würde Rumanien als beispielloser Betrüger entlarvt sein."

[16]*Das Zaristische Russland,* No. 6, 164-66.

[17]For details about bribing the Romanian press: Jancsó, *op. cit.*, pp. 230 ff.

the situation and to bring about a reversal of alliances by inducing Romania to enter the war on their side. The two chief supporters of a Russian alliance were, next to the prime minister, the Conservatives Take Ionescu and Nicolas Filipescu. The latter was used as an intermediary in the business transactions with the Romanian press, which was still not completely won over in August 1914.

The démarches began four days after the neutrality declaration. On August 7, Sazonov offered a treaty of alliance to Romania on the basis of prompt intervention against Austria-Hungary and guaranteed the Romanian-inhabited areas of the Dual Monarchy to Romania.[18] But Bratianu kept his fingers crossed because of the Russian deployment in Western and Northern Poland. He also mistrusted Russia, because of a possibility that a secret alliance might be concluded between Russia and Bulgaria.[19] Furthermore, even the strongly pro-Russian Diamandy regarded such a step as a *volte-face* which would render Romania's position untenable.[20] Bratianu was more interested in a written notice which would state that in the case of a victorious war, the Entente Powers would recognize Romania's right for compensations as a reward for her continuous neutrality. This, in turn, was evasively answered by St. Petersburg.

The second attempt was made on September 16, when Russian troops entered the Bucovina. Bratianu, however, insisted on the old demands. These were conditionally conceded by Sazonov[21] who promised the annexation of Transylvania to Romania if the latter would join the Entente. As a secondary move, the Russian envoy helped to excite the masses who held huge demonstrations and requested intervention in favor of the Entente Powers. The demonstrations in the second half of the month took such forms that the French envoy, Blondel, held that an internal revolution was possible if the King would not yield to the demands of the war party.[22] The King, already sick and weak, noted in his diary on September 27: "Tous les hommes politiques veulent entrer en Transylvanie" and a day later: "Bratianu (dit) que Sazonov garantit en cas de victoire russe, les provinces roumaines de Hongrie et veut s'engager par écrit."[23]

This pressure, coupled with military successes, put Bratianu into a difficult siuation, and for a moment he had to yield. Take Ionescu had already made a concrete offer to the Russian ambassador in Rome, Krupenski, in case he should take over the government, and Bratianu was pressed to ask for a new Crown Council. But the shrewd Prime Minister

[18]Stieve, Friedrich, *Iswolski im Weltkriege,* 1914-1917. Berlin, 1925, pp. 28-29, and *Das Zaristische Russl.* No. 16, 170.

[19]*Ibid.,* No. 20. Report of Poklewski: "Ich möchte die Anregung der Frage derartiger Zugeständnisse von unserer Seite sogar für gefährlich halten, da das die rumänische Regierung veranlassen könnte, die territoriale Unantast barkeit mittels irgendeiner uns feindlicher Kombination sicherzustellen." (Concerning a possible Russian-Bulgarian alliance and the concession of Southern Dobrudja).

[20]*Ibid.,* No. 34, 178.

[21]*Ibid.,* No. 35, 179.

[22]*Ibid.,* No. 40, 185.

[23]Diamandy, C., "Ma mission en Russie," *Revue des deux mondes,* XLIX 1929, p. 820.

did not consider the time advantageous enough to bind himself to open intervention. At least he concluded a treaty with Sazonov conceding intervention in the future and inducing the government party and the opposition to abstain from active intervention against the Central Powers and from an official declaration of Romanian neutrality, as the latter would have prevented Romania from joining any of the belligerent blocs.[24]

The article of the exchange of notes between Sazonov and the Romanian ambassador to Russia, C. Diamandy, contained several clauses which were more advantageous to Romania than to the Russian Empire. It guaranteed not only the territorial integrity of Romania[25] but also recognized her claims to those parts of Austria and Hungary which were inhabited by Romanians. By the agreement Romania was not asked to enter the war immediately, but only to occupy those areas at a time favorable to her interests. Until that date Romania was only to observe a benevolent neutrality toward Russia. Russia also undertook to obtain the consent of France and England to the stipulations of the agreement.[26]

Thus, in October 1914, Bratianu pledged Romania to the cause of the Entente, in open violation to the spirit and the letter of the alliance with the Triple Alliance which he was unwilling to cancel because of the fear of reprisals.

The question remained at what time should Romania enter the war? In spite of the dreams of the circles inside and outside of the government, to become a great power, the small size and relatively bad equipment of the army called for a cautious attitude. The Central Powers were able to strike back, and the outcome of the war was still undecided on the battlefields of France and Galicia. Thus, in the belief that the German military machine could not be defeated, a strong faction in Romania was still working to bring about a settlement with the Central Powers as late as 1916. But the fate of Romania was decided by the attitude of her government, long before 1916, and the last pro-German factor in the royal family, the old king, died in October 1914, leaving the position of the pro-Germans hopeless.

Which way Transylvania?

The pro-German faction around the old king rallied after his death around the opportunist Marghiloman, and still wanted to cooperate with the Central Powers, if the latter should recognize their nationalistic aspirations. They argued that the Transylvania question was the sore point of the Monarchy and that it must be solved, come what may. They based their arguments on the following facts:

After 1908 Romanian-Magyar relations became worse and worse in Transylvania. The law about the salary of school teachers and the legislation about state support of public schools again demonstrated that the

[24] *Das Zaristische Russl.* No. 43, 185.
[25] Diamandy, *op. cit.*, p. 811. Referring to the Bessarabia affair of 1878.
[26] Stieve, *op. cit.*, pp. 115-117.

Hungarian government was willing to pursue a Magyarization policy. Its premium system put the Romanian schools in Hungary in an impossible situation, because if they wanted to get larger subsidies they had to introduce or increase their curriculum of Magyar language, literature and history, and thereby pave the way for less vivid nationality consciousness among the Romanians, or else they would have to remain step-children of the "Fatherland." The electoral laws of Hungary—the argument ran—did not allow a real representation of the nationalities in the Parliament, and it was pointed out that in no election since the entrance of the Romanian Nationalist Party in the Parliament were more than fourteen deputies of the party elected, not-withstanding the fact that more than forty constituencies had Romanian majorities. They claimed that the Hungarian system practiced gerrymandering and that the property qualifications were too high to allow anything like a democratic government in Hungary. Furthermore, they were uncompromising enemies of the settlement of 1867, and wanted separation of Transylvania from Hungary. The ultimate aim, however, was the detachment of Transylvania from the Realm of St. Stephen and its union with Romania. The minimum program of this faction was to attain the cession of the Bucovina from Austria and a "statut politique" for Transylvania which would be equivalent to the establishment of a separate diet and an extension of suffrage. This, in turn, would alter the structure of the government in Transylvania and would effect Romanian supremacy in the province.[27]

The plans of A. C. Popovici, the author of the "Replika" in 1892, were more far-reaching. He wanted not only a separation of Transylvania, but the transformation of the whole Monarchy into a federal union under the overlordship of Austria. However, he at least wanted to form the Szekely and the Middle Transylvanian Magyar districts into a separate province, following completely the nationality approach and disregarding both the situation of communication and economic outlets by attempting such a solution. On the other hand, we must not forget that he still remained loyal to the idea of a federation without economic or military frontiers.

It is hard to describe the views held by Count Czernin, the Austro-Hungarian envoy in Bucarest. He was a member of the old Bohemian nobility, a German both in culture and Weltanschauung, but of Czech origin; he possessed the cosmopolitan spirit of his social class. He really believed the Romanian charges, and honestly tried, but with little success, to bring about a conciliation. Like other middle-of-the-road men he failed to realize that concessions from just the Hungarian side would not solve the problem, because the cleavage was deeper than a political antagonism which could have been remedied by legislation within the existing framework. His reports and memoirs imply that he advocated a generous handling of Romanian questions by the government of Hungary only as a minimum. He understood the latter as the introduction of universal suffrage, reform of

[27]Tisza, *Germ. ed.*, p. 74. Czernin's telegram from Sinaia on Sept. 6, 1914.

electoral districts, and large state subsidies to private schools. He foresaw that these measures would involve the separation of Transylvania as a later development, but he thought that separation would mean a national reconciliation, once the fabrics of the Empire were loosened.

The attitude of the Hungarian Prime Minister Tisza toward the Transylvanian question was determined by different ideas. Outside of Hungary, and even inside of some Hungarian circles, he was frequently pictured as the arch enemy of the nationalities. However, he did not harbor any hatred toward the nationalities. His speech at the blessing of Bishop Goldis of Nagyvárad in 1899 may prove it, for at that time he was in no official position, nor was he as a candidate of any political party. His letters in 1914 to Metianu, the Greek Orthodox Metropolite of Nagyszeben, indicate that the petty quarrels of the mediocre provincial lawyers failed to infiltrate his mind.[28] But on the other hand, he believed in the legal and moral righteousness of the Compromise of 1867, and considered the breaking up of the Hungarian national state, not only as high treason against his nation, but also as a victory of panslav ideas which could not be countered by a weak Hungary and a middle-sized Romania alone. Therefore he regarded the Hungarian nation-state as a necessity both for the peace and order in Europe and for the survival of his own countrymen, whether Magyars or Romanians. Indirectly, he saw in the federalist transformation of Transylvania only a transition period which would enable Romania proper to take over the province with the help of their agents among the Romanian inhabitants, who, in his eyes, did not represent the majority of their fellow nationals living in Transylvania. Therefore, he fought to the bitter end for the maintenance of the old order. He also knew that Romania's attitude would hardly be changed by offering a Transylvanian *statut politique,* because if the Central Powers succumbed to the combined pressure of the Western Allies and Russia, Romania would be the first state claiming parts of the dissolving Monarchy for herself.[29] He overestimated, however, the importance of Bulgaria to the attitude of Romania, and considered it sufficient to menace Romania by her rival in order to keep the former out of the war. While his attitude was proven correct by the fact that Romania, even after having concluded a peace in 1918, attacked the Monarchy at the moment of her dissolution, his optimism about Romanian neutrality was valid only until 1916. The chief weakness of his argument was that the war failed to bring about either a quick victory or defeat of the power blocs involved. Also, during this period, Romania had ample opportunity both to embitter the relations between Romania and

---

[28] Jancsó, *op. cit.,* Blessing of Goldis: "It makes no difference whether those who love the Fatherland are speaking Magyar or Romanian. The Magyar nation could celebrate the milennium of its existence only, because she did not suppress the language of her citizens of other nationality, and she will have a future only if she acts similarly."

[29] "Auch die weitgehendsten Koncessionen würden auf die Stellung Rumäniens keinen Einfluss haben. Dieselbe hängt ausschliesslich davon ab, wie sie die Chancen des grossen Krieges beurteilen." *ibid.,* p. 75. Telegram to Czernin.

Hungary, and by her joining the Entente, to guarantee her share long before the Monarchy was actually defeated.

But Tisza also had a minimum program. Only six months before the outbreak of the war he negotiated with the leaders of the Romanian Nationalists, but could not come to terms. He thought it would be worthwhile to attempt an agreement once more. Under pressure of Czernin and Berchtold, he received J. Maniu, A. Popovici and Vaida-Voevod. He was willing to grant substantial concessions in the question of educational subsidies, but rejected a "rechtliche Sonderstellung" of Transylvania.[30] This failed to satisfy them, yet a rapprochement still took place.

The formal offering of a Romanian alliance via Marghiloman on the basis of the Czernin-Marghiloman premises took place on September 6 under the auspices of the German minister and the Under-secretary of State of the German Foreign Office, von Kühlmann. If the program concerning Transylvania and Bucovina were not accepted, Carol threatened to abdicate, which would have meant war against the Central Powers. It was rejected by Tisza on the ground that Romania's attitude was dependent only upon the situation on the battlefields.[31] It remains questionable, however, whether Carol could have executed this program, because according to the reports of Poklewski[32] "the Romanian army has lived for a whole year now in the hope of a common advance (with Russia) against Austria-Hungary" and "the idea of a possible campaign against Russia aroused the protest and opposition of the higher officers."

The "Liebeswerben" ended abruptly in October with the death of old King Carol. His last telegram on September 29 was sent to Emperor Francis Joseph[33] and his last written remarks concerned the intrigues of the politicians.

On October 1, the German Foreign Office sent von dem Bussche to Bucarest with special orders to press a rapprochement with the Romanian government. The attempts were, however, of no avail due to the treaty of Bratianu with Russia which symbolized Romania's change of policy. This state after October 1914 could have been brought back to the Triple Alliance only by an acceptance of all her demands, which would have meant a cession of territories to her equivalent to fifteen per cent of the Dual Monarchy. It is obvious that this demand could not have been fulfilled.

Catholic University of America

[30] Tisza, *Hung. ed.*, No. 251-52, 130-31; No. 258, 133; No. 260-261, 134-35.

[31] *See* footnote 30.

[32] *Das Zaristische Russl.* No. 6, 164-66.

[33] "L'Empereur François-Josef me telegraphie, s'informant de ma santé; il dit que la situation donne beaucoup d'espoir. Je responds aussi chiffre et dit que la situation ici est très difficile." Diamandy, *op. cit.*, p. 819.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND ITALY: MY NEGOTIATIONS WITH MUSSOLINI PART I: 1922-1923

by Vlastimil Kybal

I

I HAD BEEN appointed Czechoslovak Envoy to Italy at the end of 1919 and I had taken up my mission in Rome in January, 1920. For almost two years I witnessed the struggling of the Italian liberal government with the post-war chaos. The march on Rome of October 28, 1922, and its aftermath inaugurated a new era of Italian policy and brought about a new aspect to my functions in Rome. It might even be said that from the Fascist putsch of 1922 to the time of my departure from Rome on January 26, 1925, my diplomatic activities became decidedly more autonomous and enterprising than formerly. In some respects this period represents the culmination of my mission to Rome. The narration of my experiences during that eventful era becomes an interesting, although modest chapter in the diplomatic history both of the Czechoslovak Republic and of Italy.

The representative of a democratic Republic, whose existence and welfare depended upon the cooperation of all the politically significant parties could only view with distaste and alarm the violent seizure of the government by the Fascist Party, which had hitherto been characterized by fire and sword in domestic affairs and by chauvinistic eccentricities in its foreign policy.

From the outset, however, I felt confident that the Fascist régime would last for many years, particularly when on a trip into the country I noticed the passive and almost happy acceptance of the new government, and when I recalled how Italy had given birth to Greek, Roman, and Renaissance despots. I would not go so far as the French Ambassador, Camille Barrère, and other diplomats who initially welcomed the Fascist régime, nor on the other hand would I agree with Dr. Beneš and his informers from the Italian opposition, who predicted a débâcle within one year and a return of parliamentary government to Italy. On the contrary, I was convinced that on October 28,1922, on the Apennine peninsula there began a new political and social era within whose cycle I proceeded to labor on behalf of the state which I there represented.

I was not personally acquainted with Mussolini up to the time of the revolution. I merely had had the opportunity to observe him from the diplomatic gallery in the Assembly, where he had been seated habitually on the right amidst his colleagues, whom he instructed and directed imperiously after the Fascist fashion. Often the foreign observers would read his newspaper, *Il Popolo d'Italia*, most thoroughly, that they might become familiar

with his political ideas, but discovered therein the views of an agile and vulgar journalist, rather than the program of a statesman. I perused also with great interest Mussolini's celebrated brochure on John Hus (written with the spirit of a Freethinker), which, however, during the Fascist era gradually disappeared from the bookshops, ostensibly lest the author compromise himself either with the Nationalists or with the Vatican because of his interest in the Czech hero and rebel. Subsequently, Mussolini had a good record with many friends of Italy because during the War, in Bologna on May 20, 1918, he had advocated publicly the creation of a Czechoslovak Legion in Italy, a record not greatly blemished by the fact that, in his official American autobiography, he had minimized Czechoslovak participation in the Italian triumph to the activity of "a few Czechoslovak volunteers."

My first personal conference with Mussolini took place on November 10, 1922. The conversation was held in Italian. I had received no instruction from Prague nor had I expected any, but I regarded it as my obvious duty to inform my government of the views of the new master at the "Consulta" regarding Czechoslovak questions. To my surprise Mussolini recalled his wartime interest in Czechoslovak problems, his advocacy of a Czechoslovak Legion, whose gallantry—according to him—provoked a greater devotion to duty among the Italians, and he also mentioned his brochure on John Hus. He stated that he had observed a measure of disquiet which Fascism had aroused in certain circles in Prague, markedly Socialists and in regard to Yugoslavia, but remained convinced that these fears would subside when such groups realized that the Mussolini government harbored no aggressive designs upon anyone. He pointed out that to lead a party and a nation were two quite different matters. However, Italian socialists would have to accept the triumph of Fascism or be again driven to the wall. Mussolini assured me that he would oppose any restoration of the Hapsburgs and my project to annex Austria to Germany, for Italy could not tolerate any German threat on the Brenner. With regard to Hungary, he announced that he did not welcome the reawakening of Magyar irridentism, many of whose representatives were hastening to Rome, and that he was openly opposed to any attempt to copy Italian Fascism in Hungary, Bavaria or elsewhere. In conclusion, he promised to submit at once for ratification our various legal and economic agreements.

In this first conference Mussolini appeared to be more plain and human than in his theatrical poses and pronouncements, or in society. His face appeared wrinkled, his teeth decayed, his head bald, his countenance plain in repose. Only when he began to speak did his eyes light up to magnetize his audience. Here was doubtless an individual of superior intelligence and will, a born leader, or rather, a twentieth-century Italian "condottiere".

Six days later in the overcrowded Parliament hall Mussolini's first address outlined his program. Although in part revolutionary and in part constructive, in both respects it was more clear and forceful than that of

preceding governments. Its revolutionary aspect consisted in Mussolini's regarding his government not as an organ of parliament, but as its adversary, which had seized power on a mandate of the Italian people against the existing parliament from which, he proclamined with fanfare, he was able to create a camp of Fascist warriors. In addition he had formed a coalition cabinet, in which he had included, without regard to party affiliation, any individuals who, on a non-partisan basis, sought "to save the nation."

In this fashion at the beginning of his governmental career, Mussolini appeared as an opportunistic revolutionary, who sought to consolidate his position by attracting deserters and even the working masses that might support him either actively or passively in return for promises of security by means of favorable financial and emigration policies. He would not promise the bourgeoisie any privileges that he did not intend to grant also to the workers, because he desired to protect every right compatible with increased production and with national interests. Mussolini the opportunist sought support for his government even from the Catholic church (he ended his speech with a plea for the aid of God), yet the Senate was aristocratic, as was the monarchy and army.

In regard to foreign policy, Mussolini at the outset also appeared to be surprisingly conservative, particularly as to international finance and relations with foreign powers. In Parliament he proclaimed that he intended to pursue a policy of peace and of preserving the peace treaties; nevertheless the policy would be proper, firm and nationally utilitarian under the principle "do ut des," or "niente per niente" (nothing for nothing).

Mussolini assured the Yugoslav envoy, Antonievič, who related the whole affair to me, that he would follow a peaceful policy towards Yugoslavia and would submit to parliament for ratification the treaty of St. Marguerite. Sforza's resignation as Ambassador to France, submitted as a protest against Mussolini's seizure of power, according to Antonievič, was advantageous to Yugoslavia. Barrère similarly had a rather favorable opinion of the Mussolini régime, giving it particular credit for suppressing Communism in Italy. Barrère told me that if the Mussolini government continued to observe strict legality and remained strong, it would be of great benefit to Italy both at home and abroad. To its credit were its clear-cut and specific ideas and its boundless energy. Yet it seemed to me that the enormous domestic commitments, both political and economic, would prevent the new and untried master of Italy from plunging into foreign adventures; therefore I believed that he would adopt a policy of strong words and gestures only.

Extensive and hitherto unvoiced tribute for the peaceful trend of the first few years of Fascist foreign policy should be paid to Salvatore Contarini, who continued to direct, or rather tried to direct, Italian foreign policy as the director of the Foreign Office. But there would come a day when the influence of Contarini would be reduced and he would be sacrificed by the nationalists and by the Fascist oligarchs who would frantically seek to

divert Italian foreign policy towards a course more compatible with their ideals, promises, and commitments. These machinations were revealed to me by Antonievič and I had opportunity to observe them personally in connection with our problems.

Antonievič was particularly pleased that I had obtained from Mussolini a statement that he would not receive the Magyars, a fact which, however, did not prevent them from coming to Rome anyway, where they were duly received at the "Consulta" by his followers. Not only that, but certain journalists and businessmen from Trieste, and also the Fascist deputy Suvich journeyed to Hungary, and even that early, in December, 1922, it was being rumored that Italy was smuggling arms into Hungary. The object of these intrigues was to extort speedily the creation of a customs union of all the Danubian states under Italian leadership and in a negative sense to force a revision of the peace treaties. On this occasion, November 15, 1922, Attilio Tamaro, in his magazine, *Politica,* proclaimed the nationalistic thesis that Italy, acting as the arbiter and strengthened by its new post-war position, particularly its control of Trieste and Fiume, must reorganize Central Europe.

2

In his parliamentary address of November 18, 1922, Mussolini proclaimed that the restoration of European economic harmony would be best assured not by international conferences but by bilateral commercial treaties which would give practical application to the slogans "do ut des" or the negative "niente per niente," nothing for nothing. Therefore, as soon as our Mission had been instructed by the foreign ministry of Prague, on November 9, 1922, that the installation of a Fascist régime did not mean any change in our relations with Italy, we proposed the convening of the Trieste Conference and urged also ratification of the commercial treaty of 1921. The Legation obtained promises of both, but simultaneously, apparently because of the pressure of interested parties who had become influential with the Fascists, we were pressed to obtain the exemption of the big estates of Italian residents in Czechoslovakia from the land reform law, but I refused categorically. At the Trieste Conference Italy attempted to induce Czechoslovakia to agree to supply the port of Trieste with sufficient imports to avert a crisis. On the other hand, Czechoslovakia was more concerned with obtaining Italian gratitude by means of suitable concessions, and thus to terminate further Fascist-Magyar flirtations.

However, Fascist Italy soon adopted a two-edged foreign policy and habitually sought to shop around regarding every international question. One bureaucrat from the Foreign Office told me in all seriousness that, inasmuch as Hungary was a monarchy, all Hungarians desired to have a king, and therefore it would be both futile and foolhardy to attempt to prevent it. In retaliation for the refusal to exempt the estates of seven Italian magnates from the land reform act, the Italian government from November, 1922, stopped the desequestration of the property of 190

Czechoslovaks residing in Italy, and it caused us considerable effort before things could be put in order again.

Despite the fact that the Trieste Conference terminated auspiciously on December 15, 1922, Fascist trafficking continued, resulting in encouragement for an underground movement friendly to Hungary and besmirching the Little Entente.

Through our intelligence, I soon ascertained that the Fascist government was riddled with antagonisms and conflicts, not only with its opponents, but also from within, and corrupted with the quest for power and position. It soon became evident that the so-called Fascist revolution was rather an act of violence by a group of conspirators and that Fascism was immature and incompetent to perform the duties of a normal government. In his autobiography Mussolini confessed that, apart from a perpetually dissatisfied group drawn primarily from the intelligentsia, the core of his government consisted of certain adventurers who sought solely to feather their own nests in the course of the revolution, and, unless they succeeded, would advocate the most extreme and dangerous expedients. Unfortunately, at the start young incompetents had seized power, then clashed with the older bureaucrats, and, in foreign affairs, became nationalistic fire-eaters, kinsmen to Mussolini himself.

My informant assured me that Mussolini had the same non-conformist doctrines regarding both foreign and domestic policies. Particularly did he detest the Little Entente, which was as salt to his eyes. It was a bloc too strong for him, with a Slavic majority, influential in the Adriatic and dominant in Central Europe, over which Italy had dreams of hegemony. Allegedly, Mussolini would try to disrupt the Little Entente. His entourage spread rumors that he would alienate Yugoslavia from her partners and bind her closely to Italy, yet at the same time he sought to weaken that country and to cause the Successor States to become his vassals.

Together with this information regarding Mussolini's disruptive projects for Central Europe, the Rumanian Envoy, Lahovary, informed me that Duca, the Rumanian foreign minister, would visit Rome in an attempt to clarify the relations between Italy and the Little Entente. I became aware that Dr. Beneš regarded this visit as ill-timed. Nevertheless Duca did go to Rome, but accomplished nothing. At the railway station he told Antonievič and me that Mussolini did desire a rapprochement with the Little Entente and also with Yugoslavia, but only if they would grant him economic concessions.

This brought to mind all the evil reports I had ever heard regarding the government, but I knew the Italians too well to be alarmed or repelled from cooperating with the Fascist government or Fascist groups in particular. In this respect I differed from my pessimistic Yugoslav colleague and my rather negative Rumanian colleague. Our Mission continued to insist that the commercial treaty be ratified according to the promise of Mussolini, we proposed negotiations regarding a supplementary customs convention,

we urged that there be convened a new conference for the Successor States, we presented our views regarding the question of German reparations, and I studied the problem of the financial rehabilitation of Austria with Contarini, who preferred to withdraw it from the League of Nations and solve it "en quatre," by Italy and the three Litle Entente States.

Towards the end of January, 1923, when Antonievič told me confidentially that Mussolini had assured him that he would, within three days, submit the treaty of St. Marguerite to the Parliament for ratification, I answered that I did not believe that it would come to pass, and I indicated that Yugoslav diplomacy should be more adroit than Italian and should profit from its mistakes, that its Legation should consist not of two but of twenty members and should strive to improve Italo-Yugoslav relations. (The staff of the Czechoslovak Legation consisted of 18 members.)

I continued to uphold the Little Entente to the best of my ability. When the *Giornale di Roma* accused the Little Entente of intending to seize Hungarian coal mines for Hungarian reparations, I requested that the chief of the information service of the foreign ministry express to Mussolini my hope that he would not permit such insinuations to be made against the Little Entente. Agreeing completely with me, the chief at once saw Mussolini and the attack was stopped. Shortly thereafter, when *Il Piccolo* spread a sensational report of Czechoslovak mobilization and preparations for an invasion of Hungary, I sent an official protest to the "Stefani" information agency and intervened personally with the editor, Senator Bergamini, at the *Giornale d'Italia,* the publisher of *Il Piccolo,* to stop it, and it was stopped. We would react to any unfriendly propaganda which, abusing the new régime and following its nationalistic tendencies, would becloud normal relations between Prague and Rome.

It seemed to me that Mussolini himself was able to appreciate my initiative, because at that time he did not forget to emphasize our friendship by several personal calls with which he honored our Legation. One such occasion was provided by the Moravian Teachers-Singers, who conducted a successful tour of Italy, giving about thirty concerts, starting at Udine and terminating at Palermo. In Rome they sang in the presence of both queens, who had been formally invited, and later a second time, when they charmed their audience with folksongs and a varied program, both classical and modern.

As in 1918 when the Legionnaires took their oaths in Rome, there were heard again in the Eternal City the moving strains of the Czechoslovak hymn under the blue sky of Italy, filling the Romans with emotion and admiration.

After this public demonstration, Mme. Kybal and I prepared a reception in honor of the Moravians who came to Italy to refresh the war-time Czechoslovak-Italian friendship. After five o'clock the guests began to arrive, first among them Mme. and Mlle. Barrère, then other members of the diplomatic corps and friends. At 5:20 I was informed that the Prime Minister, Mussolini, had arrived. Shortly thereafter he appeared in person in the

hall of our beautiful legation, where I greeted him, introduced Mme. Kybal, and conversed a while with him, telling him about the singers who meanwhile were assembling, ready to sing. The presence of Mussolini impressed the audience, consisting of some 300 persons. In formal dress the singers began their concert with the Czechoslovak national anthem. Mussolini was particularly surprised by the discipline and power of an over fifty-member chorus, which, he stated, did not merely sing, but actually seemed to draw breath from every command of the conductor. The singers sang Smetana's "Věno," Foerster's "Song of the People," and the national songs: "Teče voda," "Zvony," and others, closing with a Latin composition by Palestrina.

Mussolini's visit to the Czechoslovak Legation naturally converted our reception into a big social event. The newspapers the next day reported the reception in the most favorable terms. The opposition newspaper, *Il Mondo,* stated that, even though Czechoslovakia was one of the most newly-created states of Europe, the reception given in Rome by its Minister and his wife ranked with those given by Embassies.

By sheer coincidence during the next days there was discussed, in the Parliament, the Italo-Czechoslovak commercial treaty, with relatively few Deputies attending the session at which the Fascist spokesmen yielded the floor to the reporter on the treaty. The treaty was approved by 240 votes to 27. The Senate concurred without debate. The four hour debate of the Deputies showed me that, by and large, Italo-Czechoslovak relations were good, neither too cool nor too intimate. Not even the Fascists could deny the vitality and strength of the Czechoslovak state, (upon which particularly the port of Trieste depended), yet on the other hand they realized that it was not a great power which they should dread or which they might exploit, but that it was just another remote but substantial country with which it would be prudent to maintain cordial economic and political relations, lest it act to their disadvantage. Inasmuch as Mussolini simultaneously submitted for ratification the treaty with Yugoslavia, there ensued a distinct improvement in the relations between Italy and the Slavs.

3

My policy of consistently loyal friendship for Italy and of cooperation with Fascism aimed to consolidate the Czechoslovak moral and political position in both Italy and Central Europe. Nevertheless, Prague remained silent for long months and Dr. Beneš had avoided Rome, because he believed his informers from the liberal opposition, who kept predicting the fall of Fascism by the autumn of 1923. I also had been receiving similar predictions from the same sources, but I refused to believe them. The Czechoslovak Prime Minister, Dr. Švehla, was then in Italy on leave for his health, but his whereabouts were unknown and he was therefore out of touch with my sources of direct information in Italy. Monsignor Šrámek likewise came to Rome, where he was domiciled at our Legation, but he arrived too late. Through P. Sturzo he opened negotiations with certain Italian leaders of

the "Populari", who had been ejected from the Fascist party, because of a disagreement over some mutual Catholic policy which at that time had no particular significance. To Italy came also the Sudeten German intriguer, Senator Dr. Medinger, who in April, 1923, presented to the Inter-parliamentary union an impudent memoir regarding the demands of the Sudetens. There also arrived in the Eternal City still other Czechoslovak politicians and journalists, some as tourists and others from sheer curiosity about how things were progressing under the rule of the black shirts. Among them were Socialists, Agrarians, etc.

Czechoslovak policy and action still remained completely aloof from any direct contact with the Fascist government except for my own feeble efforts. Nevertheless, I did see to it that the Hungarian Deputy, Mr. Friedrich, was not received by Mussolini, and, as I ascertained directly, no agreement with the Magyar Fascists was reached. Hungary was proclaimed officially as a country quite remote politically and as only economically significant. In like fashion the visit of Monsignor Seipel from Austria was limited solely to economic matters. However, the Czechoslovak friction with Hungary persisted, so that it was obviously my duty to use every effort to prevent the anti-Slavic intrigues of Hungary from forcing the Mussolini government into a course detrimental to our own friendship with Italy.

When towards the end of April, 1923, we were informed that the Hungarian government had instructed its Ministers to the Entente to protest against Czechoslovak reprisals for the death of the financial guard, Sedláček, at Hym, Slovakia, I requested an audience with Mussolini and obtained it that very day. At the audience I delivered to the Prime Minister the statement of Dr. Beneš regarding the affair. Mussolini received me silently, but displayed little concern. However, he did become interested when I explained carefully that this most recent act of Magyar violence was by no means the first, but one of a series taking place for over two years, and, to cut the matter short, I showed him the "White Book" of the Slovak State administration, in which there were listed eighty-seven instances of border clashes and outrages perpetrated between 1921 and April, 1923. Mussolini remarked that the Magyars were impotent, that is, incapable of any military action, and made it quite evident that he disapproved absolutely of their policy. He mentioned that he had refused to receive Mr. Friedrich, and stated that the well-publicized visit of Count Bethlen was paid first to Paris and London, having as its objective the solution of the insoluble question of Hungarian reparations. The only policy that Italy would adopt at that time for Central Europe would be one of peace and of cordial economic relations, inasmuch as Italy was then engaged in the momentous task of internal reconstruction. Mussolini was ready to second any Czechoslovak suggestions to that end. He maintained that Austria sought too much foreign aid, carried out too few domestic reforms, and that the Seipel government was neither particularly strong nor sincere.

Count Bethlen's trip to Rome in that same month of May, 1923, proved

to be an utter failure. Despite the fact that, superficially, there seemed to be many Magyarophiles in Italy, and that they permeated the press (*Epoca, Giornale d'Italia*), and even sought to delude public opinion, through the officious *Agenzia Volta,* into the belief that Italy and Hungary had a common interest in preventing the rise of a strong Slav state across the Adriatic and in restoring the balance of power in Eastern Europe and in the Balkans, Count Bethlen was compelled by Mussolini to realize the hard fact that Fascist Italy would have to insist upon preservation of the peace treaties. With regard to his plea for a twenty-year reparations moratorium, the Hungarian Prime Minister was referred to London, where he had submitted his request originally.

Contarini assured Antonievi'c that the Italian government had made no political commitments to Hungary either previously or subsequently. Commendatore Biancheri, Director of Political Affairs at "Consulta", also expressed the opinion that Bethlen would have done better if he had not come to Rome at all. According to him, the officious statement of *Agenzia Volta* was a grave error and it would not be possible even to open negotiations regarding a commercial treaty with Hungary—Biancheri added—as long as there remained such stumbling-blocks as the prohibition of imports, customs questions, and the payment of Italian commercial debts.

Of much greater significance to current Italo-Czechoslovak relationships was the cautious, both nationalistic and realistic policy of Mussolini, which he explained in detail to the Senate on June 8, 1923.

This policy did not contemplate any aggressive imperialism, but merely a progressive self-reevaluation ("una progressiva rivalutazione") by Italy, which, apart from some territorial additions, had not obtained from the peace any economic or colonial concessions. According to Mussolini, Italy's best interests would be served by a speedy and peaceful solution of the European economic crisis, particularly with respect to reparations and debts. Italy participated in the financial rehabilitation of Austria in the best tradition of the Geneva Protocol of October 4, 1922, in order that the territorial integrity of the Austrian Republic might be preserved. With respect to the states of the Little Entente and the Successor States in general, Italy had adopted a policy of friendly mediation with a scrupulous regard for the maintenance of the peace treaties. That is why she had agreed to the specific application of the treaties of Rapallo and St. Marguerite and there remained solely some economic agreement regarding the complicated problem of Fiume. This definition of Mussolini's foreign policy in general appeared to be verified, except that Mussolini, an all-powerful dictator, seemed impatient, arrogant and brusque, an opinion confirmed by Antonievi'c.

Hand in hand with my diplomatic work went efforts along cultural lines. It was not without significance that on July 6, 1923, I signed at the Capitol of Rome an agreement with the royal commissioner, Felipe Cremonesi, whereby the city of Rome granted to the Czechoslovak nation the perpetual use of a tract of land of 3,101 square meters in Valle Giulia

and the Czechoslovak government promised to build within five years on this site a Czechoslovak Academy dedicated to history, archaeology, arts and literature. In this effort there was much of the pioneer labor of a liberated nation which was seeking cultural equality with others and was anxious to develop fully its own culture through its autonomous and constructive contacts with other nations, particularly with Italy. In line with American and French precedents, I desired to set up an Association of the friends of the Czechoslovak Academy in Rome, which, from public donations and funds, would establish and equip the Academy and be constantly concerned with its progress. However, after my departure from Rome in 1925, the Ministry of Education at Prague evolved an unacceptable plan of construction, and, to the best of my knowledge, killed the whole project by failing to observe the stipulation that construction must be completed within five years. Only the establishment of the Czechoslovak Historical Institute in Rome remained a stable record of our cultural policy dealing with Italy.

4

On May 1, 1923, I submitted to Jan Masaryk, the counsellor of the Legation at London, an Aide-Mémoire for Dr. Beneš in which I recommended that negotiations be opened with Italy regarding certain current problems and that, at the same time, Mussolini be decorated with the Czechoslovak War Cross and medallion. However, despite subsequent recommendations on my part, no action was taken. It was not until the early part of July, 1923, shortly before my departure for my vacation, that Dr. Beneš announced that he would undertake a trip to Paris and London, in the course of which arrangements would also be made for a conference with Mussolini, lest it appear that we were ignoring Italy entirely.

I informed Comm. Biancheri of the foreign ministry of the possibility of a conference of Dr. Beneš with Mussolini, news that was received with marked appreciation. In this connection Biancheri remarked that the visits of Seipel, Bethlen and of the Rumanian Finance Minister Bratianu to Rome had been fruitless, but that the visit of Beneš would no doubt lead to promising results, because it would not give rise to illusory hopes.

During my vacation I discussed the visit of Beneš to Italy and the status of Italo-Czechoslovak relations for the first time with President Masaryk at Topolčánky. At the outset I explained why the Mussolini government should be regarded as stable, particularly after the Parliament had approved the latest reform of the electoral law. I stated that a conference between Beneš and Mussolini would be most worthwhile, but that it would have to confer upon Italy some specific benefit, such as, for instance, a customs agreement. In contrast to the recent visits of several foreign dignitaries, the trip of the Czechoslovak foreign minister should have some distinct objective, some agreement that would be mutually advantageous. The President concurred, but remarked that Beneš had had in mind a mere detour from Geneva by automobile to Italy for the sole purpose of meeting Mussolini. I replied that the main goal politically would be a rapproche-

ment between Italy and the Little Entente, especially regarding Hungary. The President said that Italian policy appeared neurotic and that at Sinaia there would be reached an agreement concerning Hungary analogous to that of Austria, and that the Hungarian government would be compelled to adopt such terms in its foreign loan as would reaffirm the Treaty of Trianon. This development might well be made known to Italy. I called attention to the need for directly informing the Italian government, that it might cooperate with us at Geneva and that at Rome there might be strengthened the present loyal cooperation with us against the Magyarophil nationalists. I mentioned also how the latter still dreamed of creating an Austro-Hungarian-Rumanian or Bulgarian anti-Slav barrier and that all Italians remained somewhat sensitive because of their apprehensions that Czechoslovakia might become a vassal of France. The President indicated that Beneš, on his last visit to Paris, had called the attention of the French foreign office to the errors of its Central European policy, and that a turn for the better would soon ensue.

Then, deep in thought, President Masaryk volunteered the opinion that Austria remained his chief concern. Unless it should unite with Germany, which was excluded, the best solution would be to associate Vorarlberg and the Tyrol with Switzerland, and the remainder with Czechoslovakia, which might happen as soon as the latter could solve the problem of its Bohemian Germans. I replied that the problem remained as it had been in the days of Přemysl Otakar II in the thirteenth century. The President answered that, apart from historical motives (to which he gave no considerable importance), there remained those pertaining to a realistic policy, that is, economic cooperation and strategic political security against Germany, to prevent being outflanked on the south, and against an Italy that might become territorially contiguous to Germany. I observed that my reports from Rome always stressed the impact of the Austrian question upon Italo-Czechoslovak relations and that the Austrian problem would be most difficult for Italy, which could not arrive at any agreement with Yugoslavia, and which firmly opposed any resurrection of the former Austria-Hungary. I explained the Yugoslav situation and how the unsettled relations between Italy and Yugoslavia had produced in Italy a reaction unfavorable both to the Little Entente and to Czechoslovakia.

In the foreign ministry at Prague I conferred with Dr. Girsa, Under-Secretary of State, who informed me that Beneš would meet Mussolini in Rome on August 28, 1923, and desired that I be on the spot one day in advance. Beneš placed on the agenda the questions of German reparations, the Little Entente, Hungary, and others. I again stressed the necessity for some practical agreement, preferably a customs agreement.

On August 23, Dr. Girsa read me the instructions of Beneš, that I should sound out Mussolini and submit a report immediately upon my return to Rome. Dr. Beneš desired particularly to discuss the question of Hungary in the light of the Sinaia declaration, which had stated specifically the stand of

the Little Entente regarding the question of a foreign loan to Hungary. I suggested that the negotiations include also other Italo-Czechoslovak problems, particularly economic ones, and conferred with minister Dvořáček to this end.

On August 25 in Rome Antonievič brought me up to date on the question of Fiume and then, at the Palazzo Chigi, I made the necessary arrangements for Dr. Beneš' visit to Rome.

Dr. Beneš arrived in Rome on the morning of August 28, 1923. Privately I advised Dr. Beneš to seize the opportunity to decorate personally Mussolini and his colleagues with the Czechoslovak War Cross which the Czechoslovak Minister of National Defense had awarded to them. Beneš refused, saying that he had come to visit Mussolini as Prime Minister of Italy and not as a Fascist. He added that Mussolini could not obtain the revolutionary medallion, which the Minister of National Defense had awarded contrary to his (Beneš') advice. Mussolini could not be compared with Masaryk. For personal and political reasons Beneš would not be able to present even the War Cross to Mussolini, but I might do so subsequently. He would cancel the award of the revolutionary medallion to Mussolini.

Then Dr. Beneš received Contarini, after which we all drove from the hotel to the Chigi palace, where Beneš remained in private conversation with Mussolini from 11:10 to 12:35, while I and others of the staff waited in the anteroom. In addition to that, the first session was held on economic matters, and Beneš met again with Mussolini that same afternoon to discuss political matters, but I was told very little of what was decided. Beneš merely informed me that the Italian government had approved the Sinaia agreement and the statement regarding Hungary and that there had been an understanding for Italian political cooperation with the Little Entente on Central European questions, in return for which Italy would support the candidacy of Beneš to the Council of the League of Nations.

This event was the highlight of Beneš' visit, as was evidenced by whole pages of that evening's newspapers, which displayed a great measure of understanding of Beneš objectives, a view that obviously surprised him.

Dr. Beneš never held sympathy for Fascism. As a typical democrat and socialist of the French pattern, he disliked Mussolini, deemed his tenure of power temporary, and desired his fall as soon as possible. In this wish and hope Beneš was encouraged by opponents of Mussolini, such as Giovanni Amendola, whom he had received during a visit made ostensibly to Mussolini as the Italian chief of government. I thought Beneš' ideologically prejudiced and unfriendly viewpoint regarding Fascism a political error, made even more obvious after the Italian press and public opinion had greeted his visit with such surprising sincerity and affection. Regarding his visit there were written numerous editorials and leading articles, in which not only his official negotiations, but the very fact of a visit of a Czechoslovak minister to an Italian Premier were favorably commented upon. The official communiqué and the telegrams exchanged by Mus-

solini and Beneš stressed their political friendship and the successful results of their cooperation. Mussolini stated a policy of sincere friendship and of promising economic cooperation, whereas Contarini, still the director of Italian foreign policy, instructed Bordonaro, at the end of an official banquet held at the Legation, to make the keynote of the communiqué to be political cooperation; this, however, was toned down in the official version to become solely economic cooperation. Yet even so, the political status of Czechoslovakia was high and a source of envy to Magyars and many others.

5

It was unfortunate that this promising beginning to an Italo-Czechoslovak rapprochement was soon thereafter consigned to oblivion by both responsible statesmen. Mussolini's ultimatum to Greece, and his handling of the entire Corfù affair with such arrogance and hysteria, alienated from Fascism the sentiments of all peace-loving Europe, and terrified those affected, particularly Yugoslavia. Then ensued the military mission of General Giardini to Fiume, which Antonievič deemed a violation of the peace treaties. However, in reality the Yugoslavs had only themselves to blame, particularly Pashitch, whose temporizing tactics had provoked Mussolini to so violent a step. M. Charles-Roux, Chargé d'Affaires of France, told me that the Yugoslavs had let a favorable occasion for negotiating a rapprochement with Italy slip by as early as the winter of 1922, as soon as the treaty of St. Marguerite had been ratified. The dispatch of Giardini to Fiume, which, for all practical purposes, meant annexation to Italy, had been brought about by nationalistic and militaristic groups who had taken advantage of the absence of Contarini from Rome to push Mussolini into such hasty action.

It was a triumph for which the Yugoslavs now had to pay. At this point the nationalists broached again the earlier project of a politico-military partnership to mark the intimate cooperation between Italy and Yugoslavia in the Balkans and in Central Europe on condition that Yugoslavia build no navy in the Adriatic Sea. The objective was evident: Yugoslavia was to be induced to yield her privileged position in the Little Entente to Rome. However, Yugoslavia had no intention of being a party to any such conspiracy. Antonievič assured me personally that Italy, by her policy regarding Greece and Fiume, had chilled any possible friendship and that, henceforth, it would be possible to conclude with her only a treaty of ordinary friendship, but no rapprochement or close ties such as existed between the states of the Little Entente. He also intimated that Italy desired to partition Albania with Yugoslavia (October 7, 1923).

Dr. Beneš failed to take advantage of his visit to Rome to seek closer ties with Italy, deeming Geneva more important than Rome. Today everyone realizes that Czechoslovak participation in the activities of the League of Nations contributed absolutely nothing to the future security of the Czechoslovak nation. Nevertheless, Dr. Beneš at Geneva won for himself

an outstanding international reputation, most flattering to his own talents and to the ambitions of any European statesman; indeed, immediately after his visit to Rome he had the honor of being elected to the League Council, there to cooperate directly with the Great Powers in solving world problems. At this very moment Mussolini arrived at Geneva besmirched with his Corfù adventure, whereupon the two statesmen found themselves at opposite poles of world policy. It should cause no surprise that the Italian press proceeded to greet with icy silence the election of Beneš to the League Council. In his speech of November 18, 1923, to the Senate regarding foreign policy, Mussolini did not devote a single word to his agreement with Beneš; instead, he stressed the autonomous nature of Italian foreign policy and hinted that he might withdraw from the League of Nations.

A further disillusionment ensued because of the successive postponements and the eventual abandonment of the official visit of President Masaryk to Rome, as the direct result of the moralistic policy of Beneš, which, then and subsequently, produced an international situation detrimental to the best interests of the Czechoslovak Republic.

The recent official visits of President Masaryk to Paris, London, and Brussels had attracted the attention of the Italian government. Thus one day it came to pass that an Italian journalist (ostensibly sent by the government) asked me when President Masaryk would visit Rome and sought additional data regarding him. I called his attention to the formal call the president had already made on the King of Italy. Nevertheless, the press pointed out with some asperity that he could visit the chief allied capitals, yet avoided Rome, even though Italy allegedly deserved first consideration for her part in making possible an independent Czechoslovakia. *Epoca* commented tersely that gratitude was not a principle of foreign policy and that both Masaryk and Beneš preferred to remain satellites of France.

In view of this attitude of the press and as the result of my own private investigations, on October 15, 1923, I advised Dr. Beneš that it would be well if the president made a decision to visit Rome, a visit which, in any event, should precede the one to Belgrade. The next day, in the course of a conference, Contarini found occasion to apologize for his inability to stop a press campaign against Czechoslovakia, inasmuch as he did not know whether our president did or did not have any intention of visiting Rome. I replied that this press campaign was a blunder because the person of our president was sacred (*persona sacra*) to us, and that we would tolerate an attack upon our minister, but never upon our liberator. It seemed to be a calculated campaign, I continued, obviously instigated by the same source, because there were the same allegations and phrases throughout the government press; whereas the opposition journals (*Corriere della Sera, Il Mondo*) remained silent. Apparently, Contarini sped at once to Mussolini, to report my remarks, and then instructed the new chief of the information service to inform the press that President Masaryk made his first official visit to the King of Italy as far back as July, 1921, that he would journey again to Rome

at some undetermined future date, and that the president had publicly proclaimed our gratitude for Italian aid during the war. Thereupon Contarini requested that, in his name as well, I ask Dr. Beneš whether the president would journey to Rome.

That very afternoon I submitted to the *Giornale d'Italia* an account of my interview with Count Stelluti-Scala regarding the trip of the president and that evening I telephoned to the Chigi Palace the presidential comments regarding Italy (that is, the interview in the *Corriere della Sera* of March 17, 1918, the 1919 New Year's day greeting to the King of Italy, and the telegram of December, 1918, to Sonnino).

I encoded to Dr. Beneš in London the question posed by Contarini, stressing again the necessity for a presidential visit to Rome, which should precede that to Belgrade under any circumstances. On October 23, as the data for negotiations concerning a trade convention were just fixed, I sent to Prague a summary of the Italian press comments regarding the trip of the president to the Western capitals.

Yet, despite all this, Dr. Beneš telegraphed from London that under no conditions would he be able to promise that the president would make a formal visit to Rome, because circumstances (by this term he meant the fall of the Mussolini government, which he was expecting) might render it inadvisable if not actually impossible. Dr. Beneš did not oppose an official visit, but, he alleged, he could promise nothing because of the "fluid international situation then prevailing." A definite decision might well be postponed to a more suitable occasion. Dr. Beneš refused consent to a presidential visit extorted by either governmental or journalistic pressure. He would not promise such a visit while Italy was ostensibly attempting to paralyze Czechoslovakia politically, an attempt which he must seek to prevent. Dr. Beneš was also motivated by concern over the possible reaction in Belgrade, to which a prior presidential visit to Rome might be intolerable. Then Dr. Beneš pointed out how the president had been twice in Rome and had gone to Paris only after he had been subjected to severe criticism that he had seen fit to make two visits to Italy but none as yet to France. Finally, the health of the president was another alleged consideration.

On October 25, 1923, I forwarded to London to be submitted to Dr. Beneš my encoded reply, wherein I stated "the unanimous opinion of us all in Rome" to be that a presidential call on Belgrade prior to one on Rome would have catastrophic political repercussions unfavorable even to Belgrade. On the twenty-ninth, I submitted a report in the form of a letter to Dr. Beneš, calling attention to the fact that the two presidential visits to Italy (his tour of Italy in December, 1918, and his cure of July, 1921) could not be regarded as formal visits and that Rome therefore did have an historic right to expect a visit in gratitude for the aid rendered the Legions and a diplomatic right as a member of the Great Entente.

Dr. Beneš did not answer my dispatch and left open a matter as important and delicate as was the visit of our chief of state of our Italian

ally. In his parliamentary exposé of November 1, 1933, he attempted to evade the issue by showing great consideration for Italy and by praising the ease with which an agreement had been reached with Mussolini. However, Mussolini refused to comment on the matter in his November 18 address to the Senate; whereas the King thenceforth never asked me about the president, as had been his custom up to that time. The tension was eased somewhat on January 31, 1924, when I presented the master of the royal household with the decoration of the order of the White Lion for His Majesty.

I deemed the refusal of a promise of an official call by the Czechoslovak President upon the King of Italy to be a distinct liability upon cordial Italo-Czechoslovak relations. This defect became even more apparent because its chief motivation had been distaste for the Fascist government. Yet, under Fascist rule in May, 1923, the King of England and then the King of Spain, had both paid official visits to Rome without either of them evincing any scruples such as were held by the officials of a small and new state, which should show gratitude for Italian aid rendered during the war and respect for the position of the post-war Italy in Central Europe. In my personal opinion, a policy of avoiding Rome simply out of fear lest President Masaryk might, by meeting Mussolini, appear to approve him and thereby strengthen his régime, was distinctly impolite. Italy had a government acceptable to the monarch and recognized by every state in the world. Dr. Beneš had conducted official negotiations with this régime, and, after the complete and "easy" agreement of August 26, 1923, with Mussolini, it would appear logical as well as sincere and advantageous if this accord and a subsequent rapprochement might be confirmed by an official call by President Masaryk upon the King of Italy. However, Dr. Beneš did not desire that this call should ever be made, for he did not seek any rapprochement between a democratic Czechoslovakia and a Fascist Italy; on the contrary, he both hoped for and expected that the Fascist régime would vanish from the face of the earth, the sooner the better. Here was a viewpoint appropriate for a dogmatic ideologist but not for a true statesman, nor was it ever approved either by the Prague Parliament or by the Czechoslovak people.

On the day of victory, November 4, 1923, at the Chigi Palace I personally decorated with the Czechoslovak War Cross Mussolini and state secretaries Acerbo, Finzi and Sardi. I delivered a brief welcome, to which Mussolini responded that between Italians and Czechoslovaks there could exist absolute sincerity and true friendship. It was, or at least attempted to be, an historical recognition of Mussolini's sympathy for the Czechoslovak liberation movement, but Dr. Beneš had dispelled its political significance by refusing to award the decoration in person and thus bind the Fascist leader more closely to the Czechoslovak cause. Dr. Beneš was so deeply involved in the League of Nations (where the Geneva Protocol was being born) and tied to France that he completely overlooked the imminent threat facing Czechoslovakia from a reactionary Germany eventually allied

to Italy. The attempted putsch in Bavaria in November, 1923, attracted much attention in the Italian press, and *Epoca* even then found occasion to remark that an entente between Hitler and Italy might be consummated, given certain conditions. Mussolini's address of November 16, 1923, to the Senate bore evidence that he was already counting upon the return of Germany to active participation in European affairs when he proclaimed that it would be foolish to dream of the ruin of a nation which numbered sixty-one million souls within its borders and an additional ten or twelve million in Austria and other lands.

New York City

NOTES

The *Ústav Dr. Edvarda Beneše* (Edvard Beneš Institute), founded in London in 1950 (see JOURNAL, July 1950, p. 175) has begun publication of a series of brochures, *Doklady a Rozpravy,* which has now reached its thirteenth number (October, 1953). The subjects treated by Czechs and Slovaks in the emigration are focussed on several periods of Czech and Slovak history, with of course considerable emphasis on events since 1945 and planning for the future. The titles of the brochures that have come to the Editor's desk are as follows: (1) Lev Sychrava, *Svědectví a uvahy o pražském převratu v únoru 1948,* (a collection of statements by Czech witnesses and foreign observers on the February 1948 Putsch); (4) a declaration of purpose by several members of the democratic opposition, on lines of Masaryk's thought, and discussion by representative émigrés; (5) report of three sessions devoted to the Slovak Question; (6) a financial statement and sketch of the present work, resources and plans of the Institute for 1951-52; (7 and 8) three studies on the Hussite Movement in Bohemia, the first two by R. R. Betts and the third on the social aspect of the Hussite movement (this latter is an assessment of the marxist trend in present communist historiography in Prague, notably the studies of Josef Macek and Václav Husa); (9) nine statements on the Slovak Question in Czechoslovakia, by Czechs and Slovaks throughout the emigration; (10 and 11) the expulsion of the Germans from Czechoslovakia from the national and international point of view, by Jaroslav Stránský (this is an answer to the propaganda issued, with Bonn support, by the Sudeten Germans now in Germany); (12) the February 1948 Putsch, by Jaromír Smutný, former head of President Beneš' Chancellery; (13) the struggle of Czechs and Slovaks for freedom in World War I, 1914-18, which is mostly extracts from the memoirs of Masaryk and Beneš, with a description of an exhibition of letters and memorabilia from the first World War and the Czech struggle for independence.

* * *

The *Historisk Tidskrift,* the organ of the Svenska Historiska Föreningen (Stockholm) issued as a special number a *Svensk Historisk Bibliografi,* 1951, compiled by Percy Elfstrand (pp. 93), which contains a wealth of bibliographical information on all Scandinavian and Baltic areas in every field of historical, political, ecclesiastical and artistic study.

* * *

On August 16, 1953, Jules Feldmans, Minister of Latvia to the United States, died in Washington after a long illness. Mr. Feldmans had succeeded the late Dr. Alfred Bilmanis on June 28, 1948. Educated at the Law School of the University of Moscow, he served in the Russian army until Brest-Litovsk, then returned to his native Latvia. In 1919 he accepted a post in the new diplomatic service and served in various positions at home and abroad, including Paris, Bern, Geneva, and Copenhagen. As a result of Mr. Feldmans' death, Mr. Charles Zarinc, Latvian Minister in London, who is designated by the Latvian Constitution as the residual holder of

plenary presidential powers in conditions of emergency, came to the United States to renew relations with the Department of State. It will be remembered that the United States has never recognized Russian occupation and sovietization of the three Baltic states, and their representatives are thus accorded full diplomatic acceptance in Washington. Dr. A. Dinbergs, First Secretary of the Latvian Legation under both Dr. Bilmanis and Mr. Feldmans, has been accepted as chargé d'affaires ad interim.

* * *

Professor R. V. Burks of Wayne University reports the following item of interest: The Mid-European Studies Center has made a grant to Wayne University for the purpose of introducing two new courses. One is to be called "The Roots of Mid-European Unity," the other "The Cultural Profile of Mid-Europe." The object of the first course is analysis of the factors involved in a future federal reorganization of the peoples living between the German and the Russian ethnic frontiers, while the purpose of the second course is an evaluation of the literature and art of these peoples in the search of ideas and principles common to them all. Instruction is to be collective: Mid-European Unity will be taught by R. V. Burks, Sergei Dobrovolsky, Fred Dohrs, and Max Mark; those responsible for the Cultural Profile will be V. S. Dunham, Harry Josselson, Edmund Ordon and William Rudy. In addition, the Mid-European Studies Center will contribute some guest lecturers during the year.

* * *

Československý časopis historický (Czechoslovak Historical Journal) which began to appear early in 1953 carries in its third number a report on the First International Congress of Historians. It was held in Budapest from June 6 to June 14, 1953, in connection with the national convention of Hungarian historians. The Congress was attended by a Soviet delegation (A. M. Pankratova, J. V. Tarlé, and P. N. Tretjakov) and by representatives from Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, East Germany and Czechoslovakia. The theme of the Hungarian convention was "the struggle of the Magyar people for freedom in cooperation with the peoples of the neighboring countries." A large number of Magyar historians, old and young, read papers conceived in the spirit of Marxism-Leninism. Included were such topics as "the bloody role of American imperialismus in the recent history of Hungary."—The Soviet delegation would appear to have played a dominant role in the deliberations of the Congress. Lectures on various unspecified topics were followed by discussions and conferences. Several recommendations were adopted to determine the course of research in the years to come. Historians of the Soviet Union and of the captive countries agreed to commemorate, in 1955, the fiftieth anniversary of the Russian revolution by a volume of essays to be published under Soviet editorship. Attention was called to the tenth anniversary of "liberation from the Fascist yoke" of countries west of the Soviet border to be celebrated in 1944 and 1945. The Polish group promised to prepare a volume on that period. Regarding the importance of peasant wars in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the congress approved publication of a volume of studies on the Hussite movement and its reverberations in other countries. The editorial work was assigned to Czechoslovak historians. Finally, the Hungarian historians ac-

cepted responsibility for a volume of documents on the October revolution and its influence on the revolutionary Labor movement and on the struggles in the People's Democracies for liberation. This volume is scheduled for the fortieth anniversary to come in 1957. The congress made also recommendation for coordinated research, exchange of information, loans of microfilms and books, etc. The delegations were requested to embody the adopted resolutions into their national projects. No reference was apparently made to the International Committee for Historical Sciences and the forthcoming International Congress of Historians to be held in Rome in September 1955.

O.

* * *

Some attention has been given in the JOURNAL to the various activities of the Council of Europe. Its possibilities are manifold. Its success thus far in finding a substantial base of cooperation has not been brilliant. The results of the meeting of the Consultative Assembly of the Council held at Strasbourg, beginning on September 15, 1953, will illustrate the nature of the difficulties that have to be faced. M. Paul-Henri Spaak of Belgium made an eight-point policy report, the essence of which was that the West must be determined to build a United Europe of which a free Germany must be a part, and (point 7) when this society is formed, that a multilateral security pact be signed by the USSR, the United States, the United Kingdom and the European community, and (point 8) that a demilitarized zone be created on each side of the Eastern Frontier of the European community. M. Spaak refused, at a press conference, to define the eastern limits of the European community or name the peoples who, he had said, should "not be the prey of the Russians." There were some questions raised as to whether it was being proposed to accept *in perpetuum* the eastern boundary of Germany as the limits of Western society. The implications for those peoples east of Germany and west of Russia, around 100 million in number, who, throughout recorded history, have been more courageously western than the West itself, are rather grim. They have had to fight for their culture and faith. The Assembly, on September 26, voted in favor of the first seven points of M. Spaak's policy report. One might say they voted with laudable firmness to take no position at all on the policy report as a whole.

BOOK REVIEWS

KOSTELSKI, Z., *The Yugoslavs. The History of the Yugoslavs and their States to the Creation of Yugoslavia.* New York: Philosophical Library, 1952. Pp. 498. $4.75.

The outward appearance of the very beautiful and voluminous book by Kostelski about the history of the Southern Slavs, with twenty-four good illustrations, published in the English language in America, undoubtedly draws the attention and will please every Yugoslav patriot, especially the historian. That is to say, it is not often that whole books about the South Slavic past are published abroad. But I regret that the contents of the book do not approach the level of its outward appearance. This can be seen even from the foreword, as well as after a few pages of the introduction, and also from the approach to the history of various Southern Slav countries, such as Slovenia, Dalmatia, Croatia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Zeta, Rasha, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Macedonia. One can see immediately that a very serious and important work has been placed in the hands of a man who is neither a well-equipped scientist nor a well-informed journalist, but whose intention was to write a concise and useful informative compilation, based on the contemporary scientific literature, without any pretensions to originality. Kostelski's book did not succeed in its aim of popularizing the already accepted knowledge about Southern Slav history. It is even embarrassing to point out the absence of even a minimum of scientific or sound journalistic procedure. A mere glance at the biblio graphical note at the end of the book reveals that the bibliography is not only inadequate, but also extremely obsolete. The writer had good intentions but he is behind the times, and he seems to have no acquaintance with the majority of the elementary works which appeared between the wars, nor with some of those published before World War I (as for instance, the works of the well-known author, K. Jireček). Of course he can be forgiven for not knowing things which appeared after the second World War, but he leaves out so much that it can easily be said that he ignores completely the Yugoslav or Bulgarian historiography. He does not give any evidence of knowing the works of Fr. and M. Kos, Lj. Hauptmann, Fr. Grivec, Fr. Zwitter, Fr. Stele and others in the field of Slovenian historiography in the twentieth century; N. Vulić, J. Radonić, V. Ćorović, N. Radojčić, V. Čubrilović, D. Popović, M. Dinić, V. Bogdanov, and many younger students of Serbian historiography; G. and V. Novak, M. Kostrenčić, M. Barada, J. Šidak, and younger authors of Croatian historiography; J. Ivanov, P. Nikov, P. Mutavdžiev and the whole lesser school of V. Zlatarski in Bulgarian historiography. In the study of Byzantinology, if he is at all familiar with the works of D. Anastasijević and F. Granić, he should know that for almost twenty years the famous G. Ostrogorski has worked with great success at the University of Belgrade. There are many foreign historians who have done a great deal to augment the knowledge of Southern Slav history in the different periods of its development. For the modern period the author should have taken into consideration R. W. Seton-Watson's numerous works, without which it is almost impossible to write about the problems of the Austro-Hungarian Yugoslavs in their attempts for liberation from their century-long despotic domination, and for the creation of their own national state. Likewise, Mr. Kostelski should have taken into consideration numerous sound journalistic works written by Germans and Frenchmen, which have also helped somewhat to shed

light on the most recent history of the Southern Slavs. Kostelski could have found much precious data in the four books by Stanojević: *The National Encyclopedia,* or the first five volumes of *The Croatian Encyclopedia.*

Kostelski substitutes for factual knowledge the legends found in old Dubrovnik chronicles, and those by the priest Dukljanin, undoubtedly extending them with his own fiction. It is impossible to find any real substantiation for all that he boldly declares to be acknowledged historical fact. His attitude toward the Southern Slavs of ancient times seems to be completely biased. I want to emphasize that he is very eager to show the full merit and virtues of Southern Slavs, but his judgments are based on arbitrarily selected data. He is influenced by the romantics of a century ago, and the ancient Illyric idea of the autochthony of the Southern Slavs. After the discussion of certain Slavic immigrations in the early Middle Ages, the writer's over-active imagination produces an unbelievable confusion of data, surpassing many of the medieval writers in their amazing facility for discovering the "reality" of distant ages.

For Kostelski the Balkans are completely Slavic, even in the first millenium before Christ. He does not admit to the Roman invasion, because it was immediately drowned in the Slavic sea. According to him, many of the Roman emperors were Slavs, as well as Justinian and the Dioclecian, Constantine the Great. He does not appear to realize that the falsification about the origin of the emperor Justinian was made by the Bosnian, I. T. Mrnavić, in the seventeenth century, and that for more than half a century Yugoslav historiography has stated that falsification which Kostelski gives in his book as historical fact. In spite of his statement that he consulted the works of Zlatarski, Šišić, Klaić, and Smičiklas, it cannot be true, for it is not possible to find such fictions in their works.

The ethnography of the Southern Slavs is completely foreign to him, so he is again in the region of fantasy when he speaks about the proto-Christianity of the Southern Slavs. According to him, Christianity was adopted during the first centuries of their origin. Kostelski states that this Christianity influenced the formation of certain dogmas in the Catholic church, which took from the pagan Slavic mythology the idea of *Triglav* for the *De Trinitate.*

Kostelski's chronology is very unreliable during the Middle Ages as well as in modern times. Many historical names are given in the wrong way. One could write very much about both these points. His fantastic fictions are especially imaginative in his etymological explanations of certain toponymic terms, as a result of his incomplete knowledge of linguistic etymologizing.

It would be hard to find anything to say for this really unsuccessful book. Even the title can be criticized. It would have been better to have called it *The Southern Slavs* instead of *The Yugoslavs,* for this would have included the Bulgarians. Unfortunately it must be said that the book will spread many false ideas about Slavic history, thereby doing far more harm than good.

Beograd, Yugoslavia VIKTOR NOVAK

VADIAN, JOACHIM, *Lateinische Reden.* St. Gallen: Fehr'sche Buchhandlung, 1953. Pp. 166. Fr. 19.75.

The Swiss humanist and reformer Joachim von Watt, or Vadian, left his native St. Gall in 1501 to become a student in the Faculty of Arts at the University of

Vienna. After taking his first degree he remained at the University, becoming professor of rhetoric, orator, and poet laureate, attaining a doctor's degree in medicine, and holding at different times the offices of vice-chancellor and rector of the university. During this period, which lasted until his return to St. Gall in 1518, he served at least seven times, according to official records, as official orator of the University. The present volume contains the Latin texts with a German translation of those of Vadian's orations which have survived. They are five in number and one of them is now printed for the first time. The texts are accompanied by an introduction which discusses the history of rhetoric in Vienna, describes the occasions which elicited Vadian's oratory, and gives a summary of each oration.

Two of these orations are on religious subjects. The first was delivered for the Rhenish "nation" of the University on the feast day of its patron saint, St. Ursula, and the second is a Christmas composition. Both of these are of particular interest because they illustrate the humanist treatment of traditional religious themes. Although they are perfectly orthodox in belief and give no indication of Vadian's later religious thought, they do reveal in style and tone significant departures from medieval precedent. In the case of the oration on St. Ursula and her eleven thousand virgins, although Vadian had known and used the speech on the same subject by a friend and predecessor, his own composition, as the editor points out, is distinguished by a better organization and a more artistic and concentrated development of his theme. The Christmas oration shows even more strikingly characteristics of humanist oratory; it is elaborate in style and filled with references to the author's wide reading. The opening sentences, for example, refer to Carneades' annointing himself with hellebore in preparation for writing his attack on Zeno the Stoic, so that the weaknesses of the body might not becloud his mind. This serves to launch Vadian into his subject, and he asks himself what analogous means might be used for cleansing the spirit. The particular kind of combination of the antique and the Christian, as well as the details of organization, the transitions between sections, the alternations between verse and prose, all reveal the influence of the rules of rhetoric cultivated by Conrad Celtis and fashionable in the circles over which he had presided.

Of the remaining orations two were occasioned by the congress of Vienna in 1515. At this assembly Maximilian completed the arrangements for the marriage of two of his grandchildren to the son and daughter of Ladislas II of Hungary, and thus laid the basis for the replacement of the Jagellon dynasty by the Hapsburg in the kingdoms of eastern Europe. The meeting of the members of the royal and imperial families was marked by an extraordinary series of festivities and displays intended to enhance the glory of the imperial house in the eyes of the visitors. It was only natural that the humanists who had received the benefit of the emperor's patronage should be assigned an important role in the celebrations. In the name of the university, Vadian greeted Maximilain in one oration and Sigismund of Poland in another. Classical panegyrics provided the conventional models for praising the virtues of princes, and Vadian's delineation of the characteristics of his subjects remains on the whole in the realm of the abstract. In the oration to Maximilian there are interesting affirmations of the unique position of the German people never conquered by the Romans.

The final oration was pronounced on the death of Ladislas II, nephew of Sigismund and father of the betrothed pair, which occurred in 1516, a year after the congress. This discourse includes in perhaps an even more abstract style the

customary recital of the virtues of the deceased, together with passages of consolation addressed to the members of his family.

These texts, carefully edited as they are, provide a valuable documentation to supplement the magistral biography of Vadian during his Viennese period, published nearly ten years ago by Professor Werner Näf. It is illustrated with plates taken from the contemporary publications of the orations, and, in the case of the commemorative address on Ladislas, from Vadian's manuscript.

Harvard University MYRON P. GILMORE

MEDLIN, WILLIAM, *Moscow and East Rome. A Political Study of the Relations of Church and State in Muscovite Russia.* (= Études d'Histoire Économique, Politique et Sociale, sous la direction de Jacques Freymond et Jacques L'Huillier, I). Geneva: E. Droz, 1952. Pp. 252, 2 Illus.

In this soundly organized monograph the author has, with careful and balanced use of the documents, presented a vivid picture of the relations between church and state in Muscovy. The title already indicates the assumption that the political basis of Moscow derives directly from Byzantium. The Byzantine concept of the State, which arose in the time of Constantine the Great, out of the confluence of Roman political thought and the absolutism of the Empire, was first formulated and given a theoretical basis by Eusebius, and in succeeding centuries the theory was subjected to trial and modification, under the stress of the conflict between the secular and the spiritual powers in which the former was not always the victor, and came to its classic expression in the *Epanagoge* of Basil I (*ca.* 880). Here, after the grim experiences of the Iconoclastic controversy, the rights and duties of Patriarch and Emperor in a theocratic state were carefully and minutely delineated and delimited, in such a fashion that the christological formula of the Chalcedonian creed, transferred to the relation between church and state, appears as the final expression of the *symphonica* of these two great powers.

It is this Byzantine concept of the State, which had come to be an integral part of the dogma of the Eastern church, which had been propagated among all the churches and peoples of the East as they were missionarized by Byzantium as the only possible concept of the State. In that form it came also to Russia and, in the centuries before the fall of Constantinople, prepared the soil for the growth of the theocratic state of Muscovy. With the disappearance of Constantinople as an active power the way was clear.

Mr. Medlin shows how the Moscow of the VIC, however far it may have been in its spiritual and material culture from Byzantium, yet in its theocratic concept of the State was a true copy of old Constantinople, not only in its extended form but even in its essence, as the parallelism between the case of the persecution of John Chrysostom and his late redress, and the formal atonement of Alexei Michailovitch for the murder by Ivan the Terrible of the Metropolitan Philip would show.

The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries have been treated with the care which they demand. In particular the coronation ceremonies, the formal laws and the decrees of the Synods, in short, the official expressions of the theocratic state, are emphasized, and their quite fantastic reflections in a whole mass of apocryphal legends are quite properly relegated to the background. Obviously there was in

these centuries no written constitution, for even the *Epanagoge* was too general in its conceptions to be called such, yet *in actu* there was something which was in course of developing into a recognized pattern of a state structure. The author, though describing in detail the political and ecclesiastical framework, limits himself to what is actually demonstrable. This very limitation makes the portrayal of the struggle between the Patriarch and the Tsar in the mid-seventeenth century a veritable historical drama. Nikon is presented as a really tragic figure, grandeur and guilt inextricably interwoven in his character, formerly and constitutionally less notable than in actuality, between Tsar Alexei Michailovitch and his son Peter the Great, are quite clearly drawn. As he lays the book down the reader will only regret that the author has not continued his study into the post-Petrine period.

Two well chosen illustrations, a good index and an extensive bibliography and a thorough and scholarly *apparatus criticus* distinguish this study. The author has chosen the words of Christ: "Give unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and to God the things that are God's" as the motto of his book. Their appropriateness for this struggle between church and state is obvious. If the theocratic solution has had to give way to a quite otherwise oriented and motivated political and spiritual modern Europe, yet it remains, from a historical point of view, one of the most grandiose attempts at a solution that has ever been made. And many aspects of this system have had interest and value for the modern age. The history of Russian culture during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries offers many apt instances of this relevance.

University of Kiel LUDOLF MÜLLER

THOMSON, S. HARRISON, *Czechoslovakia in European History*. Princeton :Princeton University Press, 1953. Pp. X, 486. $7.50.

It is not an easy or simple task to produce a history of the Czechs and Slovaks in one volume.

Professor Thomson's story does not lack organic unity and has its own force and rhythm. It is advisable to treat at certain periods the Slovaks separately from the Czechs, and then again to sketch their common destinies. Moreover, it is necessary to give a good deal of space to the neighboring peoples with whom the Czechoslovak developments were intertwined, in particular to the Germans and in a lesser degree to the Magyars. As far as the former are concerned, that means three groups: the German-speaking inhabitants of the compact Czechoslovak territory (called inaccurately "Sudeten Germans"), the German-speaking Austrians, and the Germans in Saxony, Bavaria and elsewhere. Professor Thomson has succeeded in finding the right proportions and has given us a well balanced picture of various facets of Czechoslovak life in the past. The demand for a second edition speaks favorably for the author and his work.

Almost a hundred pages have been added to the original text and a new review of the book is fully justified. The second edition also makes it possible to call attention to some aspects of the work which for various reasons were not properly evaluated when it appeared in 1943.

Professor Thomson, undoubtedly after mature deliberation, decided not to follow the conventional pattern of general surveys in which the chronology is primarily respected. Anyone who compares his *Czechoslovakia* with the con-

temporaneous *History of the Czechs and Slovaks* by the late Professor R. W. Seton-Watson, can see that the topical approach contributed to the lucidity of Thomson's book. He was able to avoid the *embarras de richesse* which distracts the reader and slows down the narrative. When the destinies of the Czechs and Slovaks are too closely connected with the history of the Habsburg Empire, or, from 1867 to 1918, with the cumbersome Dual system of Austria-Hungary, as Seton-Watson chose to do, the line between the specifically Czech or Slovak affairs and the general trends in the Habsburg-controlled areas becomes often invisible and untraceable.

Prof. Thomson's *Czechoslovakia* is, in fact, a combination of two elements. The question arises whether his pattern should not be adopted by other authors writing about countries which were formed, at a comparatively recent date, out of territories which in the past, for a shorter or longer period, owed allegiance to several flags. The first portion of the book is made up of seven chapters in which are discussed the cardinal problems of earlier history, whereas in the second section, subdivided into six chapters, a chronological order has been observed.

The deviation from the conventional pattern had its chief motive in the author's desire to explain by an historical analysis the problems occupying the Czechoslovak people and their leaders during their struggle for independence. Then follows a discussion of the founding of the Republic, its temporary eclipse under the Nazis, and finally the era of successive crises culminating in the seizure of power by the Communists in February 1948.

The Habsburg problem, combined with the relationship of medieval Bohemia to the Holy Roman Empire, loomed large in 1914-1918 and for some time afterwards before the spectre of Restoration was dispelled. That is the theme of the four opening chapters. Nobody interested in the Czechoslovak cause in the early phase of the second World War could miss the importance of nationality struggles in the lands of the Bohemian Crown which, in 1938, aggravated the international situation and will always be listed as one of the causes of the world conflict. In two chapters on the Czechs and Germans from the era of medieval colonization down to 1918 Thomson has explained the origin and the gravity of the conflict. The rise of Czech nationalism and its specific features called for elucidation. Two chapters were devoted partly to the era of Awakening, partly to constitutional struggles from 1867 to 1914. Finally, the tension between the Czechs and one section of the Slovaks, headed by the late Father Andrej Hlinka, made inevitable a *tour d'horizon* over that field, and a close examination of such points at which the hard realities of our days connect with the past vicissitudes. Combination of two approaches proved to be not less successful than the consequent use of the topical method in such a work as *A Short History of Russia* by B. H. Sumner.

Professor Thomson's preoccupation with the Czechs and Slovaks is not of recent date and it did not originate in the days of excitement when Czechoslovakia supplied headlines for the daily press. The first contacts, almost thirty years ago, are symbolized by the names of John Wyclyf and John Hus. Some reviewers of the first edition expressed the desire to have an outline of religious history from the author's pen. It has been inserted as chapter five where it best fits.

Its title, *The Czech Reformation,* indicates the time limits. Again the author abstained from tracing the rise and fate of Christianity among the Czechs and Slovaks, and chose the reign of Charles IV as the starting point. The hero of the story is, of course, John Hus, but a sketch of the earlier activities of some re-

forming preachers and writers in Bohemia precedes the account of Hus' work. The passage devoted to him, unfortunately, had to be so compressed to fit into the general framework of the narrative that the dramatic events of the summer of 1412, with Hus' vehement campaign against indulgences, could be only alluded to. Then the story moves rapidly from its climax, the excommunication of the audacious preacher, to Hus' appearance in Constance, his trial and burning. Another dramatic section opens with the echoes of Hus' death and moves rapidly to the outbreak of storm in the country and to the crusades against the Hussites waged by the rejected claimant of the throne, the "red-haired dragon", Emperor-King Sigismund.

No small skill was needed to give in less than thirty pages a survey of religious parties in Bohemia between 1420 and 1620. Not only did the native movement split in the absence of a powerful leader of the same stature as its founder, but it became, after 1517, intertwined with the Reformation in Germany and elsewhere in Western Europe, and was finally drawn into the maelstrom of bitter conflicts, paving the way for the Thirty Years' War. The desire to keep the story within the pre-fixed limits probably accounts for the following rather terse sentence concerning Hus' progress in studies. An interval of three years came between his graduation as bachelor and the highest degree in liberal arts, and his promotion to baccalaurate in theology came most likely only in 1404. The works in Czech and German listed in the bibliography provided factual information for the chapter on the Reformation, but nowhere could be found a mould into which such a long and ramified story could be simply cast. The chapter is the outcome of not only wide reading in the field but also of a penetrating analysis of issues which gave rise to the Hussite movement and caused its splitting into several parties.

The final chapter of the first edition, entitled "Munich and After," ended in general remarks concerning the Czechoslovak cause as one of the stakes for which the second world conflict was unleashed and fought. It has been recast and supplemented by another chapter on recent developments. In fact, the final section of the book is a new piece of work which supplies the public with a much-needed account of the bitter struggles for the mastery of Czechoslovakia which had been wrested in 1938/9 by the avowed foe of the Czechoslovak democracy, and in 1948, by its putative ally.

Professor Thomson's book served in its first edition as an introduction to Czechoslovak studies and fulfilled satisfactorily its mission. The second edition is not a mechanical replacement of the first version. Extensive study of books which were not available during the war, as well as of memoirs and documents published in various languages since 1945, prepared the author for a revision of some passages and for the compilation of supplementary chapters. In its new shape, *Czechoslovakia in European History* claims its place in the list of books which really are indispensable for any serious study of old and new problems of Europe, especially of its central zone.

Columbia University OTAKAR ODLOŽILÍK

LUNT, HORACE G., ed., *Harvard Slavic Studies.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, Vol. I, 1953. Pp. 396. $6.00.

This is the first volume of a proposed series of symposiums on Slavic themes

undertaken by the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures of Harvard University in cooperation with the Mid-European Studies Center of the National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc., edited by Professor Horace G. Lunt of Harvard University. With one exception it represents scholarly activities of Slavicists in the United States alone. It opens with a brilliant and penetrating study on "The Kernel of Comparative Slavic Literature" by Professor Roman Jakobson, who seeks a common patrimony of Slavic culture in the folklore of the different branches of the Slavic people. Although Professor Jakobson's conclusions are rather speculative, his approach to the finding of a common denominator in the language and verbal art of the different Slavic people is both ingenious and stimulating.

The other contributions to this volume are: "New Traces of the *Igor Tale* in Old Russian Literature" by Professor Aleksander V. Soloviev of the University of Geneva; "Comenius' *Labyrinth of the World*: Its Themes and Their Sources" by Dmitry Chizhevsky, Harvard University; "Adam Mickiewicz, the Mystic-Politician" by Wiktor Weintraub, Harvard University; "The Czechs on the Eve of the 1848 Revolution" by Otakar Odložilík, Columbia University; "Russian Pan-Slavists and the Polish Uprising of 1863" by Michael B. Petrovich, University of Wisconsin; "The Art of Ivan Bunin" by Renato Poggioli, Harvard University; "The Letters of Maksim Gorky to V. F. Khodasevich, 1922-1925" translated and edited by Hugh McLean, Harvard University; "Marxist Theory in Czech Literature" by Milada Souchkova, Harvard University; and "A Survey of Macedonian Literature" by Horace G. Lunt, Harvard University.

Of these, the most interesting, perhaps, are the article by Petrovich and the letters of Gorky. Petrovich makes a valuable differentiation, and one that is long overdue between the Russian Slavophiles and the so-called Pan-Slavists, pointing out that Pan-Slavism (a movement or doctrine which still needs a great deal of study) was often denounced by the Slavophiles as something incompatible with Russia's historical development and "mission," and hence an instrument of propaganda and policy which could lead only to the unleashing of Russian imperialism in the name of and for a union of all Slavs.

Gorky's letters to Khodasevich, some of which appeared in the Russian original in *Novy Zhurnal* and some in English translation in *The Russian Review*, and now deposited in the Library of Congress, show clearly that the proletarian writer's anti-Sovietism in the early 1920's was motivated not by any moral principles, but by purely selfish and materialistic considerations. When Gorky found that he could not make a comfortable living as an emigré writer, he made his deal with the Communists and returned to Russia. Professor McLean did an excellent job in the translation, editing, and annotation of these letters, but not being a Russian-born, he made a mistake which any native Russian would not have made. Speaking about Khodasevich's intense and learned interest in the heritage of Pushkin, Gorky refers to this as having "now become the property of the union of innumerable Ss." Mr. McLean translates that as "Soviets", whereas the letters "ss" here mean "s.o.b's." (p. 324).

A similar lack of familiarity with idiomatic Russian is found in Poggioli's article, in which he builds a whole symbolic meaning around the fact that the woman in Bunin's story "The Village" is not given a personal name, but is called the "young one"; whereas any native Russian knows that *molodaya* means merely "young bride" and has no symbolic meaning whatever.

Another blunder of a different nature is found in Weintraub's article when in two instances (pp. 148, 163) he writes "Lamartine" instead of "Lamennais."

It is also unfortunate that the publishers adopted the transliteration of the Russian "h" (kh) by the English "x" (ex). While this reviewer has always been in opposition to the prevailing tendency in American Slavic publications to use the Croatian diacritical signs for the transliteration of certain Russian consonants, he is most vehemently opposed to this new fanciful transliteration, because it is completely unwarranted and most misleading, particularly when appearing in an all-English context; for instance, in the name of Chekhov, which is spelled "Čexov," and which to an uninitiated reader will sound "Sexov."

Notwithstanding these criticisms, the appearance of the first volume of *Harvard Slavic Studies* is a welcome contribution to scholarship in the field. Let us hope that the second and subsequent volumes will have a greater variety and geographic distribution of Slavic scholars (seven out of eleven in this volume belong to the faculty of Harvard University) and a greater emphasis on Russia's part in Slavic culture (only four articles out of eleven deal with Russian matters), because regardless of political or other considerations, the Russians have contributed a much greater share to the culture of Slavic peoples in the last 200 years than any other Slavic nation.

University of Toronto LEONID I. STRAKHOVSKY

FORSTREUTER, KURT, *Vom Ordensstaat zum Fürstentum. Geistige und politische Wandlungen im Deutschordensstaate Preussen unter den Hochmeistern Friedrich und Albrecht (1498-1525)*. Kitzingen/Main: Holzner Verlag, no date. Pp. 151.

To many medievalists the history of the crusades furnishes striking examples of an incompatible mixture of piety and secularism. These examples can be found in the history of the Teutonic Order as well as in any other. Its collapse and defeat in the fifteenth century have been attributed to the corroding effect of constantly violating professed ideals. The violation goes back to the very beginnings of the Order in Prussia. When the last Grand Master Albrecht of Brandenburg undertook to justify the secularization of the Order, he said, as some men had said from the very first days of the medieval expansion of Christianity, that the Order should have conquered the Prussians with the Word and not the Sword. This is also what the Livonians said to their early German missionary bishops.

It was the same Albrecht, who, when elected Grand Master of the Order in 1511, told Duke George of Saxony that he could not be chaste and burn. Piety did not keep Duke George from reassuring Albrecht what countless generations of monks had taken for granted, namely, that there was no need to take the Order's rule too literally. For his closest adviser Albrecht chose Dietrich von Schönberg, a man who never bothered to join the Order. Soon after their becoming friends, they probably played around with the same women in Königsberg. Dietrich never bothered to marry. His expenses for ambassadorial journeys in 1519-20 included provision for prostitutes as well as dice. A kind of diplomatic Benvenuto, he too suffered from syphilis. It was this man who guided Albrecht in the plans for secularization when it became clear that the Order could not redress the humiliation of the Second Treaty of Thorn (1466).

Mr. Forstreuter, a well-known authority on the Teutonic order, calls Dietrich, with the possible exception of Hermann von Salza, "der universalste Politiker des Deutschen Ordens." In him, Forstreuter goes on, "verkörpert sich am deutlichsten jener weltliche Typ des Renaissancemenschen." To be sure, Dietrich conceived far reaching plans to carry out the foreign policy of the Order in its last days, and travelled widely on personal missions to execute them. When nothing else succeeded he could always solicit funds for his poverty-stricken master, and take with good grace the refusal of Francis I to endow "eine blosse Versorgungsanstalt" as liberally as he endowed Italian artists. Forstreuter tries to show that it was the influence of humanism on the administration of the Order that marks the difference between the days of the illiterate Grand Master Heinrich Reuss von Plauen (1467-70) and those of the last two Grand Masters Friedrich of Saxony and Albrecht. If this influence is to be seen in the immorality and secularism of men like Albrecht and Dietrich, it could be said that these qualities are not peculiar to or necessarily characteristic of humanism. It seems also an abuse of language to refer to the "universality" of Dietrich's activity (p. 83). The monograph is nicely written. It is accompanied by an elaborate bibliographical commentary (pp. 126-151) betraying intimate acquaintance with the archives of the Order. The author might easily have spared the reviewer the necessity of making the stale remark: there is no index.

University of Nebraska EDGAR N. JOHNSON

NOLDE, BORIS, *La formation de l'empire russe. Etudes, notes et documents.* Tome II. Paris: Institut d'Etudes Slaves. 1953. Pp. 408.

The second and last completed volume of Baron Boris Nolde's posthumously published work is another solid and valuable contribution to the study of Russian history. It exhibits the same minute scholarship, balanced judgment, clear thought and precise narration which characterize the first volume of this large project (already reviewed in this periodical) —as indeed they characterize many other books written by the same author—and it throws much light on some of the most important steps in "the formation of the Russian empire." The volume contains the third and the fourth parts of the author's total scheme, namely "Southern Russia" and "The Expansion towards the Caucasus." "Southern Russia" consists of successive chapters on "The beginnings of the Russian advance towards the Black Sea," "Conflict with Turkey," "The annexation of the Crimea," "The steppes of the South," and "Bessarabia," which trace the great Russian movement southward from the reign of Peter the Great to the Treaty of Bucharest in 1812. "The Expansion towards the Caucasus," smaller and much less complete than the preceding part, deals with "The approaches," "Peter the Great and the Iranian provinces of the Caspian," "Consolidating the results achieved by the predecessors of Peter the Great," "The protectorates in Daghestan," and "Georgia: protection and annexation." The narrative ends in the reign of Alexander I making the reader regret deeply the loss of the later volumes of the study, planned but never executed.

In addition to its three hundred and eighty-seven huge pages of text, the book contains two maps and a useful bibliography. But there is no index: this is all the more unfortunate because of the wealth of valuable detailed information to be found in the volume.

This volume is a very rich book, and at best one can call attention only to a little of its varied content, more or less at random. It includes, for instance, a fascinating and convincing discussion of the cossacks of the Zaporozhie in the process of which the author demonstrates that the cossack army never formed anything resembling a state and had no landholdings of any extent. Several chapters provide interesting information about Peter the Great including the suggestion that he thought at one time of establishing the capital of Russia in Taganrog (p. 15). There is more about Catherine the Great, and the resulting general picture of Catherine represents one of the most impressive favorable evaluations of that empress in historical literature. Some parts of the book could be published as excellent separate studies. This is notably true of the story of the Crimea which contains a precise exposition of the sustained Russian efforts to establish an independent state in the Crimea in spite of the unwillingness of the natives and other adverse circumstances.

As for negative criticism, there is little to be said. Of course, the volume suffers from not being a complete unit, and it suffers in at least two ways: in several places, especially in the last sections of the book, parts of the narrative are, or appear to be, missing and occasionally references are made to non-existent chapters; furthermore, the last volumes of Baron Nolde's project would have in all probability added considerable unity and historical perspective to the earlier narratives—in its unfinished state the study is better in parts than as a whole. One might also regret the particular limitations of the author's approach, inevitable as some such limitations are. Baron Nolde, a superb diplomatic historian and legal scholar, is above all concerned with diplomacy and administration. Economic and social matters are given less attention; culture is barely mentioned. Thus when Russian troops break through the Caucasian barrier into Georgia there is very little in the author's narrative to indicate that they had moved from the steppes populated by fluid nomadic tribes into an area of truly old and complex civilization. Again, the author never explains the religion of the Armenians although he notes that in Russia their ecclesiastical affairs were administered differently from the Georgian.

The book contains very few factual mistakes. One might question, however, the statement that after the defeat at Poltava Charles XII crossed into Turkey "with his army" (p 17), for he had only a handful of men left with him rather than an army. Highly debatable is also the sweeping assertion on page 184 to the effect that the peasants in Russia were never free.

The main generalization to come out of Baron Nolde's vast and valuable researches into the formation of the Russian empire is the danger of all generalizations. The great expansion of the Russian state was both spontaneous and prearranged, both a rigid and a flexible process, both cruel and kind in terms of human values, both welcome and unwelcome to the new subjects of the empire. Russian policies were both aggressive and defensive, and the ethics involved in them were both higher and lower than the current standard. In other words, these, and it seems all other considerations, varied depending on the time, the place, the particular circumstances, the personal element, both in St. Petersburgh and on the spot, and simply chance. A minute study of these numerous, different, and even contradictory developments may be disturbing to those in search of pat patterns, ready answers, and simple explanations of imperialism, in terms of national character or otherwise. It remains, however, the one worthwhile approach to history—and to wisdom.

State University of Iowa NICHOLAS V. RIASANOVSKY

PAPADOPOULLOS, THEODORE H., *Studies and Documents Relating to the History of The Greek Church and People under Turkish Domination.* Brussels, 1952. Pp. xxiv, 507. 70s.

This book constitutes volume I of the *Bibliotheca Graeca Aevi Posterioris,* a collection designed to prepare the ground for a critical investigation of the Post-Byzantine times. It is an important contribution for the study of the history of the Greek world during the period of Turkish domination. It is important not only because it makes available source material not previously known, but also because of the author's illuminating suggestions of how one should approach the study of this history.

The book is divided into three parts, the first of which consists of a long prolegomenon devoted to the history of the Greek church under Turkish domination (1453-1800). Here the author deals with such subjects as the problem of the reconstitution of the Greek church following the destruction of the Byzantine empire; the administrative organization of the church; the geographical jurisdiction of the Oecumenical Patriarchate; and the effects of the Church on the fortunes of hellenism. The author soundly observes that "the ecclesiastical history of the modern Greeks, prior to their political emancipation, is really their national history; we can follow best the social and intellectual evolution of the modern Greeks, in the historical evolution of their Church." The study of this evolution is "worthy of attention on the part of the student of civilization," for "it exhibits a phenomenon of rare occurrence in history, viz. the preservation, under conditions of enslavement of a group unity, culturally autonomous, fostered by the relative autonomy of a religious organism, the Orthodox Church." This autonomy was made possible by the policy of the Turks. This policy, according to the author, was less oppressive than is commonly supposed. "The fiscal régime seems to have been less exactive than in many other Christian countries; while the civil jurisdiction of the Church created the external conditions for the life of the subject Greeks as a nation quite apart from the dominant race, and helped maintain the impenetrability between the two races, which impeded the absorption of the one by the other." The Greek church "preserved such traditions as constitute fundamental presuppositions for the regeneration of a national unity." Of those traditions, the greatest was the Greek language. The remarks of the author concerning the role of the Church in the preservation of the Greek nationality through the preservation of the Greek language are extremely interesting and, in the opinion of this reviewer, very sound. "The Greeks," he writes, "were differentiated from their fellow Orthodox Christians by the language; but the decline of the Greek language in its dialectical forms was so advanced, the foreign elements invaded it to such a degree, that it is to be wondered at, if, without the preservation of a pure form of it, the barbarization of the language would not have proceeded so far as to render the amalgamation of the languages in the Balkans, and with it the extinction of the sole remaining attribute of national differentiation, an accomplished fact . . . . The people had sunk into a degradation far below the normal, and what imported for the Greek nationality was the preservation of a standard of normality at which the people could aspire to return in a future time. Now the Church maintained that standard chiefly by maintaining a pure linguistic tradition; this enabled the people to look forward to the Church as to a center of superior achievement." The "community of language between people and clergy, backed by a racial relation, constitutes the basic fact underlying the preservation of a sentiment of unity among the Greeks,

with axis of reference to the Oecumenical Patriarchate." In his appreciation of the cultural and national role of the Church, the author, it must be observed, deals only with the Greek people. He is not concerned with the non-Greek elements of the Turkish empire.

The prolegomenon is the most general part of the book. The two parts that follow are restricted both in chronological scope and in subject matter. They cover the period from 1748 to 1757 with the emphasis on the two patriarchates of Cyril V. This period is of particular interest because of the controversy about rebaptization, a controversy which divided the hierarchy of the Greek Church. This controversy was occasioned by the efforts of the Greek ecclesiastics, notably Cyril V, to counteract the proselytizing propaganda of the Catholic Church among the Orthodox population of the Ottoman empire. Concerning the proselytizing activities of the Catholic Church and the dangers to which these activities exposed the Orthodox Church, the author has some interesting things to say. "What we may call the struggle against the Latins," he writes, "is the most memorable chapter in the history of the Eastern Church under Turkish domination." In this struggle the Greek Church had to contend not only with the Catholic missionaries who were better educated than the Greek clergy and disposed of greater resources, but also with the influence of foreign powers, especially the French, at the Ottoman Court. The author shows conclusively, for instance, that the deposition of Cyril V in 1757 was brought about less by the opposition of the Greek hierarchy than by the intrigues of the French officials residing in Constantinople.

It is not a narrative account of events, however, which the author offers in treating of the period covered by this section of his book. His study here deals primarily with the sources, their nature, genuineness and reliability. "No writing of history," he writes in the preface," can be attempted before Philology clears the ground" and it is this clearing of the ground for the two patriarchates of Cyril V that he attempts. This he does in two parts: in the first, he examines carefully the sources already known; in the second, he offers a new document, published here for the first time, together with an analysis of its contents and a dissertation upon its reliability. The new document is in Greek, written anonymously in political verse and entitled *Planosparaktes*, meaning "which rends, destroys the errors or the impostors." It deals with the controversy about rebaptization and is decidedly hostile to Cyril V. A number of other documents, upon which the author has thrown new light, are also reproduced. In editing and analyzing these documents the author has scrupulously observed all the canons of sound scholarship.

Rutgers University PETER CHARANIS

OSTERBLADH, KAARLO, ed., *K. F. Mennanderin lähettämiä ja saamia kirjeitä (Brev från och till C. F. Mennander)*, Helsinki, 1939, 1940, 1942. Pp. 700, 733, 929. (Suomen historian lähteitä, IV, 1-3).

The central figure in these 2,262 pages of eighteenth century correspondence is Karl Fredrik Mennander (1712-86), bishop of Åbo in Finland for eighteen years (1757-75), and archbishop of Uppsala for the remaining years of his life. Only modest fragments of this correspondence have been published earlier. Mennander's formal academic training was begun at Åbo university in 1728 and was completed at Uppsala in 1735. Shortly after leaving Uppsala, he joined the faculty at Åbo,

first as instructor in philosophy, and later as professor—successively—in physics and theology. A parish pastorate, taken on in 1749, presumably helped to qualify him for his later career in the church. As bishop of Åbo (1757-1775), and thereby an important factor in shaping university policy, he became a dominating figure in bringing Sweden's province of Finland into the main current of western European culture. The story of Mennander's career, as it emerges from his voluminous surviving correspondence, may thus become an important chapter in the intellectual and educational history of his adopted province, and indeed in the history of eighteenth century Sweden itself.

The letters passing between the father and his talented son and namesake fill most of the first two volumes, and the bulk of them fall within the era of the Enlightened Despotism whose central figure was the Francophile king, Gustavus III. The correspondence, which includes letters to and from many prominent figures in Sweden and Finland, illumines many facets of life and culture in an important period of the country's history. Father and son provided Sweden and Finland with scholarly contacts with many parts of western Europe, France, the Germanies, Italy and England,—which illustrate the increasing cultural solidarity of the western world. Their letters show to some degree how the prevailing intellectual currents were guided into Swedish-Finnish channels. The son, who was ennobled under the name of Fredenheim after his father's elevation to the bishop's seat, shared his father's enthusiasm for learning. While the son was establishing himself as a useful official in the chancery and the foreign office, he was watching the offerings of second-hand book dealers and book auctions of deceased collectors for any items that might interest his bibliophile father, whether of Swedish, French, German, English or Italian origin. Junior's appetite for rarities—books and *objets d'arts*—carried over into the years following his father's death, when Gustavus III's keen interest in such matters took Fredenheim abroad, especially to Italy, for extended trips (1787, 1788-91) during which he figured prominently in archaeological work on the Roman Forum. With the senior Mennander's upbringing behind him, and a friendly king at his side, ready to utilize his abilities, it is not surprising to find him in charge of the king's art collections by 1792. From the outset of Gustavus's reign, he had been an intense admirer of the king, whose coup of 1772 he records as "a great and fortunate event" (II, 330), and to whom he unreservedly ascribed "an ocean of great qualities, great deeds, and great and gracious declarations" (II, 331). The special envoy, count Lieven, sent to the French court to bring it the news of the king's triumph, was begged by the *honoratoires* in madame du Barry's drawing room to tell them of the "revolution" in Sweden; and the aged Voltaire flattered the king by sending him a poem in his praise. (II, 342).

As "pro-chancellor" of Åbo university during his episcopacy, Mennander kept closely in touch with academic affairs and lent his moral and material help on innumerable occasions. This interest continued unabatedly after his election as archbishop of Uppsala. From two members of the Åbo faculty, the classical scholar and historian, Johan Bilmark, teacher of the bishop's son, and the learned and brilliant professor of rhetoric ("eloquence"), Henrik Gabriel Porthan, we have here 76 letters all told. Bilmark reports fully on his pupil's progress in his studies, and comments here and there on economic and administrative affairs of diocese and university. Porthan discusses with great frankness many individual members of the instructional staff, internal faculty squabbles and intrigues, the failure of the king to pay a promised 6,000 plåtar (a copper coin) into the botanical garden fund

(III, 414), efforts towards acquiring valuable classics from the book collection of a wealthy friend of the university (III, 424), the case of an alleged sorcerer in Savolax, murdered by a farmer who had held him responsible for his son's death, the serious effect of the loss of two salt cargoes on the economy of certain Finnish towns, the shocking conduct of some parish ministers, the university librarian's work in editing an Åbo newspaper (III, 430), the publication of dissertations written under his and colleagues' directions, and much besides. But he also tells of his own researches and publications. Thus, he mentions a "Dissertatio Epistolaris" on the origin and antiquity of the Finnish people, which he plans to include in part 6 of his *Poësis Fennica,* and expresses his desire to locate some old Russian ballads, with translations, in hope of getting light from them on the age of the old Finnish runes which are supposed to be similar to the ballads, but are utterly different from modern Russian poetry; and he tells of his plan to show that the "grey runes" of the orthodox Carelians belong somewhere between the Russian ballads and the Finnish runes (III, 411). His investigations included studies of the Finnish language, folk customs, geography of the province, its old laws and institutions, as well as its literature. He is credited by modern Finnish scholars with being the real founder of the Finnish historical school. His devotion to the cause of real scholarship is reflected in a letter to Mennander where he suggests a candidate for a part time theological professorship without pay, but remarks drily that his man is "too little of a flatterer, charlatan and weathercock" to stand much chance of appointment.

Among names well known beyond Sweden's borders that appear in the correspondence, some of them letter writers themselves, are: the mystic, Emmanuel Swedenborg; the naturalist, Carolus Linnaeus; the latter's protégé, Pehr Kalm, a botanist who made an extended visit (1748-51) to the English colonies in America at Linnaeus's instigation to collect seeds for propagation in Åbo university's botanical garden. Students of early American history will recall his three-volume *Travels into North America,* published in Sweden in 1753-61 and in English translations several times since, in which he recorded the scientific results of his trip. The three volumes proved to be less than half of his total American report. The remaining four manuscript volumes survived only until 1827, when a fire struck the Åbo university library building. But the manuscript might have been saved for posterity, except for the dilatory conduct of a professor, namely Kalm's successor, Kreander. In a letter to his son, written in February, 1784, archbishop Mennander says that Kreander had promised to publish the remaining part of Kalm's *Travels,* and had indeed accepted "good money" (wackra penningar) for this, but "Kreander's promises cannot be depended on" (I, 509). The names of many persons important in Sweden's political, ecclesiastical and cultural history, who were friends or acquaintances of father or son, appear as writers of letters or receive mention, mainly in volume II.

These volumes, be it noted, appeared during 1939-42, years of terrible trial and suffering for the Finnish nation. The delay in their reaching the editorial desk of the *Journal* is understandable in view of what has happened since their printing. In collecting and editing these letters, Kaarlo Österbladh has added an important and largely a new source for the study of Swedish-Finnish history that will be warmly welcomed by scholars working on phases of that history in the era of the Enlightenment. American college and university libraries that are interested in acquiring new material on the Era of the Enlightenment, or on the history of

Sweden and Finland in the eighteenth century, would be well advised to add these three informative volumes to their collections.

University of California
Los Angeles

WALDEMAR WESTERGAARD

KALLBRUNNER, JOSEF, (ed.), *Kaiserin Maria Theresias Politisches Testament.* Munich: R. Oldenbourg. 1952. Pp. 124.

NOVOTNY, ALEXANDER, *Staatskanzler Kaunitz als geistige Persönlichkeit.* Vienna: Brüder Hollinek. 1947. Pp. 224.

WALTER, FRIEDRICH, *Männer um Maria Theresia.* Vienna: A. Holzhausens Nfg. 1951. Pp. 228.

The second edition of a comprehensive biography of Maria Theresa by Heinrich Kretschmayr, published originally in 1925 under the simple title *Maria Theresia* and reprinted in 1938, soon after the Anschluss, was the last contribution to the Era of Absolutism which came from his pen. Not long afterwards Kretschmayr died (July 1939). Another Austrian archivist, Josef Kallbrunner, compiled a preface to a modern edition of the political testament of Maria Theresa shortly before his death (March 1951) and the thin volume appeared posthumously in 1952.

The title is somewhat misleading. The two writings which had been found among the Queen's papers were compiled in her early period when she stood amid struggles for the preservation of her domains, not in the last phase of her long reign. They have been available to scholars since they were printed by A. von Arneth in the *Archiv für österreichische Geschichte* (vol. 47), but as Kallbrunner rightly says they were of little use to the historians before the appearance of detailed studies on the administrative reforms under Maria Theresa. He has particularly in mind the works of H. Kretschmayr and of his continuator Friedrich Walter in the collective publication *Die österreichische Zentralverwaltung.*

The writings were inspired by the Queen but in all probability written by one of her intimate collaborators. In some cases Maria Theresa corrected the draft. The first of them dates probably from 1750, the second from 1756-7. There are no factual revelations in these texts but they are instructive as a key to the Queen's personality. The language used by the anonymous compiler is a blend of colloquialisms and of official style. A list of technical expressions, which have since gone out of use, and an analytical study of the style by Clemens Biener supplement the critical edition and make the writings accessible to modern readers.

Novotny's biographical study presents Count and later Prince Kaunitz as a man of wide interests, promoter of intellectual activities, collector of paintings and engravings, benevolent protector of the Academy of Fine Arts, in short, one of the leading figures at the Habsburg Court.

There is no trace of hero worship in this unpretentious book, nor was the author tempted to conceal the shortcomings and limitations of the State Chancellor. It is advisable to read not only the narrative, but also the critical notes appended to each chapter. Novotny speaks of Kaunitz's admiration of France and portrays him as a mediator between Paris and Vienna both in political

matters and in cultural exchanges. He relegates to the realm of fiction some colorful details for which he found no support in contemporary sources. He does not believe that Kaunitz established personal contacts with Voltaire while in France, and discards the story that J. J. Rousseau served for some time as Kaunitz's secretary. The Austrian statesman was, no doubt, acquainted with Voltaire's chief writings, but he was by no means anxious to correspond with him as had been many illustrious contemporaries, including some crowned heads.

A concrete example of Kaunitz's inadequate knowledge of contemporary trends appears in the fourth chapter treating his interest in Fine Arts. After Kaunitz's energetic intervention, Maria Theresa purchased for the Imperial collections four large paintings by P. P. Rubens making up the altar of San Ildefonso. Kaunitz recognized at once their enormous value and resented the thought that they could be sold to St. Petersbourg, or to another capital. But in his own collections the more modern or contemporary masters, such as Goya, were either not represented at all, or only by some early work. He was a keen collector, who evidently lacked the critical ability to make his own judgments and was anxious to possess what had won fame before his own time.

There remains something enigmatic in Kaunitz's attitude toward the Church and toward the schemes of reform pursued by the Enlightened Monarchs. As Novotny points out (p. 159), under Maria Theresa the State Chancellor was occupied chiefly with the conduct of foreign affairs. It was only after her death that he became more outspoken and active. Was he simply carried away by the flood of governmental decrees, or was his previous restraint a deliberate act of neutrality, motivated not by inner convictions but merely by the desire not to antagonize the Queen by an ostentatious display of anti-clerical sentiment?

It is, in our opinion, rather risky to treat even such prominent personalities as Kaunitz as individual cases. Such men were products of their own century. Due attention must be given to the atmosphere prevailing in the upper social circles in various portions of the Habsburg patrimony at the time when the counter-reformation seemingly reached its objectives. The external symobls of its triumph, such as the Church of St. Nicholas in Prague or the Church of St. Charles Borromeo in Vienna, were built when Kaunitz passed through his boyhood and adolescence. The long expected victory over the Protestants was accomplished, but in its wake came the waning of the militant faith, and a lukewarm, skeptical attitude, or even hostility, toward the champions of re-Catholization, the Society of Jesus. This spirit of indifference appeared in the higher classes earlier than among the common folk.

It will be necessary to study more carefully Kaunitz's family background. It follows from Novotny's remarks that up to his enrollment at the University of Leipzig in 1731, at the age of twenty, Kaunitz lived in the Moravian residence of his parents and was brought up by tutors. This, however, was not at Jaroměřice (Jarmeritz) as Novotny states (p. 10), but at Slavkov (Austerlitz), the center of the family domains. As his parents' allegiance to the Roman Church was not doubted, the decision not to send the youth to Jesuit schools but to a Protestant university in Saxony must be explained by the influence of the boy's tutors or of other persons with whom he came in contact.

In this connection, attention may be called to an exhaustive study of the textile enterprises[1] by which both the grandfather and father of the coming State Chancellor endeavored to enhance the prosperity of their domains. The factory at Slavkov employed experts from foreign lands, among them Protestants, and to ensure its operation it was necessary to have more contacts with the outside world than had noble families interested primarily in agriculture.

Another angle seems worth exploring: Kaunitz's relationship with his brother-in-law, Johann Adam von Questenberg, the owner of Jaroměřice, which property was, in 1752, inherited by the Chancellor's third son Dominik Andreas. Count v. Questenberg converted his residence into a haven for composers, musicians and friends of music. Two books about v. Questenberg and music at Jaroměřice by Vladimír Helfert brought to light a mass of details. The first of them, *Hudební barok na českých zámcích. Jaroměřice za hr. J. A. z Questenberku* (publ. in Prague, 1916), has general information on the Count's wide range of interests and sheds light on aristocratic life in the first half of the eighteenth century.

Novotny's book follows a different line than other books on Kaunitz, including the study of his accomplishments in foreign affairs by G. Küntzel (*Fürst Kaunitz-Rittberg als Staatsmann,* 1923). It gives proper place to his political activities and although Novotny presents a much broader scope, the book provides only a preliminary sketch of the biography which our Austrian colleagues owe to themselves and to all students of modern history. Our criticisms are made in the hope that such a biography either is in preparation or will soon be started.

The collection of portraits which Friedrich Walter has drawn is a companion to his learned studies of administrative reforms under Maria Theresa and Joseph II. Written in a light vein, the book was designed for a wide circle of readers and it will undoubtedly satisfy their interest in the splendid court of such a colorful figure as Maria Theresa. The author searched not only for facts but also for specimens of language and style; in the Austrian archives he found documents from which he could quote amply to give his audience the flavor of the Viennese atmosphere two hundred years ago. It is a relief to see lifted the *gesamtdeutsch* fog which hung for many years over the Austrian peaks and dales, and was thickened in no small measure by such historians as von Srbik and his admirers.

The men around Maria Theresa are her husband and son, and seven statesmen high in her counsels. It is interesting to trace their origins and family connections. J. Ch. Bartenstein, who stood by the Queen in her most critical period, immediately after her accession to the throne, came from Frieburg i. Breisgau, in the lands along the upper Rhine. F. W. von Haugwitz was born about 1700 to a family in the service of the Elector of Saxony, converted from Lutheranism to Catholicism, and rose to prominence in Silesia. The Moravian background of W. A. Kaunitz has been mentioned. The Queen's personal physician and adviser in matters of education, Gerhard van Swieten, was a native of Leyden and got his training both there and at Louvain. The bearer of a pompous title, Prince de Sylva and Count de Tarouca, alluded to in a contemporary diary as *ami de l'Imperatrice,* was of Portuguese origin. Thus only the leader of the Imperial forces, L. J. Daun, and the courtier J. J. Prince Khevenhüller-Metch, were of Austrian origin. The Queen's consort, Francis Stephen, ruled in Lorraine before his marriage and ex-

[1] *Časopis Matice Moravské,* v. 55 (1931), pp. 95-168, 418-468, and v. 56 (1932), pp. 101-180. Written in Czech by Jindřich Šebaněk.

changed his homeland for Tuscany, having vacated Lorraine for Stanisław Leszczyński after the war for the Polish Succession.

New details concerning the life and career of these men have been brought to light and skilfully connected with notes and observations from that well of information, the diaries of the Supreme Master of the Court, Khevenhüller-Metsch.

The true hero of the book is the Queen herself, with her son, Joseph, given secondary prominence. Maria Theresa is portrayed as a ruler, as the top figure in Vienna society, and as a woman adorned with virtues and talents, but yielding to purely human instincts in hours of joy and happiness as well as in days clouded by depression and sorrow.

Dr. Walter's collection of biographical essays is a serious work, readable and appealing, but nowhere deviating from the precepts of sound scholarship.

Columbia University OTAKAR ODLOŽILÍK

MISCH, CARL, *Deutsche Geschichte im Zeitalter der Massen.* Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1952. Pp. 555. DM 19.80.

Whether the work under review is a useful one would seem to this reviewer to depend on whether there is in Germany a need for it. Mr. Misch, its author, at present teaching at Center College, Kentucky, has apparently written to furnish his erstwhile countrymen with a history of modern Germany (from 1789 to the present) as this history appears to one who has developed the point of view of an outsider. He acknowledges the American aid given him for the writing of the book; presumably the project was thought a valuable one, although it would seem to have only a limited public in this country. Rather an interpretive textbook than anything else in form, it is simply written and has a kind of appeal because the author's sympathies lie with the German people, which he sees as achieving so much and yet as having suffered so bitterly.

In so far as Mr. Misch's sympathy is with the masses, they may be said to be his hero, but the volume is in no way a true history of the "masses." The masses are there, but they wait in the wings while the play Mr. Misch describes is for the most part that of their political leaders. In Germany after 1815 the people were brought into the nation, they awoke politically, they advanced economically and socially, they came into the "rights" the West had taught them to demand. But in the political conflicts of modern times the forces of tradition won out over liberalism and democracy. Although Germany had the conditions far more than most states for a true "age of the masses" (p. 210), the very economic success the state and the masses enjoyed only helped these forces to have their way politically. To the author even the Weimar Republic appears in no way a fulfillment for the masses of a liberal, democratic state: "Never before had there existed a cleft between people and state of such depth" (p. 265), he writes, as under this ill-fated régime. Hitler's régime was, on the contrary, strong in popular support and through the identification of the masses with the state and ruler. As under Bismarck Germany under Hitler took its true place in Europe; then again the leader took a wrong turning. Mr. Misch is of the opinion that today the Republic is weaker even than was the Weimar Republic; for this time the state is without Prussia and without the army, which General von Seeckt kept alive under Weimar. And this time, he concludes,

East and West meet in the very heart of Germany: "Never before was Germany split between East and West. Her fate will depend on how she decides between them" (p. 534).

University of Nebraska PAULINE R. ANDERSON

CRAIG, GORDON A. and FELIX GILBERT, edd., *The Diplomats 1919-1939*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1953. Pp. x, 700. $9.00.

Numerous treatises have been written on the diplomatic history of the years 1919-1939. This book, while recording much of this diplomatic history, is concerned primarily with the technique of diplomacy and the conduct of individual diplomatists, and in 21 chapters by 17 authors, most of them professors of history, provides three kinds of studies. First, there are accounts of the British, French, German, Italian, Japanese, and Soviet foreign offices and the United States Department of State. Both the general atmosphere and the special procedures of each office are analyzed, and the conduct of the more important foreign ministers of each country is examined from a professional point of view. Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay tried to maintain "the old tradition in a new era." The Wilhelmstrasse and the Palazzo Chigi, as they became the instruments of Hitler's and Mussolini's aggressions, revealed "the twilight of diplomacy." The Kremlin and the Gaimusho were in large measure opportunists who were adept at fishing in troubled waters. The Department of State (for which no synonym had been found) sat "on the side lines." "Diplomacy at Geneva," that is, an attempt to work out a new style, gets two chapters.

Secondly, there are some chapters on special themes. Three are devoted to "fighters for lost causes": Arthur Henderson (disarmament), Maxim Litvinov (collective security) and Alexis Léger (French security); one to Turkish diplomacy from Mudros to Lausanne; and one to the policy of Colonel Beck, the much-criticized foreign minister of Poland.

Thirdly, a number of ambassadors are portrayed, both for the reports they sent to their foreign offices and for their possible influence on policy. Those selected are Sir Horace Rumbold (Berlin), Sir Nevile Henderson (Berlin), the Earl of Perth (Rome), André François-Poncet (Berlin and Rome), Robert Coulondre (Moscow and Berlin), Count von der Schulenburg (Moscow), Herbert von Dirksen (Moscow, Tokyo and London), William E. Dodd (Berlin), William C. Bullitt (Moscow and Paris), and Joseph P. Kennedy (London). No ambassadors in Washington have been included, no doubt because adequate information is not available.

The individual chapters are generally well done, though some of them make dull reading; however, taken together they make a very long book, which is heavy to hold. Surely, in a study of the technical aspects of diplomacy, many of the details here assembled might well have been omitted. On the other hand, there is no adequate treatment of the German reoccupation of the Rhineland, which is mentioned only casually because it was carried through by the *Büro Ribbentrop*, rather than by the foreign office. Furthermore, while a chronological presentation is not imperative, it is somewhat disconcerting to find the Mosul question (1925) and the Geneva Protocol (1924) taken up, in that order, before the struggle with

Germany over reparations from 1919 to 1924 and the conflict with Turkey from 1918 to 1923.

The thesis of the book is relatively simple. Professional diplomatists are generally cautious, conservative and conventional; left to themselves, they would not have precipitated wars in Asia, Africa or Europe. Both Hitler and Mussolini, at least in their more adventurous ideas, were at first restrained or opposed by the career diplomatists, and perhaps the most valuable sections of the book are those showing how Ribbentrop and Ciano circumvented or got rid of the professionals who were afraid of war or the risk of war. The dictators, however, were not unique in by-passing foreign offices; Neville Chamberlain did the same thing, and Georges Bonnet paid little attention to his ambassadors.

The ambassadors generally emerge in pretty good stature from the microscopic examination of their activity. The Europeans, being professionals, reported objectively, the one exception being Sir Nevile Henderson. He seems to have been badly rattled, continually insisting that Hitler was a man of peace. He had to be reprimanded more than once for what he said to the Germans, and it is hard to understand why he was left at his post. That the reports of the ambassadors exercised much influence on policy is much less clear. The two Americans had one thing in common: they received much confidential information from the British and French governments. But whereas Bullitt wished the United States to play an active part in European politics, Kennedy deplored such a policy. President Roosevelt listened to both men, but the action he took—which was neither startling nor effective--was determined by the state of public opinion in the United States. By and large, ambassadors seem to have counted for very little.

Alexandria, Virginia BERNADOTTE E. SCHMITT

NAMIER, LEWIS, *In the Nazi Era*. New York: St. Martin's Press. 1952. Pp. 204.

In February 1951 the British Government decided to finance a History of Parliament and invited Sir Lewis Namier to participate in the project. He accepted and suspended his critical studies of contemporary affairs. The book *In the Nazi Era* appeared soon after the new assignment, as a companion volume to his *Diplomatic Prelude* and *Europe in Decay*. It closes, at least temporarily, the series of analytical contributions elucidating the second World War, its origin, course, and aftermath.

Twice in his life Professor Namier has found it advisable to leave his field of specialization to give time and attention to current problems. During the first World War he collaborated with R. W. Seton-Watson, Harold W. V. Temperley and other British scholars. There are in his bibliography a book on Germany and Eastern Europe and two pamphlets on Bohemia and the Czechoslovaks, not counting articles in the periodicals. When the war was over he compiled a chapter on the "Downfall of the Habsburg Monarchy" for vol. IV. of Temperley's *History of the Peace Conference in Paris*. Hitler's aggressive policy, and finally his decision to take up the sword interrupted Namier's painstaking studies of British constitutional history. The question of how the second war came about claimed once more his time and energy.

In the Nazi Era, the third installment of Sir Lewis' essays, has been presented in two parts, entitled "Men Who Served Hitler" and "Surrender to Danger."

They all have been devoted, directly or indirectly, to German policy under the Nazi ascendancy. They shed new light both on the high places in the government and on party conclaves.

Under the general title, "Men Who Served Hitler," come some of his aides who survived the *Götterdämmerung* and published, after 1945, accounts of their activities. Their books, when translated into English, aroused a good deal of attention and were accorded by thoughtless reviewers a far more favorable reception than was warranted, either by content or literary qualities. Sensing the dangers which might come from the readiness to let bygones be bygones and to forgive even deadly sins at the first manifestation of repentance, Sir Lewis scrutinized the available confessions to assess their value as historical documents. Moreover, he treats them as indicative of the mood prevailing among the pardoned diplomats and generals and among their audience. Sir Lewis has not been deflected from his search for truth by the strong trend toward revisionism, nor has he been blinded by the halo with which credulous people are willing to surround career diplomats and conquerors. His remarks are, therefore, not only witty but also incisive, and he seldom fails to come to the point by the shortest route. If it is necessary to take the monocle from the diplomat's eye and present him as an obedient tool of the Führer, he does so with a tactful but firm hand. His reviews of the books, *Moscow, Tokyo, London,* by Herbert von Dirksen, and *Memoirs,* published by Ernst von Weizsäcker, stand as perfect specimens of historical analysis. Hardly any other commentator on the recent developments destroys legends so effectively as Sir Lewis. One short sentence sufficed to give the true proportions to von Weizsäsker's inflated story of "his roaring at Ribbentropp at the Tempelhof airport" (p. 68)—"The noise of engines presumably offered an opportunity for roaring," says Sir Lewis calmly.

The second batch of essays, of broader scope, traces the road to Munich. Three of them originated in Sir Lewis' perusal of both German and British official papers. He consulted the *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945* (series D, vol. I & II) and *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939,* (series III, vol. I & II). The third of the essays, "The Makers of Munich," is undoubtedly the pièce de résistance. Although it touches only upon some aspects of the story, it helps to uncover the causes of Munich more convincingly than could a listing of all relevant facts. A sympathetic review of diplomatic memoirs from the pen of the French Ambassador, Robert Coulondre, who served successively in Moscow and in Berlin, closes the second section of Sir Lewis' book. Its readers are advised to give more than passing attention to a short appendix in which Sir Lewis crosses swords with one of the most prominent figures on the international stage around Munich, the French Foreign Minister, Georges Bonnet.

Compared with the large and thorough books which Sir Lewis has written on British constitutional history in the eighteenth century, the trio of collected essays on the background of the second World War stand like *parerga* of temporary appeal, or like products of intellectual curiosity emerging from the press without a solid basis, or with only vague contours. But precisely therein lies their value and usefulness for the less initiated students of modern history. Sir Lewis teaches us how to read romanticized memoirs or autobiographies, and leads us into the study of bulky volumes of documents. He seldom gives a mere description and his remarks are both brilliant and helpful.

Columbia University OTAKAR ODLOŽILÍK

LINDSAY, JACK and CORNFORTH, MAURICE, *Rumanian Summer*. London: Lawrence & Wishard, 1953. Pp. 152. 5 s. net.

Reliable information about the real situation in the countries behind the iron curtain is badly needed. Reading, however, the *Rumanian Summer* we soon became aware that this is not the book we wanted, because it is a standard product of the Communist propaganda machinery with which the world is flooded.

The co-authors—as privileged visitors invited by the "Rumanian Institute for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries" (properly a state agency)—spent only a few weeks in Rumania. And yet this relatively short time was sufficient for them to give a complete account of the historical development of the Rumanian Popular Republic, of its miraculous achievements in the field of political freedoms, science, art, education and social welfare, besides dedicating a special chapter to the monumental construction work of the Danube-Black Sea Canal.

How could they accomplish this? Simply because almost everything related in the book is not based on their own experience or observation. Out of a particularly naïve credulity, or perhaps determined by absolute party discipline, the authors took at face value all the information received from official sources and heard from representative spokesmen. No attempt to check the gathered material can be traced in the book and the result of such a comfortable method is that on almost every page one encounters mere reiterations and sometimes quotations of official presentations or slogans steadily paraphrased by the Communist press, like "The workers see their work as a noble deed in the cause of peace" (p. 38).

In this way facts appear distorted and historical events sometimes falsely presented. Here are only a few examples illustrating this statement. Attending the parade of liberation day (August 23), the authors identify the marching factory workers as "partisan groups" who rose in August 1944, though everybody knows that in 1944 the Antonescu régime was not broken down "by the uprising of the people," and that the industrial workers had no part whatsoever in the coup d'état. Likewise ill-founded is the story about "the revolt of 18 Rumanian divisions . . . . who turned their arms on Hitler . . . . " (p. 9).

The currency reform of 1947 and 1952 is shown as a great success which "strengthened the Lei" and "benefited the working people" (p. 67). The truth, however, is that both of these measures were desperate attempts to check inflation and that the complete failure of the reforms contributed greatly to the fall of the party bosses: Anna Pauker, Teohari Georgescu and Vasilie Luca.

Speaking about nationalization of Rumanian industry the authors tell us that former owners and stockholders have been compensated (p. 68), a statement entirely contrary to facts.

Trying to defend the régime against accusation of exaggerated exploitation of the workers, Mr. Lindsay pretends that "the increase on wages (??!) and productivity is not gained on the cost of physical and nervous exhaustion; it comes from intelligent simplifications and modifications."

Charmed by an excess of zeal in serving their hosts, Messrs. Lindsay and Cornforth present us Rumania as the "land of smiles" with only sunshine, without any clouds, without unsolved problems. But they overshoot the target and find it necessary to justify somehow the most unlikely presentation of a harassed country as a wonderland. According to the authors the explanation for the miracle is first of all that instead of the "impotent," "incapable," and "rotten" middle class, now

"the working people are in command" and devoted to the consolidation of the socialist state. Then, they say, the Rumanian planned economy "is a peace economy first and last dedicated to building a good life for the people." The socialist economy made "in so short a time such splendid advances and offered a plain object lesson as to the endless resources that are tapped as soon as the burden of capitalist profit is thrown off and the country's wealth goes to benefit the people who produce it." (p. 147-148).

These are well-known phrases from the Communist catechism which, however, have nothing to do with the gloomy reality prevailing in Rumania and other Communist-ruled countries as well.

Amherst, Massachusetts P. B. Steanu

Schwarz, Solomon M., *Labor in the Soviet Union*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1952. Pp. xviii, 364. $6.00.

Dr. Schwarz first describes the transformation of Russian workers from people-laboring-in-cities, whose hearts and pocketbooks are in the countryside, into a modern working class without rural ties. This process is all but completed in the Soviet Union.

He then briefly discusses the steps which the government has taken since 1930 to overcome the perennial problem of a shortage of industrial laborers. The principal measures have been recruitment of manpower from farms and the increased utilization of female and juvenile workers.

Next he considers the state's efforts to halt the flow of floating workers coming and going in a ceaseless search for better jobs. By 1930, each worker, on the average, changed jobs every eight months. The repressive policies designed to correct this turnover ended any free labor relations still existing in the U.S.S.R. in 1940 and reduced the worker to the status of a semi-serf.

Nearly half the volume is devoted to an analysis of wages and living standards. Real wages in the Soviet Union dropped precipitously from 1917 until 1921, when they began to rise slowly. By 1928 real wages slightly exceeded those existing in Russia during the last days of Tsarist rule. The Five Year Plans were inaugurated in 1928 and real wages had dropped 50% by 1932. They rose about 20% between 1935 and mid-1938. A new decline then set in and continued until 1946, when an upward movement started which had not ended in 1951—the point at which Schwarz terminates his analysis. In his view, the real wages of the average worker in the United States are more than seven times greater than those of a worker in the U.S.S.R.

Dr. Schwarz was active in the trade union movement in Tsarist Russia and was later a member of the Menshevik opposition to the Soviet régime until he was deported by the secret police in 1922. However, his book is not an anti-Bolshevik polemic. He evaluates factors other than real wages in his appraisal of labor's standard of living. Social insurance, public health services, education, housing, and hours and conditions of work are considered. His conclusion is the same in every case: in general, Soviet policies have sacrificed the security and welfare of wage and salary earners for maximum production.

Few books about any phase of life in the U.S.S.R. will satisfy the reader who seeks broad conclusions based on data which can successfully withstand all challenges. Most western students of Soviet economic life have challenged the level at which Schwarz puts the average wages of Soviet workers as being too low. Exception has been taken to the fact that his cost-of-living index includes only the prices of foodstuffs. It has been pointed out that in dealing with only "workers and employees" as "labor," he has neglected over one-half of the total Soviet labor force. Despite these criticisms, the reader will find that Dr. Schwarz has generally been cautious in his use of data.

Labor in the Soviet Union is stimulating reading, the plethora of statistics notwithstanding. It sheds new light on one of those proverbial badly lit corners.

Social Science Foundation
University of Denver C. Dale Fuller

Mason, Henry L., *The Purge of Dutch Quislings, Emergency Justice in the Netherlands.* The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1952. Pp. 199. $2.65.

In the Netherlands, as in one conquered area after another, including the Ukraine, the Nazi Germans initially uncovered a well of willingness to work with them. In Holland the well never completely ran dry. This study tells how the non-"Quisling" Dutch dealt with fellow citizens whose collaboration with the Germans exceeded the uncertain bounds of necessity. About 120,000-150,000 persons, one in seventy, were taken into the Liberation's dragnet in mass arrests, demanded by an angry and self-righteous public, during the fall of 1944 and the spring of 1945. Estates of 132,000 persons were seized by the Dutch government.

In January, 1946, 93,000 collaborators were held in 106 internment camps, often former German concentration camps, in which the lessons in inhumanity the Nazis had taught were now turned against them and their fellow travelers. Those accused of collaboration—artists, business men, judges, bureaucrats, newspapermen, workers, and undiscriminating wenches—were tried not by regular courts but by special tribunals, which dispensed wholesale justice—and frequently injustice—in a hurry. Reluctant to renew capital punishment, abandoned in 1873, the Dutch by December, 1950, had executed only thirty-six accused collaborators. But thousands had received lesser sentences and successful appeals were not common; "out of every 5 suspected Quislings in the Hague district, 3 received an out-of-court settlement, and 1 was tried by a Tribunal or Special Court. In 1 out of ever 5 cases no judicial action was taken . . . . " (p. 84).

A comparative analysis of de-Nazification procedures in all the countries freed from Hitler's hegemony in 1944-1945 would X-ray one of the most diseased areas of the social pathology of mid-century Europe. Perhaps only through such a study, through the knowledge that the phenomena of personally remembered acts of persecution and revenge transcended the local or even the national scene, can people who must live together in half a dozen countries of Europe acquire the broader vision and the mutual confidence which constitute necessary ingredients in the cement of society. This valuable study, which would have been improved by more mature stylistic treatment, is a pioneering one. A reading of it should lead post-war Germans in particular to see their own de-Nazification problems, complicated by foreign occupation, in a new, revealing, and broadening spirit.

Tulane University John L. Snell

RUNES, DAGOBERT D., *The Soviet Impact on Society*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1953. Pp. xiii, 202. $3.75.

Dr. Runes' study of *The Soviet Impact on Society* covers very much ground in just under two hundred pages. Of its four parts, the first is concerned with Marx and Marxism, the second—and the largest one—with the Soviet Union, the third with communist régimes in Hungary, Bavaria, and China, while the fourth, somewhat in the nature of a conclusion and a warning, discusses the "Red Front Against Democracy" and "Marxists Over America." The volume also contains an irrelevant *Forword* by Dr. Harry Elmer Barnes and an index.

The Soviet Impact on Society belongs to the brand of literature which has recently gained increasing, indeed overwhelming, popularity; namely it is another summary outline and interpretation of the Soviet system and of communism in general. Dr. Runes' book, however, was written in 1937 and published for the first time in 1953 without any addition or change. In spite of its age it is one of the most interesting studies of its kind, with a number of clear and solid virtues. To begin with, Dr. Runes has a rather accurate, if devastating, vision of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, he succeeds in integrating the different aspects of the Soviet régime into a very impressive total picture, and he fully recognizes the key importance of Marxist ideology in that picture. One is relieved to find no discussion of Russian national character in the text and no mention of Ivan the Terrible in the index. Dr. Runes' particular observations of the Soviet reality are usually interesting and at times brilliant, notably so on the subject of "Birobidjian, the World's Largest Ghetto" (pp. 125-127). His sustained attack on the Soviet Union is varied and pointed: he delights, for instance, in depicting how Marx's gloomy predictions about the future fate of the masses under capitalism proved to be true only for communist societies, or in comparing the Soviet and the Nazi systems (pp. 53-57). And his fundamental indictment of the U.S.S.R. is only too valid today as well as in 1937: "This is the great tragedy of the Socialist government in Russia. There is no regard for man. Men are shot for stealing a bag of flour. Men are shot for criticizing the leader of the proletariat. And men are shot, as in the Kirov case, for being entered in the notebook of alleged assassins" (p. 48).

Still, Dr. Runes' study is by no means an unqualified success. It is a pity, for instance, that this well-known student of philosophy has very little to say about Marxism and its appeal, beyond the statement that both are based on the principle of expropriation and thrive on hatred and greed. As a matter of fact, he concludes that "Mr. Marx's land of milk and honey is not much different from the utopias of the other social fantasts of his time. What makes all the difference in the world between Marx and, for example, Owen, Fourier, Proudhon or Bakunin, is Mr. Marx's blood red slogans of expropriation and extermination for those who possess property" (p.26). This last assertion appears to indicate both a gross oversimplification of the ideology of Marx and a basic ignorance of that of Bakunin.

Gross oversimplification occurs in many other connections as well, and it is accentuated by the doctrinaire and exasperated tone of the author. Thus on p. 77 Dr. Runes discusses the disposition of the "surplus value and profit" in the Soviet society and lists "the Rolls Royces imported from England and the Lincolns imported from America" for the party élite, but neglects to mention the industrialization of the country under the Five Year Plans. Red terror is discussed very prominently, as indeed it should be, but there is almost no mention of White terror. The author provides a provocative description of the communist reliance

on the poor and the destitute, but he virtually identifies that layer of society with the good-for-nothing, the shiftless and the criminal: a dubious practice, especially for countries with backward economies.

Dr. Runes' selection of evidence is at times strange. Whereas there is no discussion of forced labor camps, there is a repeated reference to the wives of Soviet workers being forced "into foul intimacy with sweating men ditch-diggers" (p. 18 and p. 121). Dr. Runes wrote his study as early as 1937 and although the main argument has stood the test of time remarkably well, the detail is usually highly impressionistic and often dated.

The Soviet Impact on Society is an interesting and in many ways a good book. One wishes, however, that it were better, especially because one is left with the impression that much improvement could be achieved for little additional effort.

State University of Iowa NICHOLAS V. RIASANOVSKY

TETENS, T. H., *Germany Plots With The Kremlin.* New York: Henry Schuman Inc., 1953. Pp. 294. $3.75.

> "In this book—'Germany Plots With The Kremlin'—I have assembled documents exposing the ominous situation which has developed out of our German policy. This policy is leading our people into a trap which has been carefully prepared by German planners. The very freedom and independence of America are at stake, as revealed by these documents."

Fortunately, these frightening words in Mr. Tetens' open letter to President Eisenhower, which serves as a foreword to his book, are not supported by evidence in the next 200 pages. There is a basic need for a balanced, dispassionate discussion of the German problem and all its ramifications. It is indeed unfortunate that the author does not squarely meet the problem to which it is directed.

We are all aware that if Western plans succeed, West Germany will become a sovereign power of considerable influence in Europe, as we are equally aware of the circumstances and the undeniably sound reasons behind such a policy. It is Mr. Tetens' thesis, however, that the West has been duped, that German Chancellor Adenauer is following a diabolical plan to first expand German power, then at the propitious moment make a deal with the Kremlin. In the international game of power politics no one would deny that such an eventuality is possible—given circumstances that are not presently foreshadowed—but Mr. Tetens offers no evidence that it is the present real objective of the Bonn government.

Most of the "evidence" cited for the grandiose plan are quotations from a segment of the German press, and the Circular Letter of the German Geo-Political Center in Madrid. The organization is undefined but presumably is composed of self-exiled German Nazis enamored of Haushofer's geopolitical theories and German *realpolitik*. Whatever tenuous connections individuals of the group have with members of the Bonn government, it most assuredly cannot be represented as official German thinking.

Another bit of "evidence" offered by Mr. Tetens is Adenauer's reaction on the occasion of the Soviet Union's March 1952 note to the Western powers offering a German peace treaty. The proposal is portrayed as the "German dream come true," and Adenauer's negative attitude toward it as proof of his desire for a more

opportune moment to negotiate with the USSR. This and subsequent Soviet proposals, however, have shown the realities of Soviet intentions and insincerity, clearly demonstrating that the Chancellor and the Western powers, rather than being intransigent, simply were not caught napping. Surely, Mr. Tetens realized this when he wrote his book.

In his open letter to President Eisenhower, the author claimed that if the book "opens the much needed debate on our German policy, it will have fulfilled its purpose." Perhaps the United States should re-examine its German policy, as all facets of foreign policy must be continually appraised. Mr. Tetens' book, however, is not likely to be the impetus for such a reappraisal. Indeed, if a debate were to be introduced on the basis of the "facts" presented in *Germany Plots With The Kremlin,* it would serve the purpose only of those who would weaken Western policy in Europe.

There is a German problem. Mr. Tetens might have served his purpose better if he had approached his subject, which often occasions quick tempers and snap judgment, with a scholarly objectivity.

Mexico City JOHN BARTÁK

SHORTER NOTICES

The second volume of *Acta Historica*, ed. E. Andics, published by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (Budapest, 1953) contains four studies of varying length. (1) E. Lederer, "The Tartar Invasion in Hungary (1241) and the international relations of the period" (in Russia). The theme is that Bela IV, King of Hungary, having found that the western rulers gave promises of help and did nothing about actually helping Hungary—that they even made alliances with the Golden Horde—, turned to David Romanovič of Volhynia. This alliance seemed to be disappointing, and it was only the resistance of the Russian people that broke up the Tartar horde. The West had betrayed Hungary, and the Russian people saved her. (2) Gy. Spiva, "L'alliance de Lajos Kossuth avec la gauche radicale et les masses populaires de la révolution bourgeoise de 1848-1849." (3) "Le 150e anniversaire de la naissance de Lajos Kossuth." (4) G. Majos, "The Role of the British and American Imperialists in the Stabilization of Horthy Fascism." This illuminating article begins: "Inspired by the victory of the Russian proletariat over tsarist rule, the peoples of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy smashed the second prison of the peoples, the second pillar of reaction—the Hapsburg Empire." It would be difficult to give an overall judgment as to the accuracy of the picture in conventional historical terms.

S.H.T.

Jokiel, Rudolf, ed., *Schlesische Reihe, Werkhefte der Eichendorff-Gilde.* Aschendorff: Paul Pattloch Verlag, 1948 ff.

Only five of these brochures have come into my hands. The latest (1953) lists six *Hefte* as already appeared and three as soon to appear. They vary in size from 38 to 94 pages. No. 2, *Das Bistum Breslau im Wandel der Jahrhunderte* (1948) by Prof. F. X. Seppell, is a rapid survey of the bishopric and its tribulations from the days of St. Adalbert (Sv. Vojtěch). Conditions improved when German colonists came into the country late in the twelfth century, and deteriorated when Hussite doctrines filtered across the mountains to revive under the Hapsburgs, then suffer great damage under Prussian control. The *Kulturkampf* dealt further cruel blows to the Catholic cause.

The third study, *Die Hl. Hediorf, Schlesien Landespatronin* (1948) by Anton Stowner is a winsome modern hagiobiography for devotional use. No. 4, *Die Missionierung des Osten und der Schlesier St. Hyazinth* (1948) by Joseph Gottschalk, is a brief study of the work of St. Hyacinth (d. 1257) to keep Silesian Christianity firmly bound to Rome. The convictions of the author are perhaps too obvious. He asserts that Bohemia was converted from Repusburg. The missionaries that pioneered in this task were of course Germans, or if by chance of Slavic blood and tongue, got their culture and their missionary impulse from the Germans. No. 6, *Eichendorff, Die Sendiny des Christlichen Ritters,* by Reinhold Schneider (1949) is the story of the life and thought of the early nineteenth century Silesian nobleman, poet and mystic (d. 1857) who was passionately dedicated to the cause of spreading German culture eastward. His ideal was the medieval German knight, noble and unsullied. Eichendorff seems to have been somewhat unhappy. No. 6, *Geschichte Schlesiens* (1913) by Ernst Bekman is the longest and perhaps the most significant of the *Reihe.* At times his enthusiasm for things German in an area where Slavic blood predominated leads him to make assertions which are difficult to accept. If one makes necessary allowances for the author's point of view, this is a useful short sketch.

S.H.T.

MARCINKOWSKI, KAROL, *The Crisis of the Polish-Swedish War 1655-1660.* Wilberforce, Ohio: Wilberforce University. Published by the author, 1951. Pp. 98. $1.00.

The tradition that the Swedish offensive against Poland in the first phase of the Northern Wars was turned back by the spirited defense of the Monastery of Częstochowa, led by Prior Augustin Kordecki, is old and almost universally accepted. Professor Marcinkowski had prepared, before 1939, a three volume study of this war, with particular attention to the responsibilty for the revival of Polish resistance after King John Casimir had given up and taken refuge in Silesia. Mr. Marcinkowski, basing his conclusion on all the known contemporary documents, contends that there is no justification for ascribing any credit whatsoever to Prior Kordecki and that this same prior was in fact a traitor to the Polish cause. He went to the camp of the Swedish king in October, 1655, and pledged him his loyalty. The real inspirer and organizer of Polish resistance was Stephen Czarniecki who headed stubborn resistance at Cracow which revived the spirit of the Poles in the rest of the *Rzcez pospolita.* It would appear that Kordecki's own story of his heroism was fortunate in its wide acceptance. Many of the documents upon which Mr. Marcinkowski bases his conclusions are now inaccessible and some have certainly been destroyed. Certainly this "noxious legend," as the author calls it, would appear to call for reexamination.

P.W.

HALAYCHUK, BOHDAN, *Natsiya ponevolena ale derzhavna: Ukrayins'ka vyzvol'na sprava z mizhnarodno-pravnoho punktu bachennya.* (A Nation Subjugated but Nevertheless a State: The Question of Ukrainian Liberation from the Standpoint of International Law.) Munich: Suchasna Ukrayina, 1953. *Mala Politychna Biblioteka,* No. 2. Pp. 97.

This booklet is largely a collection of newspaper articles written originally by the author for the Ukrainian newspaper "Suchasna Ukrayina," published in Munich, Germany. Munich has become since the last war, what Prague was in the period 1920 to 1939, the center of a group of refugee scholars, who under immense difficulties are attempting to keep alive the tradition of free Ukrainian scholarship.

The subject here discussed is not a new one, involving as it does the political concepts of state and of nation, a nationalist interpretation or view of history, and a belief that international organization must be based on the free association of self-conscious and self-governing groups.

There are times when the political observer wishes that the term "self-determination" had never been invented, as it adds confusion to the English language which already confounds the meanings of state and nation, law and right, right and want. However, behind the not-too-precise term has been a far-from-precise, but discernible, historical process, which in a rough fashion brought about for the English-speaking people some sort of political balance between the classes and interests within their community, some kind of regional division of power, some degree of common acceptance of social ideal, some considerable substitution for force in free discussion, free organization and free election, and a tolerably efficient defense organization which kept them from being pushed about too noticeably, too frequently or too harshly by other groups.

It ill behooves English-speaking people, who achieved the process and invented the term, to look down with impatience on other groups whose historical circumstances were, and are, less favorable, but who still aspire to achieve a similar type of freedom. The Ukrainians, who at a comparatively late date in the seventeenth and eighteenth century were brought under the control of Moscow, are among these groups.

The writer of this book argues for the distinctiveness of the Ukrainians as an historical and self-conscious group. He makes out a case for them in international law. At bottom Mr. Halaychuk's "right" is the now familiar one of mass majority.

No one minimizes the extraordinary difficulty and delicacy of Ukrainian affairs in the current international situation. The practical difficulties and interzonal differences might well furnish material for a much larger book. The author, however, concentrates on the theoretical side, and it is from this point of view that the book is worth reading.

University of Saskatchewan. GEORGE W. SIMPSON

KOMARNICKI, TYTUS, *Piłsudski a polityka wielkich mocarstw zachodnich.* London: Josef Piłsudski Institute, 1952. Pp. 80.

In this tightly argued and documented story of "Piłsudski and the policy of the great western powers," Mr. Komarnicki presents the power of the realities Piłsudski had to face when he returned from prison in Majdebury, traces the change in European orientations that supervened between Versailles and the advent of Hitler, and concludes that Munich was the natural consequence of these changes, that Jalta and Potsdam were in the same basic line and that therefore the present perilous situation is traceable to decisions of profound significance carelessly and casually made in the early 'twenties.

The significant conclusion which Mr. Komarnicki might have drawn, and has refrained, at least, from emphasizing, is that before Versailles the Western allies did not think through the implications of their own war aims and therefore, at the peace table, made political decisions whose results would accumulate over generations on bases of transitory political expediency. The other prong of Mr. Komarnicki's argument, explicative perhaps of the first, is that the policy of the Western powers toward Central Europe in general and Poland in particular, was only one of the factors in their policy toward Germany and Russia, whereas it might conceivably have been, profitably for the West, the reverse. He credits Piłsudski with perceiving the dangers to Poland in this Western policy from the first. He points out further that the Western powers once even considered seriously limiting armament for the small nations of Central Europe, so that, e. g., Poland with 25 million, would not attack and abuse Russia with 175 million. There is nothing to compare with the high sense of comedy with which some statesmen are so illustriously endowed.

T.

FREYMOND, JACQUES, *Lénine et l'impérialisme.* Lausanne: Librairie Payot, 1951. Pp. 133.

M. Jacques Freymond presents in this small volume the series of lectures on imperialism which he delivered at l'Institut Universitaire des Hautes Etudes à Genève. In particular, he is concerned with the thesis presented by Lenin in *Imperialism; The Highest Stage of Capitalism.*

Quite rightly, he begins with a review of the changing concepts of imperialism from the days of Rome and its doubtful successor the Holy Roman Empire, through the overseas expansion of modern Europe, to the socialist concepts preceding the First World War. By 1914, imperialism to the socialist was no longer Russian or British or French, but collectively "capitalistic"—an international phenomenon of the bourgeois class. Lenin's contribution was, of course, to advance the proposition that imperialism was the *last* stage of capitalism, both the manifestation and instrument of capitalist decay. He saw the war as evidence of the correctness of his

theories, and called upon the proletariat to strike the death blow by transforming the imperialist war into civil war.

Freymond takes exception both to the purely economic explanation of imperialism and to the conclusion that it represents capitalism's last gasp. His arguments and examples are well chosen, though in most cases familiar to readers aware of the other literature on the subject. The virtue of the volume is its simplicity of style and exposition. For this reason it should prove a useful handbook for those who wish a summing-up.

University of Colorado ROBERT P. BROWDER

DENNETT, RAYMOND AND KATHERINE D. DURANT (edd), *Documents on American Foreign Relations.* Volume XIII. 1951. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1953. Pp. xxix, 626. $7.50.

This volume, like its predecessors, will be of great value to all who are interested in American foreign policy. In its documentary coverage of the multifold activities of the United States in world affairs during 1951, it clearly reflects the new responsibilities and concerns which have been thrust upon the nation since World War II.

The Great Debate over troops for Europe, the recall of General MacArthur and the diplomacy of the Korean War, the Mutual Security Program, the Schuman Plan, military and economic assistance, the United Nations, NATO, problems of the governance of dependent areas, international trade and finance, labor and social problems, cultural relations, the administration of the Deparment of State, Point Four, and relations with individual countries and areas are all included. The selection of materials is designed to illustrate the salient issues and decisions as lucidly as is possible in such a collection. In this task the editors have been eminently successful. Particularly striking is the impression received by the reader of Soviet Communism's far-flung ramifications in almost every aspect of American foreign policy.

P.B.

CZARNOMSKI, F. B., *Can Russia Survive?* New York: Philosophical Library, 1953. Pp. 128. $2.75.

Mr. Czarnomski is bitter about everything that is happening in the Soviet Union and proudly claims to be "utterly biased against tyranny and oppression." He is critical of the naïve liberals and democratic press in the free world which have fallen into the trap of Soviet propaganda, and yet, worse, which use the double standard of judgment to excuse the Soviet methods they would never accept in the West. His thesis is that the Soviet Union is internally weak, its weaknesses generating from the limited capacities of the Russian land and consequences of the Soviet tyranny. Relying on many eye-witnesses who have visited Russia as journalists and as officials, he sees corroding conflicts among the many nationalists of the Soviet Union; unrest emanating from appalling housing conditions, tortures in labor camps, dreadfulness of the worker's life, suppression of religion, twisting of sciences and culture, chaos and failure in planning production. "Russia is consuming her own substance," is Mr. Czarnomski's conclusion. Though she is unable to wage and win a major war the danger is here, and the only hope lies in a political counter-offensive of the free world, including the formation of a Free Russian government composed of respectable refugees.

Though many students of the Soviet Union would not dispute Mr. Czarnomski's description of the life in the Soviet Union, some of them would disagree with his conclusions and recommendations.

University of Denver JOSEF KORBEL

FEIERABEND, LADISLAV, *Agricultural Cooperatives in Czechoslovakia*. New York: Mid-European Studies Center, 1952. Pp. 125.

The modern cooperative movement has found congenial soil in Czechoslovakia. Dr. Feierabend was actively associated with it for many years before Munich, and, from 1945 to 1948, was a witness to the destruction of the whole structure by the Communists who believe in another sort of cooperation.

This pamphlet is a documented and objective study of the cooperatives in Czechoslovakia which set out to describe precisely why and how they functioned, and what their contribution to the solid progress of the less fortunate classes, e.g., in Ruthenia, and in the Magyar parts of Slovakia. The cooperative movement began in 1890, and in Moravia in 1893, the fruition of the pioneering thought and propaganda of F. C. Kampelik, a country doctor. Their spread thereafter was rapid, both in number and territory covered, but in the area of agricultural life to which the principle was applied, credit, warehousing, marketing and processing. The post-1918 period was the most fruitful, with government encouragement, and voluntary federation of the separate classes of cooperatives brought even greater benefits to the farming areas. The system of repression imported by the Germans in 1939 was adopted and improved upon by the Communists from 1945 onwards, and the movement has now been completely destroyed. The lessons of its growth and efficiency, however, are clear.

T.

RECENT PERIODICAL LITERATURE

GENERAL

Armstrong, H. F., "The Grand Alliance Hesitates," *For. Aff.*, October 1953, 48-67.
Bala, Mirza, "The Crimean War of 1853-56 and the Caucasian Question," *United Caucasus*, August 1953, 7-11.
Brodie, Bernard, "Nuclear Weapons: Strategic or Tactical?" *For Aff.*, January 1954, 217-229.
Catlin, George, "Propaganda and the Cold War," *The Yale Rev.*, Autumn 1953, 103-116.
Červinka, František, "Blanquismus a I. Internacionála," *Československý Časopis Historický*, Ročník 1, 164-182.
"La Conférence de Washington (10-14 juillet 1953)," *Chron. de Polit. Étr.*, September 1953, 595-624.
Conze, Werner, "Die Strukturkrise des östlichen Mitteleuropas vor und nach 1919," *Vierteljahrsheft f. Zeitgeschichte*, October 1953, 319-338.
Davletbey, M., "Collectivisation in Non-Russian Regions," *United Caucasus*, August 1953, 11-16.
Freund, Michael, "Der Alptraum der Bündnisse," *Aussenpolitik*, September 1953, 549-560.
Gruenther, Gen'l. A. M., "NATO Facing Harder Test," *Freedom & Union*, October 1953. 5-8.
Guiton, R. J., "Die Französische Union und die Europäische Einigung," *Europa Archiv*, November 20, 1953, 6095-6100.
Héraud, Guy, "Chronique constitutionnelle européenne: Nature juridique de la communauté européenne d'après le projet de statut du 10 mars 1953," *Rev. du Droit Public et de la Science Polit. en France et à l'Étranger*, July-Sept. 1953, 581-607.
Hildebrand, G. H., "Das Zukunftsideal der marxistischen Ideologie," *Schweizer Monatshefte*, September 1953, 321-331.
Hodza, Milan, "On Regional Federalism," *Monthly Bull. of the Intern. Peasant Union*, Sept.-Nov., 1953, 15-16.
Hoeffding, Oleg, "East-West Trade Possibilities: An Appraisal of the Moscow Economic Conference," *Amer. Slavic & E. Eur. Rev.*, October 1953, 350-360.
Holborn, Hajo, "American Foreign Policy and European Integration," *World Politics*, October 1953, 1-30.
Jasieńczyk, Janusz, "Agitować czy propagować," *Kultura*, Paźd.-Oct. 1953, 15-38.
Kemény, George, "Eastern Europe: Developments in Social and Economic Structure," *World Politics*, October 1953, 67-83.
Kief, Fritz, "The Tasks of an Active Peace Movement," *Rev. of Intern. Aff.*, October 16, 1953, 14-16.
Kloss, Heinz, "Das Recht der nichtabendländischen Völker auf nationale Eigenständigkeit," *Zft. f. Geopolitik*, October 1953, 513-516.
Kruls, H. J., "Die Europa-Armee. Ein ungelöstes Problem," *Schweizer Monatshefte*, November 1953, 449-457.
Küntzel, Ulrich, "Europa-freier Zusammenschluss oder Rheinbund?" *Zft. f. Geopolitik*, November 1953, 577-581.
Kveder, Lt.-Gen. Dushan, "'Territorial War': The New Concept of Resistance," *For Aff.*, October 1953, 91-108.
Librach, Jan., "'Little Europe'," *The Eastern Qy.*, Jan.-April 1953, 8-15.
Listowel, Judith, "There is a Change," *E. Eur. & Soviet Russia*, November 19, 1953, 6-8.
Matl, Josef, "Okzidentale oder eurasische Auffassung der slawischen Geschichte?" *Saeculum*, IV/3 1953, 288-312.
Münster, H. A., "Das Anzeigenwesen in der Planwirtschaft Osteuropas," *Osteuropa*, August 1953, 264-268.
Orel, Harold, "The Forgotten Ambassadors: Russian Fiction in Victorian England," *Amer. Slavic & E. Eur. Rev.*, October 1953, 371-378.
Ornstein, Jacob, "Facilities and Activities of the Library of Congress in the Slavic and East European Field," *Amer. Slavic & E. Eur. Rev.*, December 1953, 549-554.
P., "Middle Ground between America and Russia: An Indian View," *For. Aff.*, January 1954, 259-269.
Pachydermus, "Cold War Shivers," *E. Eur. & Soviet Russia*, November 19, 1953, 1-4.
Padev, Michael, "Democratic Katyn," *E. Eur. & Soviet Russia*, October 15, 1953, 6-9.

"The Peace Treaty and its Consequences," *Italian Aff.*, November 1953, 92-105.
Rosdolsky, R., "Das 'Kapital im allgemeinen' und die 'Vielen Kapitalien'," *Kyklos*, Vol. VI, Fasc. II, 1953, 153-162.
Schanzlin, G. L., "Achtung vor der Vielfalt-nicht Beherrschung oder Teilung der Welt," *Zft. f. Geopolitik*, September 1953, 449-450.
Scheffer, Paul, "Das Thema der Atombomben," *Aussenpolitik*, November 1953, 694-703.
Serech, Jurij, "Zachód jest Zachodem—Wschód jest Wschodem," *Kultura*, List.-Nov. 1953, 9-23.
Sharp, S. L., "Political and Economic Aspects of the Eastern European Communist Bloc," *Proceedings of the 28th Inst. of the Norman Wait Harris Mem. Found. (1952): The World Influence of Communism*, 89-121.
Simeon, Julius, "Die 'Endeckung' des Verbrauchers (Industrie)," *Osteuropa*, October 1953, 366-369.
Soloveitchik, Samson, "International Law as 'Instrument of Politics'," *Univ. of Kansas City Law Rev.*, Summer 1953, 169-183.
Studnitz, H. G. v., "Spiel mit der Geschichte," *Aussenpolitik*, November 1953, 716-726.
Thornton-Kemsley, Colin, "A Central European Freedom Force," *The Eastern Qy.*, Jan-April 1953, 2-7.
Tomas, Ivan, "Velika Britanija u funckciji nove Europe," *Hrvatska Revija*, rujan-sept. 1953, 277-291.
White, T. H., "France: Politicians, Pressure Groups, and a New Face." *The Reporter*, December 22, 1953, 18-21.
Zarzewski, Stanisław, "Fetysze i fikcje emigracji," *Kultura*, Wrzesień-Sept. 1953, 3-22.

THE BALTIC

Audenas, Juozas, "Life in one Soviet-Enslaved Country," *Monthly Bull. of the Intern. Peasant Union*, Sept.-Nov. 1953, 11-15.
Heymann, Egon, "Eine schwedische Industriestadt—Katrineholm," *Zft. f. Geopolitik*, November 1953, 582-589.
Scott, F. D., "Swedish Trade with America in 1820: A Letter of Advice from Baron Axel Klinkowström," *Jl. of Mod. Hist.*, December 1953, 407-414.
Teal, J. J., Jr., "The Rebirth of North Norway," *For. Aff.*, October 1953, 123-134.
Von Knorre, Werner, "Die Handelsbeziehungen der skandinavischen Länder zu Ost-Mitteleuropa nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg," *Zft. f. Ostforschung*, 2, 1953, 321-329.
Weiss, Helmuth, "Änderungen in Verwaltung und Personalbestand (Estland)," *Osteuropa*, August 1953, 291-293.
Wittram, Reinhard, "Patkul und der Ausbruch der Nordischen Krieges," *Nachrichten der Akad. der Wissenschaften in Göttingen, I. Philol.-Hist. Klasse*, 1952, Nr. 9, 201-232.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Alex, "K Životní Úrovni v ČSR," *Skutečnost*, October 1953, 123-128.
Cizevsky, Dmitry, "The Slovak Collection of the Harvard College Library," *Harvard Library Bull.*, Autumn 1953, 299-311.
G. L., "New Policy in Czechoslovakia," *The World Today*, October 1953, 439-449.
Graus, Fr., "Pokus o periodisaci českých dějin v období feudalismu I," *Československý Časopis Historický*, Ročník 1, 202-213.
Grébert, Arvéd, "Was Czecho-Slovakia a Democracy?" *Slovakia*, September 1953, 1-12.
Hájek, H. J., "Mládež za Komunismu," *Skutečnost*, Září-Říjen, 1953, 119-123.
Holotík, L'., "K periodizácii slovenských dějin v období feudalizmu a kapitalizmu," *Československý Časopis Historický*, Ročník 1, 213-233.
Kopecky, R., "The Political Exiles from Czecho-Slovakia and their Problems," *The Eastern Qy.*, Jan.-April 1953, 16-23.
Křížek, Jurij, "Za novodobou československou archaeografii," *Československý Časopis Historický*, Ročník 1, 154-164.
Rudnytsky, I. L., "Zadržení či Osvobození?" *Skutečnost*, Září-Říjen 1953, 129-134.
Sidor, Karol, "Dr. Hubert Ripka's Version of the Communist 'Putsch' in Czecho-Slovakia," *Slovakia*, September 1953, 32-60.
"La Situation en Tchécoslovaquie," *Chron. de Polit. Étrangère*, September 1953, 641-650.

Urban, Rudolf, "Aussenpolitik, Innenpolitik, Industrie, Landwirtschaft, Kultur- und Kirchenpolitik, Minderheitenpolitik (Tschechoslowakei)," *Osteuropa,* August 1953, 293-300.

Urban, Rudolf, "Die Strukturwandlung der tschechoslowakischen Landwirtschaft seit 1945 (Teil II)," *Zft f. Ostforschung,* 2, 1953, 388-398.

Urban, Rudolf, "Verwaltungskarte der heutigen Tschechoslowakei (mit einer Karte)," *Zft. f. Ostforschung,* 2, 1953, 398-400.

DANUBIA

B. C., "Funzione dell'Albania nella Politica Balcanica," *Rel. Intern.,* 5 Settembre 1953, 840-841.

Baerlein, Henry, "How Greece is Meeting New Housing Problems," *Gt. Britain & the East,* November 1953, 27ff.

Eliade, Mircea, "Dos Tradiciones Culturales y la Situación Actual de la Cultura Rumana," *Oriente,* July-Sept. 1953, 213-218.

Enescu, M. F., "Misión de la Emigración Rumana," *Oriente,* July-Sept. 1953, 231-239.

I. D. C.—Coterlan, "Los Principios del Cristianismo Rumano," *Oriente,* July-Sept. 1953, 179-185.

Koch, Hans, "Sofia—ein neues Patriarchat der Ostkirche (Bulgarien)," *Osteuropa,* October 1953, 383-386.

Mircea, P. A., "La Situación Actual de la Iglesia en Rumania," *Oriente,* July-Sept. 1953, 219-230.

Nagy, I., "La nouvelle politique hongroise," *Cahiers Intern.,* Sept.-Oct. 1953, 79-86.

Padev, Michael, "Who Killed King Boris," *E. Eur. & Soviet Russia,* September 24, 1953, 7-10.

Papahadjis, G. M., "Chronique administrative étrangère: Grèce. L'institution du conflit positif d'attributions et la mission du Préfet hellène," *Rev. du Droit Public et de la Science Polit. en France et a l'Étranger,* July-Sept. 1953, 608-614.

Raditsa, Bogdan, "The One-and-a-Half Party System in Greece," *The Reporter,* December 8, 1953, 34-37.

Stamatu, Horia, "El Aspecto Cristiano del Pensamiento Político Rumano," *Oriente,* July-Sept. 1953, 205-211.

"La Situation en Hongrie," *Chron. de Polit. Étrangère,* September 1953, 650-658.

Schepky, E. C., "Presse und Propaganda (Bulgarien)," *Osteuropa,* October 1953, 386-389.

Suret-Canale, J., "L'agriculture roumaine et les émigrés," *Cahiers Intern.,* November 1953, 85-94.

Uscatescu, George, "El Destino del Pueblo Rumano," *Oriente,* July-Sept. 1953, 197-204.

V. O., "La Visita di Papagos a Roma," *Rel Intern.,* 3 October 1953, 925-927.

Von Randa, Alexander, "Los Cantacucenos," *Oriente,* July-Sept. 1953, 187-196.

GERMANY, AUSTRIA, & SWITZERLAND

Abendroth, Wolfgang, "Die völkerrechtliche Situation Deutschlands," *Aussenpolitik,* October 1953, 645-657.

Arndt, H. J., "Reflections on the Impact of America on Germany," *Confluence,* September 1953, 82-94.

Assmann, Erwin, "Die Stettiner Bevölkerung des ersten Jahrhunderts nach der Stadtrechtsverleihung (1243-1352)," *Zft. f. Ostforschung,* 2, 1953, 230-263.

Borchers, Walter, "Pommersche Geschichte im Spiegel gewirkter Wandbehänge," *Zft. f. Ostforschung,* 2, 1953, 178-189.

Brecht, Arnold, "The German Army in Retrospect," *Social Research,* Autumn 1953, 358-365.

Bryans, J. L., "Zur britischen amtlichen Haltung gegenüber der deutschen Widerstandsbewegung," *Vierteljahrshefte f. Zeitgeschichte,* October 1953, 347-351.

Bussche, Axel von dem, "German Rearmament: Hopes and Fears," *For. Aff.,* October 1953, 68-79.

Bussmann, Walter, "Ein deutsch-französischer Verständigungsverzuch vom 6. Dezember 1938," *Nachrichten der Akad. der Wissenschaften in Göttingen, I. Philol.-Hist. Klasse,* 2, 1953, 47-77.

Cieślak, T., "Z dziejów prac kodyfikacyjnych w Niemczech imperialistycznych," *Przegląd Zachodni,* Kwiecień-Maj 1953, 520-525.

Dexter, Byron, "Locarno Again," *For. Aff.,* October 1953, 34-47.

Diestelkamp, Adolf, "Die Historische Kommission für Pommern," *Zft. f. Ostforschung*, 2, 1953, 281-285.

Duret, J., "Vers l'Europe allemande," *Cahiers Intern.* Sept.-Oct. 1953, 29-34.

Engel, Franz, "Erläuterungen zur historischen Siedlungsformenkarte Mecklenburgs und Pommerns," *Zft. f. Ostforschung*, 2, 1953, 208-230.

Evely, Richard, "Patterns of Consumption and Cooperative Trade. 6. The Federal Republic of Western Germany," *Rev. of Intern. Cooperation*, November 1953, 272-275.

"Les Événements de Berlin-Est des 16 et 17 Juin 1953," *Chron. de Polit. Étrangère*, September 1953, 635-640.

Forstreuter, Kurt, "Die Anfänge der Sprachstatistik in Preussen und ihre Ergebnisse zur Litauerfrage," *Zft. f. Ostforschung*, 2, 1953, 329-352.

Habicht, Max, "The Special Position of Switzerland in International Affairs," *Intern. Aff.*, October 1953, 457-463.

Hale, W. H., "Austria Learns How to be a Buffer State," *The Reporter*, December 22, 1953, 22-27.

Hęciak, Paweł, "Niemcy po Wyborach," *Myśl Polska*, 1 Października 1953, 5-7.

Hiscocks, Richard, "Austrian Prospects," *Intern. Jl.*, Autumn 1953, 240-248.

Holthusen, H. E., "The Zero Point: The Literary and Cultural Situation of Postwar Germany," *Confluence*, September 1953, 25-41.

Hostowiec, Paweł, "Istotne i nieistotne aspekty wyborów niemieckich," *Kultura*, Listopad-Nov. 1953, 43-48.

Hubatsch, Walther, "Der Kulminationspunkt der deutschen Marinepolitik im Jahre 1912," *Historische Zft.*, October 1953, 291-322.

Jacobi, Claus, "The New German Press," *For. Aff.*, January 1954, 323-330.

Kaehler, S. A., "Zur Beurteilung Ludendorffs im Sommer 1918," *Nachrichten der Akad. der Wissenschaften in Göttingen, I. Philol.-Hist. Klasse*, 1, 1953, 3-28.

Kamiński, A. J., "Zwrot ku postepowi w niemieckiej literaturze historycznej," *Przegląd Zachodni*, Kwiecień-Maj 1953, 473-497.

Klafkowski, A., "Podstawowe elementy międzynarodowo-prawne pozycji Niemiec po 8. V. 1945 Roku," *Przegląd Zachodni*, Kwiecień-Maj 1953, 397-433.

Koehl, R. L., "A Prelude to Hitler's Greater Germany," *The Amer. Hist. Rev.*, October 1953, 43-65.

Kostrzyński, Witold, "Niemcy Wschodnie," *Kultura*, Paźd.-Octobre 1953, 97-109.

Laufner, Richard, "Die deutschen Bistümer im Schicksal von Raum und Zeit," *Zft. f. Geopolitik*, September 1953, 457-464.

M. S., "Niemcy zachodnie wznawiają na szeroką skalę tzw. 'Ostforschung'," *Przegląd Zachodni*, Kwiecień-Maj 1953, 597-603.

Marlewski, Józef, "Wybory w Niemczech," *Kultura*, Paźd.-Octobre 1953, 94-97.

Morgenstern, Friedrich, "Hardenberg and the Emancipation of Franconian Jewry," *Jewish Soc. Studies*, July-Oct. 1953, 253-274.

Naganowski, Egon, "Wielkość Henryka Manna," *Przegląd Zachodni*, Kwiecień-Maj 1953, 571-590.

Neumark, Fritz, "Gedanken zur deutschen Steuerreform," *Schweizer Monatshefte*, November 1953, 457-465.

Nowak, K., "Rewolucja listopadowa w Niemczech," *Przegląd Zachodni*, Kwiecień-Maj 1953, 525-549.

Pakenham, Lord, "Mein Abschied von den Deutschen," *Aussenpolitik*, September 1953, 568-574.

Papke, Gerhard, "Pommern im deutschen Geschichtsbild," *Zft. f. Ostforschung*, 2, 1953, 161-178.

Piprek, J., "Jerzy Weerth, niemiecki pisarz marksistowski," *Przegląd Zachodni*, Kwiecień-Maj 1953, 550-570.

"Die Rede Himmlers vor den Gauleitern am 3. August 1944," *Vierteljahrshefte f. Zeitgeschichte*, October 1953, 357-394.

Rhode, Gotthold, "Die Deutschen im Osten nach 1945," *Zft. f. Ostforschung*, 2, 1953, 371-388.

Schaper, Edzard, "Wir Gefangenen," *Wort und Wahrheit*, September 1953, 673-681.

Schlesinger, Walter, "Herrschaft und Gefolgschaft in der Germanisch-Deutschen Verfassungsgeschichte," *Historische Zft.*, October 1953, 225-275.

Schürmann, Leo, "Noch eine Finanzvorlage," *Schweizer Monatshefte*, November 1953, 471-476.

Serwański, E., "Drogi rozwoju gospodarczego Niemieckiej Republiki Demokratycznej," *Przegląd Zachodni*, Kwiecień-Maj 1953, 498-520.
Silex, Karl, "Bericht aus Westdeutschland," *Schweizer Monatshefte*, December 1953, 544-547.
Silvain, René, "L'Allemagne a voté pour l'Europe," *Rev. Polit. et Parlementaire*, October 1953, 137-145.
Skalweit, Stephan, "Ranke und Bismarck," *Historische Zft.*, October 1953, 277-290.
Skubiszewski, K., "Uwagi o zagadnieniach prawa międzynarodowego w konstytucji Niemieckiej Republiki Demokratycznej," *Przegląd Zachodni*, Kwiecień-Maj 1953, 434-453.
Snell, J. L., "Socialist Unions and Socialist Patriotism in Germany, 1914-1918," *The Amer. Hist. Rev.*, October 1953, 66-76.
Sokolnicki, Michał, "Niemcy po Wielkiej Przegranej," *Kultura*, Listopad-Nov. 1953, 48-69.
Steiner-Jullien, J., "Les élections allemandes: une défaite de l'attentisme," *La Rev. Socialiste*, October 1953, 247-250.
Tamss, Friedrich, "Über die Abwanderung Jugendlicher aus ostpommerschen Dörfern," *Zft. f. Ostforschung*, 2, 1953, 263-275.
Taylor, Edmund, "RIAS: The Voice East Germany Believes," *The Reporter*, November 10, 1953, 28-32.
Tenenbaum, Joseph, "Auschwitz in Retrospect," *Jewish Soc. Studies*, July-October 1953, 203-236.
Von Irinyi, Eugen, "Stand der Österreich-Verhandlungen," *Aussenpolitik*, September 1953, 594-597.
Von Muralt, Leonhard, "Über Bismarcks Glauben," *Historische Zft.*, August 1953, 45-92.
Weinberg, G. L., "Der deutsche Entschluss zum Angriff auf die Sowjetunion," *Vierteljahrshefte f. Zeitgeschichte*, October 1953, 301-318.
Wiewióra, B., "Unowy graniczne między Polską a Niemiecką Republiką Demokratyszną," *Przegląd Zachodni*, Kwiecień-Maj 1953, 453-473.
Wilmot, Chester, "Die Rheinarmee und Europa," *Aussenpolitik*, November 1953, 712-716.
Wurzbacher, Gerhard, "Studien über den Wandel der sozialen und völkischen Struktur eines Landkreises im pommerschen-westpreussischen Grenzraum zwischen 1773 und 1937," *Zft. f. Ostforschung*, 2, 1953, 190-207.

ITALY & YUGOSLAVIA

B. C., "Il Commercio tra l'Italia e l'Europa Orientale," *Rel. Intern.*, September 19, 1953, 883-884.
Dilas, Milovan, "The Enigma without a Secret," *Rev. of Intern. Aff.*, September 1, 1953, 9-13.
Dordević, Jovan, "New Conceptions of the Status of Universities," *Rev. of Intern. Aff.*, September 1, 1953, 17-18.
"The Economic Ties between Italy and the Free Territory of Trieste," *Italian Aff.*, November 1953, 151-155.
Fenoaltea, G., "Le Parti Socialiste Italien et l'ouverture à gauche," *Cahiers Intern.*, Sept.-Oct. 1953, 87-91.
"Foreign Policy," *Italian Aff.*, September 1953, 9-29.
"Italian Vital Statistics," *Italian Aff.*, September 1953, 1-9.
"Italy's Rights and Yugoslav Violations," *Italian Aff.*, November 1953, 80-91.
Jovanović, Vojislav, "Signor Pella, too, does not know History," *Rev. of Intern. Aff.*, October 1, 1953, 9-10.
Listowel, Judith, "Freedom in Yugoslavia," *E. Eur. & Soviet Russia*, September 3, 1953, 1-4.
Listowel, Judith, "In Trieste we Fail," *E. Eur. & Soviet Russia*, November 12, 1953, 7-9.
"L'On. Pella propone un Plebiscito per Trieste," *Rel. Intern.*, September 19, 1953, 890-892.
La Palombara, J. G., "The Italian Election and the Problem of Representation," *The Amer. Polit. Science Rev.*, September 1953, 676-703.
Peregrinus, "Bericht aus Italien," *Schweizer Monatshefte*, December 1953, 547-550.
"The Problem of Trieste in the Immediate Post-war Years," *Italian Aff.*, November 1953, 1953, 74-80.
"Reconstruction of the Mercantile Marine," *Italian Aff.*, September 1953, 35-43.
"Reorganization of the Armed Forces," *Italian Aff.*, September 1953, 20-35.
Sterling, Claire, "The Mess in Trieste," *The Reporter*, November 10, 1953, 8-10.

Sterling, Claire, "Southern Italy: Land, Politics, and the Empty Belly." *The Reporter,* August 4, 1953, 17-20.
"Trieste up to the Time of the Treaty of Rapallo," *Italian Aff.,* November 1953, 65-74.
"The Tripartite Declaration," *Italian Aff.,* November 1953, 105-116.
V. O., "Il Problema di Trieste dal 1943 ad Oggi," *Rel. Intern.,* 17 October 1953, 987-989.
Vukota, Pero, "Opsjene i stvarnost," *Hrvatska Revija,* Sept. 1953, 298-314.

NEAR & MIDDLE EAST

Bączkowski, Włodzimierz, "Nowa Turcja," *Kultura,* Paźd.-Oct. 1953, 109-123.
Coate, W. A., "The Condition of Arab Refugees in Jordan," *Intern. Aff.,* October 1953, 449-556.
Erven, L., "Relations between Turkey and the USSR," *Rev. of Intern. Aff.,* October 1, 1953, 11-13.
Fischel, W. J., "The Newly Discovered Hebrew Bible Scrolls," *Idea and Experiment,* September 1953, 3-6.
Gherson, Randolph, "The Anglo-Egyptian Question," *The Middle East Jl.,* Autumn 1953, 456-483.
Grunwald, Kurt, "Israel is on the Way to Economic Stability," *Gt. Britian & The East,* November 1953, 13-16ff.
Hussein, Aziza, "The Role of Women in Social Reform in Islamic Countries," *The Middle East Jl.,* Autumn 1953, 440-450.
Inalcik, Halil, "Some Remarks on the Study of History in Islamic Countries," *The Middle East Jl.,* Autumn 1953, 451-455.
Jarblum, Marc, "L'État d'Israel vu par les Soviets," *La Rev. Socialiste,* November 1953, 400-410.
Levy, A., "The Development of Israel," *Gt. Britain & The East,* November 1953, 23-25.
Meissner, Frank, "Prospectives of Artificial Rain Enhancement in the Jordan Valley Development," *The Middle East Jl.,* Autumn 1953, 484-498.
Monroe, Elizabeth, "The Arab-Israel Frontier," *Intern. Aff.,* October 1953, 439-448.
O'Brien, C. B., "Russia and Turkey, 1677-1681: The Treaty of Bakhchisarai," *Russian Review,* October 1953, 259-269.
Patterson, Gardner, "Israel's Economic Problems," *For. Aff.,* January 1954, 310-322.
R. W. B., "Dr. Musaddiq and After," *The World Today,* October 1953, 421-428.
Sinogowitz, Bernhard, "Die byzantinische Rechtsgeschichte im Spiegel der Neuerscheinungen," *Saeculum,* IV/3, 1953, 313-333.
Sleppal, Fritz, "Die islamischen Monarchien," *Aussenpolitik,* October 1953, 663-672.
Smith, R. H., "Notes on the Kathiri State of Hadhramaut," *The Middle East Jl.,* Autumn 1953, 499-503.
Stahmer, A. M., "Erdölpartner Jemen," *Zft. f. Geopolitik,* November 1953, 615-616.
Weinryb, "The Lost Generation in Israel," *The Middle East Jl.,* Autumn 1953, 415-429.
Zarour, Mariam, "Ramallah: My Home Town," *The Middle East Jl.,* Autumn 1953, 430-439.

POLAND

Duker, A. G., "Leon Hollaenderski's Statement of Resignation; a Document of the Polish Great Emigration," *Jewish Soc. Studies,* July-Oct. 1953, 293-302.
Heike, Otto, "Die Erinnerungen des Grafen Szembek," *Aussenpolitik,* September 1953, 561-567.
Iranek-Osmecki, Kazimierz, "Przyczynki do Powstania Warszawskiego," *Kultura,* Listo.-Nov. 1953, 99-105.
Kamiński, A. J., "Republika na przełomie 1952/1953," *Przegląd Zachodni,* Kwiecień-Maj 1953, 629-635.
Levytsky, Orest, "Socinianism in Poland and South-West Rus'," *Annals of the Ukrainian Acad. of Arts & Sciences in the U.S.,* Spring-Summer 1953, 485-508.
Łodyński, M., "Z dziejów organizacji nauki w Polsce: Początki polskiej polityki bibliotecznej (1774-1794)," *Przegląd Zachodni,* Kwiecień-Maj 1953, 606-613.
Morley, Charles, "Czartoryski's Attempts at a New Foreign Policy under Alexander I," *Amer. Slavic & E. Eur. Rev.,* December 1953, 475-485.

A Polish Correspondent, "The Inner Truth," *E. Eur. & Soviet Russia,* October 8, 1953, 7-10.
Rojek, M. E., "Struktura Społeczna w Polsce," *Myśl Polska,* 1 września 1953, 5-8.
Suchocki, M., "Problematyka Ziem Odzyskanych w świetle pracy Józefa Stalina Ekonomiczne problemy socjalizmu w ZSRR," *Przegląd Zachodni,* Kwiecień-Maj 1953, 375-396.
Sukiennicki, W., "Soviet 'Elections' in Poland," *The Eastern Qy.,* Jan.-April 1953, 40-45.
Voellner, Heinz, "Landschaft und Geschichte zwischen Oder und Memel," *Zft. f. Geopolitik,* September 1953, 451-456.
Weintraub, Wiktor, "Alexander Fredro and his Anti-romantic Memoirs," *Amer. Slavic & E. Eur. Rev.,* December 1953, 535-548.
Z. W., "Elementy historii Polski w ujeciu Herder-Institut w Marburgu," *Przegląd Zachodni,* Kwiecień-Maj 1953, 603-605.

RUSSIA

Achminow, Hermann, "Die Oberschicht in der Sowjetunion," *Osteuropa,* August 1953, 243-250.
Achminow, Hermann, "Die Oberschicht in der Sowjetunion (II)," *Osteuropa,* October 1953, 339-347.
Albert, "Základní prvky ruské zahraniční politiky," *Skutečnost,* Červenec-Srpen, 1953, 93-97.
Americus, "The Russia First Movement in the United States," *Ukrainian Qy.,* Summer 1953, 206-213.
Ascher, Abraham. "The Kornilov Affair," *Russian Review,* October 1953, 235-253.
Bahrianyj, Ivan, "Is Revolution Possible in the U.S.S.R.?" *The Eastern Qy.,* Jan.-April 1953, 36-39.
Baron, S. H., "Plekhanov on Capitalism and Peasant Commune," *Amer. Slavic & E. Eur. Rev.,* December 1953, 463-474.
Bechtoldt, Heinrich, "Malenkow ohne Berija," *Wort und Wahrheit,* November 1953, 827-834.
Beloff, Max, "The Foundation of Soviet Foreign Policy," *Soviet Studies,* October 1953, 151-159.
Bleiber, "Afghanistan und die Sowjetunion," *Osteuropa,* October 1953, 322-331.
Buchholz, Arnold, "Kritik sowjetischer Biologen an Lyssenko," *Osteuropa,* August 1953, 251-256.
Caroe, Sir Olaf, "Soviet Colonialism in Central Asia," *For. Aff.,* October 1953, 135-144.
Contius, W. G., "Beziehungen zum Westen (Sowjetunion, Aussenpolitik)," *Osteuropa,* October 1953, 355-361.
Contius, W. G., "Der 17. Juni in der Sowjetpresse (Sowjetunion)," *Osteuropa,* August 1953, 269-277.
David, Luděk, "Soumrak Stalinismu," *Skutečnost,* Červenec-Srpen, 1953, 89-92.
Davletbey, M., "Organisation of Urban Horse Transport in the USSR," *United Caucasus,* September 1953, 15-19.
Deutscher, Isaac, "The Beria Affair," *Intern. Jl.,* Autumn 1953, 227-239.
Dirksen, Herbert v., "Moskau-Peking. Die Gegensätze in den chinesisch-sowjetischen Beziehungen," *Schweizer Monatshefte,* September 1953, 337-344.
Edgerton, W. B., "Leskov and Tolstoy: Two Literary Heretics," *Amer. Slavic & E. Eur. Rev.,* December 1953, 524-534.
Einaudi, Mario, "Europe after Stalin," *The Yale Rev.,* Autumn 1953, 24-36.
Gross, Rebecca, "Repercussions of a Visit to Moscow," *Nieman Reports,* October 1953, 12-17.
Guillebaud, Philomena, "The Role of Honorary Awards in the Soviet Economic System," *Amer. Slavic & E. Eur. Rev.,* December 1953, 486-505.
Guins, G. C., "The Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R.," *Russian Review,* October 1953, 269-279.
Holzman, F. D., "The Profit-Output Relationship of a Soviet Firm," *Canadian Jl. of Econ. & Polit. Science,* November 1953, 523-532.
Hulička, K., "Political Education in Soviet Schools," *Soviet Studies,* October 1953, 138-151.
Inkeles, Alex, "The Soviet Attack on the Voice of America: A Case Study in Propaganda Warfare," *Amer, Slavic & E. Eur. Rev.,* October 1953, 319-343.
Jagoditsch, Rudolf, "Leo Tolstoj im Urteil M. Gorkijs," *Wissenschaft und Weltbild,* November 1953, 334-337.

Jurczynski, Zbigniew, "Communist Slave Labor Exposed," *Monthly Bull. of the Intern. Peasant Union,* Sept.-Nov., 1953, 9-10.

K. M., "Südasien und die Sowjetwelt," *Osteuropa,* October 1953, 321.

Kafka, G. E., "Die Sowjetunion und Österreich (II)," *Osteuropa,* August 1953, 257-263.

Kavka, František, "J. V. Stalin a historická věda," *Československý Časopis Historický,* Ročník 1, 1953, 133-149.

Kolymsky, Peter, "On the Borders of Manchuria and the Pacific Shore," *Ukrainian Qy.,* Summer 1953, 268-274.

Koutaissoff, E., "Soviet Education and the New Man," *Soviet Studies,* October 1953, 103-138.

Kulski, W. W., "Class Stratifications in the Soviet Union," *For. Aff.,* October 1953, 145-153.

Lazitch, Branco, "Early Days of the Cominform," *The Eastern Qy.,* Jan.-April 1953, 46-51.

Leites, Nathan, "Stalin as an Intellectual," *World Politics,* October 1953, 45-66.

London, Isaac, "Days of Anxiety: A Chapter in the History of Soviet Jewry," *Jewish Soc. Studies,* July-October 1953, 275-292.

Maetzke, E. O., "Die Parteisprache in der Sowjet-zone," *Vierteljahrshefte f. Zeitgeschichte,* October 1953, 339-346.

Magalashvili, G., "Armenian-Georgian Relations," *United Caucasus,* October 1953, 10-21.

Manning, C. A., "The Disgrace of Beria," *Ukrainian Qy.,* Summer 1953, 236-242.

Mathewson, R. W., Jr., "The Soviet Hero and the Literary Heritage," *Amer. Slavic & E. Eur. Rev.,* December 1953, 506-523.

Mehnert, Klaus, "Deutschlandpolitik der Sowjets (Sowjetunion, Aussenpolitik)," *Osteuropa,* October 1953, 349-355.

Mehnert, Klaus, "Iran und UdSSR 1942-1953," *Osteuropa,* October 1953, 374-381.

Meissner, Boris, "Nach Stalins Tod; Der Sturz Berijas; Georgien (Sowjetunion, Innenpolitik)," *Osteuropa,* August 1953, 278-289.

Meissner, Boris, "Tagung des Obersten Sowjet (Innenpolitik)," *Osteuropa,* October 1953, 361-366.

Mikolajczyk, Stanislaw, "The Real Causes of the Breakdown of the Soviet Agricultural Production," *Monthly Bull. of the Intern. Peasant Union,* Sept.-Nov. 1953, 5-7.

Mosely, P. E., "The Kremlin's Foreign Policy Since Stalin," *For. Aff.,* October 1953, 20-33.

Mueller, Herbert, "Dairen und Port Arthur vor, auf und nach der Jalta-Konferenz," *Zft. f. Geopolitik,* October 1953, 541-545.

Nauruz, M., "Seducers of the Childish Soul," *United Caucasus,* September 1953, 24-28.

* * *, "Neglected Education of Caucasian Youth," *United Caucasus,* October 1953, 25-28.

Nove, A., "Rural Taxation in the USSR," *Soviet Studies,* October 1953, 159-166.

Orois, Dr., "Soviet International Policy," *United Caucasus,* October 1953, 4-7.

Pachydermus, "The Bulgarian Doctrine," *E. Eur. & Soviet Russia,* October 8, 1953, 1-4.

Pachydermus, "Nyet Tactics," *E. Eur. & Soviet Russia,* November 12, 1953, 1-3.

Riasanovsky, Nicholas, "Fourierism in Russia," *Amer. Slav. & E. Eur. Rev.,* October 1953, 289-303.

Rouslanov, N., "L'Ascension de Malenkov," *La Rev. Socialiste,* November 1953, 411-421.

Schiller, Otto, "Die Neue Landwirtschaftssteuer (Landwirtschaft)," *Osteuropa,* October 1953, 370-374.

Shub, David, "Kropotkin and Lenin," *Russian Review,* October 1953, 227-235.

Spuler, Bertold, "Zur Entwicklung der Orthodoxie," *Osteuropa,* August 1953, 300-305.

Strakhovsky, L. I., "The Historianism of Gogol," *Amer. Slavic & E. Eur. Rev.,* October 1953, 360-371.

Sweet, J. V., "The Problem of Nationalities in Soviet Asia," *Ukrainian Qy.,* Summer 1953, 229-236.

Timasheff, N. S., "Russian Penal Law: Imperial and Soviet," *Amer. Slavic & E. Eur. Rev.,* December 1953, 441-462.

Timoshenko, V. P., "Agriculture in the Soviet Spotlight," *For. Aff.,* January 1954, 244-258.

Timoshenko, V. P., "New Soviet Economic Plan: Its Agricultural Aspect," *The Jl. of Political Economics,* December 1953, 489-508.

Tokaev, G., "My Fatherland—the Caucasus," *United Caucasus,* September 1953, 4-11.

Vachnadze, D., "Emigré Movement for Caucasian Union," *United Caucasus,* August 1953, 3-6.

Wraga, Ryszard, "XIX Congress of C.P.S.U. (B)," *The Eastern Qy.,* Jan.-April 1953, 24-35.

THE UKRAINE

Borschak, Elie, "A Little Known French Biography of Yuras' Khmelnytsky," *The Annals of Arts & Sciences in the U.S.*, Spring-Summer 1953, 509-517.

Boyko, Yuriy, "The Voice of a Ukrainian Patriot," *Ukrainian Qy.*, Summer 1953, 263-268.

Chubaty, N. D., "The 700th Anniversary of the City of Lviv," *Ukrainian Qy.*, Summer 1953, 242-254.

Dobriansky, L. E., "The World Dilemma and How to Aggravate It," *Ukrainian Qy.*, Summer 1953, 254-263.

Ivanytsky, Borys, "Ukrainian Forestry," *Annals of the Ukrainian Acad. of Arts & Sciences in the U.S.*, Spring-Summer 1953, 553-570.

Kovaliv, Panteleymon, "Problems of the Ukrainian Literary Language," *Annals of Arts & Sciences in the U.S.*, Spring-Summer 1953, 571-583.

Müller, Karl, "Umvolkung und Sozialschichtung in der Slowakei (mit Diagrammen)," *Zft. f. Ostforschung*, 2, 1953, 400-424.

Nagurney, Michael, "The Bolshevik Freedom of Religion," *The Ukrainian Qy.*, Winter 1953, 62-63.

Pors'ky, Volodymyr, "New Soviet Literature on the Decembrists in the Ukraine," *Annals of the Ukrainian Acad. of Arts & Sciences in the U.S.*, Spring-Summer 1953, 584-587.

Prychodko, Nicholas, "The Famine in 1932-1933 in Ukraine," *Ukrainian Qy.*, Summer 1953, 213-217.

Rozhin, Ivan, "Animal Husbandry in Soviet Ukraine," *Ukrainian Qy.*, Summer 1953, 218-229.

Stachiw, Matthew, "*Thirty-Five Years of the Ukrainian Independence* (1918-1953)," *Ukrainian Qy.*, Winter 1953, 14-18.

Sturms, Eduard, "Das Problem der ethnischen Deutung der kaiserzeitlichen Gräberfelder in der Ukraine (mit einer Karte)," *Zft. f. Ostforschung*, 2, 1953, 424-432.

Zenkovsky, Serge, "A Century of Tatar Revival," *Amer. Slavic & E. Eur. Rev.*, October 1953, 303-319.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Albertini, Luigi, *The Origins of the War of 1914*, 2 v., New York, Oxford University Press, 1952, 1953, $9.00, $10.00.

Andrews, T. H., *The Polish National Catholic Church*, London, S.P.C.K., 1953, 12 s., 6 d.

Brandt, Karl, *Management of Agriculture and Food in the German-Occupied and Other Areas of Fortress Europe*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1953, $10.00.

Brashich, Ranko, M., *Taxation in Yugoslavia's Agriculture*, New York, Mid-European Studies Center, Mimeographed Series No. 4, 1953.

Bretton, Henry L., *Stresemann and the Revision of Versailles*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1953, $3.00.

I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani, (V. I, ser. 1 and 3; V. XII, ser. 8; V. XIII, ser.8), Rome, Ministero degli Affari Esteri, 1952, 1953.

Caroe, Olaf, *Soviet Empire*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1953, $5.00.

Flenley, Ralph, *Modern German History*, New York, E. P. Dutton, 1953, $6.00.

Görlitz, Walter, *Der Zweite Weltkrieg (1939-1945)*, 2 v., Stuttgart, Steingrüber, 1951, 1952.

Hantsch, Hugo, *Die Nationalitätenfrage im alten Österreich*, Wien, Herold Verlag, 1953, S 32.

Harkins, William E., *Anthology of Czech Literature*, New York, King's Crown Press, Columbia University, 1953, $3.50.

Hassman, Heinrich, *Oil in the Soviet Union*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1953, $3.75.

Hilger, Gustav and Alfred G. Meyer, *The Incompatible Allies*, New York, Macmillan Company, 1953, $5.00.

Hiscock, Richard, *The Rebirth of Austria*, New York, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1953, $3.50.

Janetschek, Ottokar, *The Emperor Franz Joseph*, London, Warner Laurie, 1953, 18 s.

Klimov, Gregory, *The Terror Machine*, New York, Praeger Press, 1953, $4.00.

Koren, Hanns, *Pflug und Arl*, Salzburg, Otto Müller, 1950.

Lukacs, John A., *The Great Powers and Eastern Europe*, New York, American Book Company, 1953, $7.50.

Lyons, Eugene, *Our Secret Allies, the Peoples of Russia*, New York, Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1953, $4.50.

Meyer, Peter, et al, *The Jews in the Soviet Satellites*, Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1953, $6.35.

Misch, Carl, *Deutsche Geschichte im Zeitalter der Massen*, Stuttgart, Kohlhammer, 1952, DM 19.80.

Moody, Joseph N., ed., *Church and Society, Catholic Social and Political Thought and Movements (1789-1950)*, New York, Arts, Inc., 1953, $12.00.

Örvik, Nils, *The Decline of Neutrality 1914-41*, Oslo, Tanum, 1953.

Raspi, Sergio, *Relazioni fra Piemonte e Corsica durante le guerra di successione d'Austria*, Udine, Tipografia Arti Grafiche Friulane, 1949, 350 frs.

Reichhold, Ludwig, *Europäische Arbeiterbewegung*, Frankfurt am Main, Josef Knecht, 1953, DM 12.

Scharp, Heinrich, *Abschied von Europa?*, Frankfurt am Main, Josef Knecht, 1953, DM 8.80.

Schnee, Heinrich, *Die Hoffinanz und der moderne Staat, Vol. I, Die Institution des Hoffaktorentums in Brandenburg-Preussen*, Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 1953, DM 22.

Seraphim, Peter-Heinz, *Das Genossenschaftswesen in Osteuropa*, Nenwied a Rh., Raiffeisen Druckerei, 1951, DM 7.90.

Smutný, Jaromír, *Unorový Převrat 1948, I.*, No. 12, London, Edvard Beneš Institute, 1953, 33 c.

Soviet Economic Policy in Postwar Germany, New York, Research Program on the USSR, 1953, $2.25.

Sternberg, Fritz, *The End of a Revolution: Soviet Russia—from Revolution to Reaction*, New York, John Day, 1953, $3.00.

Stránský, Jaroslav, *Odsun Němců z ČSR s Hlediska Národního i Mezinárodního*, Nos. 10, 11, London, Edvard Beneš Institute, 1953, 66 c.

Tadić, Jorjo, *Gradá o slikarskij Školi v Dubrovnika XIII-XVI Siec*, Belgrade, Srpska Akademiia Nauka, 1952.

Uustalu, Evald, *The History of the Estonian People*, London, Boreas, 1952, 21 s.

Venturi, Franco, *Il populismo russo*, 2 v., Turin, Einaudi, 1952, L. 1,000 the set.

Wandycz, Damian S., *Zapomniany List Piłsudskiego do Masaryka*, London, Gryf Printers, 1953.

Wheeler-Bennett, John W., *The Nemesis of Power, the German Army in Politics, 1918-1945*, New York, St. Martin's, 1953, $12.00.

Zaleski, Eugène, *Les Courants Commerciaux de l'Europe Danubienne*, 1952, 200 frs.